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Abstract 
Although self-generated thought (SGT i.e. cognition unrelated to the here and now) 
has traditionally been considered as a homogeneous phenomenon, recent findings 
challenge this assumption by showing that SGT can have both costs and benefits, and that 
SGT can be linked to both executive control and executive failure. To gain insight into 
these discrepancies, this PhD tested the hypothesis that SGT is a heterogeneous 
phenomenon and examined whether the content of the thoughts is one factor underlying 
the heterogeneities observed. By taking into account the temporal, social and emotional 
dimensions of SGT content, we were able to systematically identify distinct types of 
thoughts. In addition, we observed that these different SGT types can have heterogeneous 
functional outcomes (for example, in terms of their relation to task performance or to 
measures of self-concept). We also found that these SGT types can have different 
phenomenological properties, suggesting that heterogeneous cognitive correlates are 
recruited during the generation of distinct types of thoughts. Finally, we demonstrated that 
the neural substrates of SGT (as assessed using resting state fMRI) varied according to 
individual differences in thought content. Altogether, the empirical findings described in 
the current thesis strongly support the hypothesis that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon 
and highlight that taking into account SGT content allows a better understanding of the 
neurocognitive underpinnings supporting this subjective experience. 
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Chapter 1.  
General Introduction  
1.1 Self-generated thought as a heterogeneous phenomenon  
Individuals can generate mental experiences based on previously acquired 
knowledge rather than current environmental input. These self-generated thoughts (SGT, 
often described as mind-wandering or day-dreaming) allow individuals to escape the here 
and now, by simulating future events, remembering the past or imagining someone else’s 
thoughts (Smallwood, 2013; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). The current thesis aims to gain 
a better understanding of the neurocognitive processes supporting SGT.  
1.1.1 SGT as a homogeneous experience  
Because SGT allows individuals to process information that is independent from 
the immediate environment, research on SGT has usually emphasised a dichotomy 
between SGT and perceptually-guided thoughts (PGT). This dichotomy is apparent in the 
terms that have been used to label the two types of cognitions e.g. task-unrelated vs. task-
related thought (Barron, Riby, Greer, & Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood, Obonsawin, & 
Heim, 2003), stimulus-independent vs. stimulus-dependent thought (Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011; Teasdale et al., 1995), or internally vs. 
externally-guided cognition (Smallwood et al., 2012). This dichotomy is also reflected by 
the methodological approaches employed to measure SGT. For example, probing methods 
used to assess SGT and PGT usually consist of questions such as “are you thoughts 
focused on the task, or on something else?” (Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013). In 
addition, SGT is commonly measured while participants perform complex tasks during 
which SGT occurrence leads to deleterious effects on their performance (Kane et al., 2007; 
McVay & Kane, 2012; Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davies, 2006; Smallwood, 2011; 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). Taken together, both the labels and the methods 
employed focus on SGT as a mental experience unrelated to the here and now. As a 
consequence, these approaches have led to a simplified characterisation of SGT and to the 
assumption that SGT is a homogeneous phenomenon. Yet, evidence in the literature 
challenges this supposition. 
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1.1.2 Inconsistencies in the literature 
1.1.2.1 Costs and benefits of SGT  
Recent reviews illustrate the substantial body of evidence showing that SGT is 
associated with both negative and positive functional outcomes (Mooneyham & Schooler, 
2013; Ottaviani & Couyoumdjian, 2013; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Negative 
consequences are commonly observed when SGT occurs during complex tasks. Under 
laboratory conditions, SGT has been associated with reduced comprehension and increased 
reading durations during reading tasks (Smallwood, 2011). In tasks requiring sustained 
attention, SGT has been linked to absent-minded errors, cognitive failure and reduced 
attentional processing of external stimuli (e.g. Kane & McVay, 2012; McVay, Kane, & 
Kwapil, 2009). Evidence also suggests that it is associated with poor measures of fluid 
intelligence and reduced working memory capacity (WMC, Mrazek et al., 2012). In daily 
life, SGT has been involved in automobile accidents (He, Becic, Lee, & McCarley, 2011; 
Yanko & Spalek, 2013) and reduced learning outcomes (Lindquist & McLean, 2011; 
Szpunar, Khan, & Schacter, 2013). Finally, SGT has also been linked to negative mood, 
with some studies finding a causal negative effect of SGT (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010) 
and others reporting increases in SGT during dysphoria (Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, 
& Obonsawin, 2007) or following negative mood inductions (Smallwood, Fitzgerald, 
Miles, & Phillips, 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). 
Despite the large body of evidence supporting the view that SGT is linked to 
negative functional outcomes, other studies also report an increasing number of benefits. 
SGT has been linked to more patient choices during inter-temporal discounting tasks 
(Smallwood, Ruby, et al., 2013), increased performance in tasks requiring creative problem 
solving (Baird et al., 2012) as well as mnemonic advantages and increased likelihood of 
enacting goals (Mason & Reinholtz, 2015). SGT also supports emotion regulation (Poerio, 
Totterdell, Emerson, & Miles, 2015) and pain regulation (Kucyi, Salomons, & Davis, 
2013). Taken together, these studies suggest that tendencies to generate SGT may also be 
beneficial. The observation that SGT can be both advantageous and deleterious is therefore 
inconsistent with the assumption that SGT is a homogeneous phenomenon.  
1.1.2.2 Role of executive functions in SGT 
In addition to findings highlighting the positive and negative outcomes of SGT, 
another discrepancy in the literature relates to the role of executive functions in SGT. 
Studies investigating SGT under constraining conditions (e.g. during a complex task) have 
shown that its occurrence is associated with poor executive processes, for example reduced 
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WMC (Kane et al., 2007; McVay et al., 2009; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012). Based on 
these findings, the executive failure model proposed by Kane & McVay (2012) affirms that 
SGT occurs due to a failure of the executive system in either maintaining the pursuit of an 
ongoing goal (such as correctly performing the task at hand), or effectively inhibiting the 
generation of a mind-wandering episode. However, other studies have reported data 
contradicting the executive failure model. Levinson and colleagues found that participants 
with higher WMC experienced SGT more frequently when performing non-demanding 
tasks (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). Similarly, Rummel & Boywitt (2014) 
reported that individuals with larger WMC were better able to regulate the occurrence of 
SGT according to the demands of the external environment i.e. SGT was reduced when 
performing a demanding task but increased during non-demanding situations. Using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Christoff and colleagues also showed that 
regions supporting executive processes were activated during mind-wandering (Christoff, 
Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009). Altogether, these data illustrate the 
executive control hypothesis which states that executive functions actively support SGT 
(Barron et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2013a).  
In summary, data in favour of both the executive failure and the executive control 
hypothesis suggest that SGT can be associated with better and worse executive processes. 
These findings as well as the observation that SGT can have both costs and benefits are 
therefore inconsistent with the assumption that SGT is homogeneous and highlight the 
need for developing an alternative model that is able to explain these conflicting results. In 
the current thesis, we propose to take into account SGT characteristics (e.g. the content of 
the thoughts and the context in which they are generated) to gain a better understanding of 
the contrasting findings described in the literature.   
1.1.3 SGT as a heterogeneous phenomenon  
The current PhD aims to resolve the inconsistencies reported in the literature by 
considering SGT as a heterogeneous experience. We will test the hypothesis that SGT 
consists of different types of thoughts, and that each type can possess a specific set of 
functional outcomes. For example, one type of SGT may be associated with poor executive 
functions whereas another may be linked to improved abilities. Considering the existence 
of separate types of SGT therefore provides a potential explanation for the inconsistent 
findings reported in the literature. In addition to describing how the complex properties of 
SGT may emerge, the PhD also attempts to show that a better characterisation of the 
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cognitive and neural processes supporting SGT can be obtained by taking into account its 
heterogeneity.  
1.2 Theoretical framework  
Considering SGT as a heterogeneous phenomenon requires an explanation for i) the 
potential factors involved in SGT heterogeneities and ii) an outline of the mechanism 
underlying SGT heterogeneities. First, we propose that both the content of the thoughts and 
the context in which they occur may lead to SGT heterogeneities (Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Second, we propose to use the component 
process hypothesis as a theoretical framework to clarify how SGT heterogeneities may 
emerge. The component process hypothesis states that specific cognitive and neural 
components are selected according to the specific requirement of the SGT experienced, 
therefore allowing SGT to possess heterogeneous properties (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, 
& Spreng, 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; 
Smallwood, 2013a).  
1.2.1 Factors involved in SGT heterogeneity  
1.2.1.1 Content of SGT 
Several independent research groups have demonstrated that individuals tend to 
generate thoughts that are directed towards the future rather than the past (Baird, 
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 
2009; Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011). In addition to occurring more frequently, future thinking also involves goal-
directed cognition (Baird et al., 2011; Cole & Berntsen, 2015; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011) and is linked with self-referential processes (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 
2011). Altogether, this suggests that future-focused SGT, but not past-focused SGT, is 
related to autobiographical planning. Studies also highlight that the relation between SGT 
and well-being depends on SGT content. For example, past but not future SGT is linked to 
depressive symptoms (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 
2011). In addition, increases in mood levels are observed following the generation of 
thoughts focused on the future (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013), on interesting 
matters (Franklin et al., 2013) and on significant others (Poerio et al., 2015). Following a 
stress induction, future thinking is linked to reduced physiological stress markers (Engert, 
Smallwood, & Singer, 2014). Finally, life satisfaction is positively related to SGT taking 
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into account close others and negatively linked to SGT involving non-significant 
acquaintances (Mar, Mason, & Litvack, 2012).  
Altogether, these results are summarized by the content regulation hypothesis 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) which states that 
different types of SGT have heterogeneous functional outcomes. Based on these findings, 
we propose that the content of the thoughts is an important factor underlying SGT 
heterogeneity. However, although the literature highlights that the content of SGT is 
related to its functional outcomes, studies have failed to provide a clear description of 
distinct types of SGT.  The first aim of the PhD will therefore be to identify potential types 
based on the content of the thoughts. 
1.2.1.2 Context of SGT  
The context in which these different types of thoughts occur also plays a role in 
SGT heterogeneities. For example, SGT is reduced when participants perform a 
demanding task but is increased under less demanding conditions (Smallwood et al., 2013; 
Smallwood, 2013b; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). In addition, SGT is linked to poor 
task performance when it occurs during complex tasks, but does not have a significant 
impact on the performance of tasks requiring less resources (Kane & McVay, 2012; 
Smallwood, 2013a). Moreover, the context regulation hypothesis proposed by Smallwood 
and colleagues suggests that individuals are able to efficiently regulate the generation of 
SGT to non-demanding conditions in order to limit their potential negative outcomes on 
the task at hand (Levinson et al., 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Taken together, these findings show that the 
functional outcomes of SGT may vary according to the context in which the thoughts occur 
and highlight that the context may be an additional factor involved in SGT heterogeneities.  
1.2.2 Component process hypothesis  
The following section will outline the potential mechanism allowing SGT 
heterogeneities to arise based on the thoughts’ content and context. We propose to use the 
component process hypothesis as a theoretical framework to gain a better understanding of 
SGT (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, 2013a). The component process hypothesis states that 
different sub-processes may be flexibly recruited according to the necessities of different 
types of SGT and that this flexible selection allows SGT heterogeneities to emerge.  The 
potential processes involved will be discussed hereafter.  
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1.2.2.1 Examples of cognitive processes recruited during SGT  
Smallwood (2013) proposes a model in which episodic memory, working memory 
and emotional processing interact in order to generate SGT. Although all these three 
components are involved in SGT, evidence suggests that different types of thought may 
rely on these processes to a different extent.  
Episodic memory. As mentioned above, SGT commonly involves the simulation of 
future events or the retrieval of past events (Baird et al., 2011; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; 
Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 
2011). Although both types of SGT rely on episodic processes, they differ with regard to 
the manipulation of previously-stored information. Past-related thoughts are constructed 
based on mental episodes that were generated during the occurrence of the corresponding 
event. On the contrary, future-related thoughts emerge from the generation of hypothetical 
episodes and therefore require the flexible reorganization of information and additional 
simulation processes compared to past-related SGT (Addis & Schacter, 2011). 
Neuroimaging studies provide evidence that both types of SGT rely on episodic memory, 
but that Future SGT may require additional episodic processes. For example, several 
regions that are part of the Default Mode Network (DMN), such as the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), are activated during SGT 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; 
Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013). However, studies have found that regions such as the 
hippocampus are more active during the generation of future vs. past autobiographical 
memories (Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; Mason, Bar, & Macrae, 2007; van 
Mulukom, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2013). Overall this suggests that episodic memory 
may be involved differently in distinct types of SGT.  
Working memory. Working memory is traditionally described as a mechanism that 
allows the manipulation of information in a goal-related fashion (Baddeley, 1992). 
Evidence from cognitive psychology shows that future-related SGT is frequently goal-
directed and that individual differences in future-related SGT, but not past-related SGT, 
predicts WMC (Baird et al., 2011). Neuroimaging studies also support the assumption that 
working memory may be differently involved in different types of thoughts. For example, 
Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter (2010) observed that during an 
autobiographical planning task (which required participants to generate detailed plans in 
order to reach specific goals), the DMN was coupled to the Frontoparietal Network (FPN), 
which supports working-memory and control processes. On the contrary, studies 
investigating the neural correlates of retrospective memory do not usually report the 
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involvement of this network (Tulving, 2002). Overall these findings suggest that working 
memory may be more involved during the generation of future-related SGT compared to 
past-related SGT, and therefore supports the component process hypothesis.   
Emotional processing. As mentioned above, several studies highlight a negative 
link between SGT and mood (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, et al., 
2009; Smallwood, O’Connor, et al., 2007; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). In addition, 
studies investigating the content of SGT also show that individuals often describe their 
thoughts as involving emotional information (e.g. Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Engert et 
al., 2014; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Ruby et al., 2013).  Moreover, Tusche, 
Smallwood, Bernhardt, & Singer (2014) report that emotional SGT rely on similar brain 
structures as task-driven emotion processing. Overall these studies demonstrate that 
emotional processing and SGT are closely related. Nevertheless, differences may exist for 
different types of SGT. For example, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2013) found that SGT with 
different temporal aspects have on average a different valence i.e. past-SGT are more 
likely to be negative whereas future-SGT are more likely to be positive, in line with 
D’Argembeau & Van der Linden (2006). Similarly, Ruby et al. (2013) showed that Past 
SGT predicts subsequent decreases in mood, whereas Future SGT is associated with 
subsequent improvements in mood. In addition, levels of Past SGT, but not Future SGT, 
are increased during depression and dysphoria and patients with suicidal attempts lack 
future-related SGT (O’Connor & Noyce, 2008; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). 
Altogether, although SGT is linked to emotional processing, this relationship may vary 
according to the content of SGT. 
1.2.2.2 Component process model 
The evidence presented above suggests that several sub-processes (e.g. episodic 
memory, working memory, emotional processing) are involved in SGT but may be 
differentially recruited under certain circumstances. These findings illustrate the 
component-process hypothesis, which proposes that the brain is able to flexibly select and 
coordinate sub-processes according to the type of SGT being generated, therefore 
accounting for the heterogeneity of SGT in terms of neurocognitive processes and 
functional outcomes.  
Flexible selection of sub-processes. From a general cognitive and neural 
architecture, specific component processes can be selected and others can be 
simultaneously neglected according to the type of SGT being processed. This leads to a 
functional reorganization of both the cognitive and neural architectures that is specific to 
the SGT experienced, similarly to the reorganization that occurs during the processing of 
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specific PGT e.g. processing of visual stimuli reply on occipital areas (e.g. Grill-Spector & 
Malach, 2004) whereas processing of auditory simuli recruit the auditory cortex (e.g. 
Zatorre, Belin, & Penhune, 2002).  
Competition for accessing the sub-processes. Because the brain can only process a 
limited amount of information at any current time, SGT will compete with other sources of 
information (e.g. other internally or externally-generated information) to access the 
required sub-processes. When SGT is favoured over PGT, the processing of SGT will 
cause a reduction in the resources directed towards PGT, therefore impairing the 
processing of externally-generated information. This perceptual decoupling is supported 
by electroencephalography (EEG) and pupillometry findings showing that responses to 
external stimuli are reduced during mind-wandering episodes (Kam et al., 2011; 
Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). Thus, the component-process hypothesis provides an 
explanation for SGT’s negative consequences reported in the literature. 
Heterogeneity in SGT consequences. Because different types of SGT recruit 
different cognitive and neural processes, the consequences of SGT when they occur during 
a task will vary. If SGT and a task rely on the same cognitive or neural processes to be 
performed properly, there will be a competition between internal and external inputs, and 
the processing of SGT will lead to worse task performance. For example, when SGT 
occurs during a reading task, working memory and mental simulation processes are 
recruited by SGT, leading to decreases in reading comprehension (Smallwood, 2011). On 
the other hand, if SGT and the task at hand do not rely on the same processes, the 
consequences of SGT on task performance may be limited. For example, in an easy task 
that does not heavily rely on working memory, the recruitment of WMC for the processing 
of SGT is not associated with reduced task performance (Levinson et al., 2012). The 
component process hypothesis therefore provides a potential explanation for the 
heterogeneous consequences of SGT observed under different contexts.  
1.2.2.3 Conclusions 
To summarize, findings highlight that the content and context of SGT are two 
features that can influence its functional outcomes. Different types of SGT occurring in 
different conditions can lead to a wide range of consequences on the task at hand. The 
component process hypothesis proposes that SGT heterogeneities are made possible 
through the specific recruitment of cognitive and neural sub-processes for distinct types of 
thoughts. In the current PhD, we will first aim to identify different types of SGT based on 
their content. Next, we will test whether these different SGT exhibit distinct functional 
outcomes and finally, whether they rely on heterogeneous cognitive and neural processes. 
  25   
1.3 Current thesis  
The aim of the PhD is to provide evidence for our hypothesis that SGT is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon.  To this end, we conducted four experiments in order to test 
the following three predictions:  
i. Different types of SGT can be characterised based on the content of the 
thoughts. 
ii. Different types of SGT have heterogeneous functional outcomes. 
iii. Different types of SGT rely on distinct cognitive and neural correlates.  
Findings in favour of these three predictions would demonstrate that the content of 
SGT is an important factor influencing SGT properties and that the component process 
hypothesis is one mechanism underlying SGT heterogeneities. Taken together, this would 
provide support for the general hypothesis that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon.  
1.3.1 Identification of SGT types  
Although the literature has highlighted that the content of SGT is related to its 
functional outcomes, studies have failed to provide a clear description of distinct types of 
SGT.  The first aim of the PhD will therefore be to provide evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that different types of SGT can be identified based on the content of the 
thoughts. 
1.3.1.1 Dimensions of SGT content  
Smallwood et al. (2009) found that as much as 60% of off-task thoughts are 
directed either towards the future or towards the past (later replicated by Baird et al., 2011; 
Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk et al., 2011), therefore showing 
that a temporal dimension is a common component of SGT. Studies have also found that 
individuals generate thoughts involving oneself (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood, Schooler, 
et al., 2011; Tusche et al., 2014) and others (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Mar et al., 2012; 
Poerio et al., 2015; Song & Wang, 2012), suggesting that a social dimension is also 
significant. Finally, individuals frequently report thoughts with a negative or positive 
valence, demonstrating that SGT possesses an emotional dimension (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2013; Engert et al., 2014; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 
2013; Tusche et al., 2014). Based on these findings, we propose that the temporal, social 
and emotional dimensions are significant constituents of SGT content. 
Although these studies provide insight into the relevant features of SGT, each 
aspect has traditionally been considered independently from the others and the 
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characterisation of clear types of thoughts has been overlooked. Here we adopt a more 
holistic approach and propose to described SGT content as a combination of these three 
dimensions. We hypothesise that the interaction between the temporal, social and 
emotional dimensions of SGT constitutes the basis for different types of SGT and provides 
individuals the freedom to engage in a wide range of subjective experiences (e.g. 
rumination, worry, reminiscence, prospection and so on). The first aim of the PhD will be 
to statistically identify how the three dimensions interact in order to define distinct types of 
SGT.  
1.3.1.2 Overview of the methodological approach  
To measure SGT content, we will use an experience sampling approach applied to 
laboratory conditions. SGT will be probed while participants perform a cognitive task. The 
task, extensively used in the SGT literature, consists of two conditions: a non-demanding 
Choice Reaction Time task (CRT) and a more demanding Working Memory task (WM, 
Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood, Ruby, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 
2011; Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013). Employing two distinct conditions allows us to 
manipulate the context in which SGT occurs and to apply boundary conditions to SGT, 
therefore providing us the chance to investigate how the properties of distinct types of SGT 
vary according to external demands.  
Participants will be probed about their SGT while performing the cognitive task. 
Each probe will assess the temporal, social and emotional dimensions of SGT as well as 
whether the thoughts were task-related or task-unrelated. We will examine how the three 
dimensions interact using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is commonly used to 
reduce a large number of variables into a smaller number of components based on the 
covariance among the initial variables (Jolliffe, 2002). We will take advantage of this 
property in order to statistically determine how the three dimensions interact and form 
distinct types of SGT, as represented by the components obtained via PCA. Previous 
studies have shown that three main types of SGT can be identified using this approach. 
These consist of: i) future-focused SGT (with a social element), ii) past-focused SGT (with 
a social element), and iii) emotional SGT (independent from the temporal and social 
dimensions, see Engert et al., 2014; Ruby et al., 2013).  
The studies conducted in the PhD will aim to provide evidence for the claim that 
SGT types can be identified based on the content of the thoughts. Chapter 2 describes in 
detail the methods employed to measure and characterise SGT types. Subsequent chapters 
will demonstrate that the structure of SGT is replicable, can be validated by independent 
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measures and can be manipulated, altogether demonstrating that the types of SGT are 
meaningful. 
1.3.2 Investigating the functional outcomes of different types of SGT 
Following the identification of distinct thought types, we will investigate whether 
these different types have heterogeneous functional outcomes. To this end, our analyses 
aim to highlight the potential similarities and differences between types of SGT. For 
example, Ruby et al. (2013) observed three types of SGT using PCA, namely future-related, 
past-related and emotional SGT. They found that both negative SGT and past-related SGT 
were linked to subsequent decreases in mood levels. On the contrary, future-related SGT 
was linked to subsequent increases. These data suggest that the relation between SGT and 
mood levels is heterogeneous and is related to the thought content. More generally, this 
study supports our claim that distinct types of SGT can be identified based on the content, 
and that these distinct types may have heterogeneous functional outcomes.   
The studies conducted throughout the PhD rely on an individual differences 
approach and explore whether individual differences in SGT content can predict individual 
differences in other measures (e.g. questionnaire scores, task performance, and so on). First, 
Chapter 3 investigates the link between SGT and social problem solving. Findings show 
that SGT is often related to individuals’ current concerns and unresolved goals (Baird et al., 
2011; Cole & Berntsen, 2015; Klinger, 1978, 1999; Mason & Reinholtz, 2015). In addition, 
SGT commonly involves other individuals and is linked to creative problem solving 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Baird et al., 2012; Mar et al., 2012; Poerio et al., 2015; Song 
& Wang, 2012). Taken together, this suggests that individuals who spontaneously engage 
in SGT may possess good social problem solving skills. Chapter 3 investigates whether 
SGT is related to social problem solving and whether this relation varies for different types 
of SGT.  
Chapter 4 examines the role of SGT in shaping one’s sense of self, or self-concept. 
Previous studies have shown that SGT is often self-related (Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood, 
Schooler, et al., 2011; Tusche et al., 2014) and that future-directed SGT (but not past-
directed SGT) relies on self-referential processes (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). The 
experiment described in Chapter 4 draws on these findings and tests the hypothesis that the 
thoughts spontaneously generated by individuals, especially those directed towards the 
future, may influence their sense of self.  
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Taken together, both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 aim to provide evidence in favour of 
our second hypothesis (i.e. that different types of SGT have heterogeneous functional 
outcomes) and for the general claim that SGT content plays a role in SGT heterogeneity. 
1.3.3 Investigating the cognitive and neural correlates of different types of SGT  
Following the identification of distinct types of SGT and having provided evidence 
that they possess heterogeneous properties, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 test the prediction that 
the neurocognitive substrates of SGT vary for different types of thoughts. Chapter 5 
focuses on the phenomenology of different types of SGT (i.e. the subjective properties that 
individuals associate with the SGT generated) and we propose that these properties may 
shed light on the cognitive processes involved in SGT generation. For example, thoughts 
can be represented using inner speech or visual mental imagery (Singer & Antrobus, 1972; 
Singer, 1966; Smallwood et al., 2003; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Cassol, & 
D’Argembeau, 2013). The first type of representation is based on semantic processes 
whereas the second type relies on visual simulation processes. As a consequence, types of 
SGT that are represented using inner speech and visual mental imagery will require distinct 
cognitive processes. Overall, finding differences in phenomenological properties will 
provide evidence for the hypothesis that SGT can have heterogeneous cognitive correlates.  
Finally, Chapter 6 focuses on the neural correlates associated with different SGT 
types. A large body of evidence highlights the role of the DMN in SGT (Allen et al., 2013; 
Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Christoff 
et al., 2009; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, 
Tipper, et al., 2013; Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & 
D’Argembeau, 2011). Using resting-state fMRI, we will investigate whether the main hubs 
of the DMN (i.e. PCC and mPFC) express different connectivity patterns depending on 
individual differences in SGT content. Chapter 6 therefore explores the neural correlates of 
SGT and provides further evidence in favour of the component process hypothesis.  
1.3.4 Summary  
In summary, a review of the literature highlights that considering SGT as a 
homogeneous phenomenon is inconsistent with recent empirical findings. Studies show 
that SGT can be associated with both costs and benefits, and that the relation between SGT 
and executive functions is mixed. To gain insight into these discrepancies, the current PhD 
proposes that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon. We aim to find evidence that the 
content of the thoughts is an important factor underlying the heterogeneous properties of 
SGT and that this is made possible by the flexible recruitment of distinct cognitive and 
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neural processes. Using this component process view of SGT, our objective is to show that 
taking into account the heterogeneity of SGT allows a better characterisation of the 
neurocognitive correlates of SGT and therefore a better understanding of this subjective 
experience. 
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Chapter 2.  
Methodology  
2.1 Introduction 
Although self-generated thought (SGT) has traditionally been considered as a 
homogeneous phenomenon, recent studies challenge this assumption and highlight 
discrepancies regarding SGT’s functional outcomes and cognitive substrates (see Chapter 1 
for a review). In order to provide an explanation for the conflicting findings present in the 
literature, the current PhD hypothesises that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon. 
Furthermore, we propose that the content of the thoughts plays a role in SGT 
heterogeneities, following the content regulation hypothesis (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; 
Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).  
Previous studies provide preliminary evidence in favour of this hypothesis. 
Regarding the temporal dimension of SGT, thoughts that are focused on the future tend to 
involve autobiographical planning (Baird et al., 2011) and are linked to self-referential 
processes (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011) whereas thoughts focused on the past do not 
exhibit these qualities. However, past-focused thoughts are linked to negative outcomes 
such as low mood levels and depressive symptoms (Poerio, Totterdell, & Miles, 2013; 
Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). In addition to the 
temporal dimension, the social content of thoughts also explains variance in SGT 
heterogeneities. For example, thinking about significant others is related to increased well-
being and life satisfaction, whereas thinking about acquaintances is negatively linked to 
these constructs (Mar et al., 2012; Poerio et al., 2015). Altogether, these studies indicate 
that the functional outcomes of SGT may vary according to the content of the thoughts.   
A large body of studies also highlights that the temporal, social and emotional 
dimensions of SGT are important constituents of thought content. For example, thoughts 
are frequently directed towards the future or the past (Baird et al., 2011; Engert et al., 
2014; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Nind, et 
al., 2009; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011; Tusche et al., 2014). They also involve oneself and other individuals (Baird et 
al., 2011; Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011; Tusche et al., 2014) and they vary in valence 
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(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013; Tusche et al., 2014). Based on these findings, we propose that the temporal, 
social and emotional dimensions are important aspects of SGT content that should be 
considered when aiming at understanding the role the content plays in SGT heterogeneities. 
Although these studies provide valuable insight into the relevant dimensions of 
SGT, the different aspects have usually been investigated separately. However, recent 
evidence highlights potential interactions across dimensions. For example, Smallwood and 
colleagues found that priming individuals’ to reflect on themselves led to significant 
increases in future thinking, but not past thinking (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). On 
the contrary, inducing a negative mood in individuals was related to increases in past 
thinking, but not future thinking (Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). Both examples illustrate 
that different aspects of SGT content may share common variance. Following these 
findings, we adopt a more integrated approach by simultaneously taking into account the 
temporal, social and emotional dimensions. In particular, we propose that distinct types of 
SGT exist, with each type being characterised by a specific set of interactions between the 
three dimensions. The first aim of the PhD will be to statistically define these types of 
thoughts.  
To this end, we measured individuals’ SGT content using multidimensional 
experience sampling. While performing a short cognitive task, participants were 
interrupted several times and probed about the temporal, social and emotional dimensions 
of their thoughts. We propose to use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to define 
distinct types of SGT based on the interaction between the three dimensions. This 
statistical technique is commonly used to reduce a large number of variables into a smaller 
number of principal components (PC) based on the covariance among the initial measures. 
We apply PCA at the probe level (i.e. one data point representing one thought report) in 
order to exploit the covariance over time, taking into account both the within and between-
participant variance present in the data. This allows us to maximize our capacity to identify 
mental states that are present across our population sample.  
The aim of the current chapter is to provide evidence for the first prediction the 
PhD set out to explore i.e. different types of SGT can be identified based on the content of 
the thoughts. In particular, we present the analysis pipeline that we employed throughout 
the thesis to characterise distinct SGT types. In addition, we provide preliminary evidence 
to validate the PCA approach. 
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2.2 Analysis pipeline  
The current section presents the analysis pipeline employed to statistically identify 
SGT types. Data published by Ruby et al. (2013) will be used to illustrate our PCA 
approach. In this study, seven aspects of SGT content were probed while participants 
performed the Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task (Table 2-1). In addition, mood levels 
were also measured in order to investigate the relation between the different types of SGT 
and mood. In total, 83 participants were recruited and 590 probes were recorded (Figure 
2-1b). More details on the methods are described in Ruby et al. (2013).  
All statistical analyses reported in the thesis were computed using R (R Core Team, 
2012) and SPSS (Statistics, 2011). Results were plotted using the ggplot2 package 
(Wickham, 2009). We first provide an overview of the analysis pipeline. More details 
about each step will be described in subsequent sections.  
2.2.1 Overview  
The analysis pipeline involves the following steps:   
i. SGT content is probed several times at random intervals while participants perform 
a short cognitive task (Figure 2-1a and Figure 2-2). 
ii. Probe data recorded across all participants are concatenated into one dataset. In our 
example, the data consist of a 590 x 7 matrix (Figure 2-1b).  
iii. PCA with Varimax rotation is applied to the data to identify distinct SGT types 
based on the interaction between the temporal, social and emotional dimensions. In 
our example, three PC are identified and can be described as Past SGT, Emotion 
SGT and Future SGT (Figure 2-1c).  
iv. Using the structure identified by PCA, the original data are then converted into 
SGT scores (Figure 2-1d).  
v. Finally, SGT scores are averaged for each participant in order to represent 
individual differences in SGT content (Figure 2-1e).   
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Figure 2-1. Analysis Pipeline (previous page) 
a) Each subject (e.g. S1) is probed a number of times randomly throughout the cognitive task. Each probe is 
indicated by a red bar on the figure and consists of a set of questions assessing SGT content. b) The probe 
data collected across all participants are then concatenated into one dataset. In our example, the dataset 
consists of a 590 x 7 matrix. c) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is then computed on the dataset in order 
to extract principal components (PC) based on the covariance between the probe questions. The heat map 
represents the loadings of each probe question on each PC. d) SGT scores are then generated at the probe 
level using the PC identified by PCA. e) Finally, the SGT scores are averaged for each participant. These 
scores reflect individual differences in SGT content. 
2.2.2 Measuring SGT  
2.2.2.1 Cognitive task  
We record SGT while participants perform a short cognitive task involving two 
conditions: a non-demanding Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task or a more demanding 
Working Memory (WM) task (Figure 2-1a; Figure 2-2; Engert et al., 2014; Ruby et al., 
2013; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood, Ruby, & Singer, 2013; Smallwood, 
Brown, et al., 2011; Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013).   
 
Figure 2-2. Choice Reaction Time task and Working Memory task 
In both conditions, black digits are presented for 1000 ms and coloured digits are presented for 2000 ms. 
Events are separated by a fixation cross of random duration (2200, 2800, 3200 or 4400 ms). Targets (or 
question marks) and non-targets are presented with a ratio of 1/6. The average number of targets depends on 
the duration of the cognitive task but does not differ between Choice Reaction Time (CRT) and Working 
Memory (WM) tasks. The illustration was adapted from (Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). 
During the CRT task, participants observe a sequence of black digits on a computer 
screen while waiting for a target (a coloured digit) to appear, at which point they have to 
indicate the parity of this target (odd or even) with a button push. In the WM task, 
participants are exposed to the same sequence of black digits, and are intermittently probed 
with a coloured question mark (‘?’).  When the question mark is presented, participants 
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have to make a button push to indicate the parity of the previous digit.  Because the 
occurrence of the coloured question mark is randomly determined, the WM task requires 
participants to encode and retain in memory the parity of each non-coloured number and to 
make a response only when probed by the question mark. 
The cognitive task was employed in all empirical studies reported in the thesis. In 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, participants performed both the CRT and WM tasks. In the 
current chapter and Chapter 5, participants only performed the CRT task. Finally, in 
Chapter 4 participants performed either the CRT or the WM task depending on their group. 
The duration of each task also varied for each study and will be described accordingly in 
each chapter. 
2.2.2.2 Experience sampling  
While performing the cognitive task, participants are intermittently interrupted and 
asked to answer a set of questions which assess the temporal, social and emotional 
dimensions of their thoughts, as well as whether they are focusing on the task (on-task) or 
on something else (off-task; Figure 2-1a; see Table 2-1 for a list of questions). Participants 
answer using a 9-point Likert scale (Chapters 2, 3) or a slider ranging from “Not at all” to 
“Completely” (Chapters 4 – 6). Intervals between probes are randomly determined and 
vary between 0.5 – 5 min. The number of probes presented depends on the duration of the 
cognitive task. 
Note that prior to assessing SGT, probes presented in Chapter 2, 4 and 6 also 
measured participants’ mood levels. Mood levels were recorded as a large body of 
literature highlights a link between SGT and well-being (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; 
Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood, Fitzgerald, et al., 2009; Smallwood, O’Connor, et al., 
2007; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). The question “Please describe your current mood:” 
was presented twice to participants, who answered once using a slider ranging from “Not 
at all” to “Extremely positive” and once using a slider ranging from “Not at all” to 
“Extremely negative”.    
Table 2-1. List of probe questions assessing SGT 
Dimension Questions 
Off-task Were you thinking about the task, or about something else? 
Temporal 
Were you thinking about an event that could happen in the future? 
Were you thinking about an event that happened in the past? 
Social 
Were you thinking about yourself? 
Were you thinking about other people? 
Emotional 
How negative were your thoughts? 
How positive were your thoughts? 
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2.2.3 Principal Component Analysis  
Following the recording of SGT content, the probe data collected from several 
participants are concatenated into one dataset (Figure 2-1b). PCA is then applied to the 
data to determine how the three SGT dimensions interact. In our example, the data are 
organized in a 590 x 7 matrix with the seven columns containing the ratings obtained from 
the seven probe questions, and therefore consist of a 7-dimensional space (Figure 2-1b)
1
. 
PCA allows reducing the number of initial dimensions i.e. seven variables, into a smaller 
set of dimensions i.e. PC (Jolliffe, 2002). Based on a correlation matrix (i.e. correlations 
between all seven variables), PCA estimates the shared variance between the seven 
variables and computes PC. These PC represent the interaction between the temporal, 
social and emotional aspects of SGT. We propose to use the PC as proxies for thought 
types. Following the computation of the PCA, we also apply Varimax rotation to the PC 
generated (Jolliffe, 2002). This allows maximizing the orthogonality between PC i.e. 
forcing the new dimensions to be as independent as possible (i.e. non-correlated). Varimax 
rotation therefore ensures that the PC represent types of SGT that are as distinct as possible 
from each other.  
PC are characterised by a set of loadings and an Eigen value. Each loading 
represents the correlation between a PC and a given variable and therefore indicates how 
each aspect of SGT content relates to each SGT type; the Eigen value describes the amount 
of variance explained by the PC (see Table 2-2 for an example). The output of PCA is then 
represented using a heat map, where variables loading positively on a PC are represented 
in yellow, and variables loading negatively are represented in dark green (Figure 2-1; 
Figure 2-3). 
2.2.4 Example of Principal Component Analysis  
An example of PCA is provided using probe data published by Ruby et al. (2013). 
As can be seen in Figure 2-3 and Table 2-2, the first PC loads positively on off-task, past, 
and other ratings and was named Past SGT. The second PC loads positively on negative 
ratings and negatively on positive ratings and was named Emotion SGT. Finally, the last 
                                                 
 
1
 Please note that the term “dimension” represents different concepts when referring to the data’s dimensional 
space and when describing the dimensions of SGT. In the former case, the term dimension is a statistical 
construct. Each variable in our dataset represents one dimension; our dataset therefore consists of a 7-
dimensional space. In the latter case, the term dimension is a theoretical construct. For example, we suspect 
that negative and positive aspects of SGT are anti-correlated constructs i.e. they represent two extremes of 
the emotional dimension.  
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PC loads positively on off-task, future and self ratings i.e. Future SGT. Altogether, these 
three PC explain 69% of the variance in the probe data.  
Important observations can be made based on the PCA results. First, Emotion SGT 
mainly loaded on negative and positive ratings, suggesting that the emotional dimension is 
fairly independent from the temporal and social dimensions of SGT. In addition, this PC 
did not load positively or negatively on off-task ratings, suggesting that it may represent 
thought valence in general, whether on-task or off-task. Regarding Past SGT, the positive 
loadings on past and other ratings suggest a strong interaction between the temporal and 
social dimensions of SGT. Similarly for Future SGT, the positive loadings on future and 
self ratings also suggest that the temporal and social dimensions interact in order to support 
this type of thought. Taken together, these findings illustrate that distinct types of thoughts 
can be identified based on the shared variance across the temporal, social and emotional 
dimensions. The PCA results therefore provide empirical support for our holistic approach 
to SGT content.  
Note that the names attributed to the types of thoughts i.e. Future and Past SGT, 
focus on the temporal dimension of SGT. This choice takes into account all the results 
presented in the current thesis and in particular, the fact that PCA commonly generates two 
PC that differ in terms of their temporal focus (i.e. one involving past thinking, the other 
one involving future thinking) but not necessarily in terms of their social aspect (e.g. both 
Future and Past SGT load on other ratings in data presented in Chapters 3 – 6).  This 
suggests that differences between types of SGT are highlighted by their temporal focus 
rather than by their social aspect, and SGT names take this observation into account.  
 
Figure 2-3. Principal Component Analysis for the probe data published by Ruby et al. (2013). 
The loadings represented on the heat map are also provided in Table 2-2.  
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Table 2-2. Results of the Principal Component Analysis for the probe data published by Ruby et al. 
(2013).  
 
Principal Components 
Past Emotion Future 
Off-task 0.64 0.16 0.47 
Other 0.88 -0.03 0.07 
Past 0.62 0.20 0.11 
Self 0.04 0.10 0.91 
Future 0.43 -0.11 0.63 
Negative 0.20 0.82 0.18 
Positive -0.01 -0.89 0.10 
 
Eigen values 2.55 1.42 .85 
 
2.2.5 Transformation of probe ratings into SGT scores 
Based on the covariance patterns identified by PCA, the original probe data are 
then converted into SGT scores (Figure 2-1d). Each thought probe can now be described 
using the three scores rather than ratings from the seven initial variables. Note that in 
certain datasets (Chapters 2, 4, 6). Emotion SGT is represented by a PC which loads 
positively on negative ratings. Under those circumstances, we reverse the Emotion SGT 
scores so that a higher average reflects more positive SGT. 
Finally, the data measured at the probe level are averaged for each participant 
(Figure 2-1e). These mean SGT scores estimate individuals’ tendencies to generate Future 
and Past SGT as well as their general SGT valence.  
2.2.6 Relation between SGT and independent measures  
Once SGT scores are computed, subsequent analyses can be performed to explore 
the relation between SGT types and other independent variables such as task performance 
(e.g. Chapter 3) or phenomenological properties (Chapter 5). These analyses can be done 
either at the probe level or at the participant level depending on the independent variable 
examined.   
Probe level. Analyses computed at the probe level require independent measures to 
be simultaneously recorded with SGT content. These analyses are computed on probe data 
(Figure 2-1d) and require the use of linear mixed models (LMMs, see Chapter 5). For 
example, Ruby and colleagues investigated the effect of different SGT types on transient 
mood levels. They found that the occurrence of Future SGT predicted subsequent increases 
in mood levels, whereas the occurrence of Past SGT predicted subsequent decreases in 
mood levels (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). These data illustrate that the thought 
content plays a role in the relation between mood and SGT, and that the SGT types 
generated using PCA capture meaningful covariance.  
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Participant level. Analyses computed at the participant level involve independent 
variables which are trait measures (e.g. task performance or questionnaire score). These 
analyses can be used to investigate the cognitive correlates and functional outcomes of 
SGT.  These analyses require averaged SGT scores (Figure 2-1e) and are usually computed 
using ANOVAs or linear regressions. For example, Ruby et al. tested whether individual 
differences in SGT were linked to individual differences in depressive symptoms, as 
assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1993). They 
found that participants who on average experienced more frequently Past SGT also had 
higher BDI scores, suggesting that past thinkers tend to experience depressive tendencies 
and replicating previous findings (Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). These results provide 
additional support that PCA is capturing meaningful covariance present in the probe data.  
2.3 Discussion 
In summary, the data presented in the current chapter illustrate that distinct types of 
SGT can be statistically identified. Using PCA, we were able to characterise three PC and 
we suggest that they represent three types of SGT: Emotion, Future and Past SGT. 
Whereas Emotion SGT mainly relied on the emotional dimension of thought content, 
Future and Past SGT were both characterised by a specific interaction between the 
temporal and social dimensions of thought. Taken together, these results support our 
prediction that distinct types of thought can be characterised based on the interaction 
between the three dimensions.  
Subsequent chapters will explore the functional outcomes and neurocognitive 
substrates of the different types of SGT. The findings described above can guide these 
studies. In particular, the PCA data highlight that Future and Past SGT share similar 
properties. For example, both types of SGT are off-task thoughts and involve an interaction 
between the temporal and social dimensions. Moreover, future and past thinking are 
commonly referred to as mental time travel (MTT, e.g. Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) and 
studies investigating task-driven MTT provide evidence that both prospection and memory 
rely on a set of shared and distinct neurocognitive substrates (Addis & Schacter, 2011; 
Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). Based on these 
findings, we suggest that the similarities and differences between Past and Future SGT will 
be particularly important to explore and the analyses conducted throughout the PhD will 
take this observation into account.  
In the following chapters, the PCA pipeline will be systematically applied in order 
to statistically identify distinct types of thoughts. Each empirical chapter will aim to 
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provide support for the hypothesis that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon. To this end, 
we will explore whether the different SGT types possess heterogeneous functional 
outcomes (Chapter 3; Chapter 4) and whether they rely on similar or distinct cognitive 
(Chapter 5) and neural processes (Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 3.  
Relation between 
Social Problem Solving and SGT 
(This chapter has been published as peer-reviewed article: Ruby, F. J. M., 
Smallwood, J., Sackur, J., & Singer, T. (2013). Is self-generated thought a means of social 
problem solving? Frontiers in Psychology, 4 (December), 962. doi:10.3389/fpsyg. 
2013.00962) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The social world poses many of the most complex problems that we as a species 
have to solve. Our interactions with other people directly impact upon success in inter-
personal relationships and influence many aspects of our lives such as our happiness, our 
health, and our success in our job and as a family member. The capacity to define and 
implement the correct strategy in a given social setting is therefore a skill that determines 
the degree of fit between individuals and their social environment.  
Recent work in psychology and cognitive neuroscience has highlighted that in daily 
life cognition is not always generated from perceptual information. Instead states such as 
mind-wandering or daydreaming illustrate that humans have the capacity to self-generate 
thoughts based on previously-stored information rather than events in the perceptual 
environment (Smallwood, 2013a). Experience sampling studies suggest that such self-
generated thoughts (SGT) account for fifty percent of waking thought and content analysis 
suggests that across cultures these experiences are mainly focused on the self in the future 
(e.g. Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Iijima and 
Tanno, 2012; Song and Wang, 2012), implying that these episodes may reflect a form of 
autobiographical planning (Baird et al., 2011). Despite the high frequency of SGT in daily 
life, there is no clear consensus on the purpose that these experiences may serve. The 
current experiment examines whether these states may be related to social problem solving 
processes. 
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Successful problem solving depends on two related processes (D’Zurilla & 
Goldfried, 1971). The first is a capacity to imagine conditions that would allow the agent 
to move forward on the problem, and the second is a capacity to selectively implement the 
most effective strategy, a process we will refer to as controlled processing. Although the 
capacity for controlled processing can arguably be common to both self-generated and 
perceptually guided thought (Smallwood, 2013a) it is possible that the role of imagination 
necessary for social problem solving could be specifically related to SGT. For example, the 
ability to imagine the series of steps that allow a social problem to be solved and the ability 
to self-generate thought both depend on the capacity to imagine events that are unrelated to 
the present moment (Frith & Frith, 2006; Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013). The main goal 
of the current study was to assess whether individual differences in SGT are related to 
processes of social problem solving, and if so, whether specific forms of mental content 
mediate this relation. 
In a large cohort of participants social problem solving was assessed using the 
Means-End Problem Solving (MEPS) task, a validated measure of individuals’ abilities to 
solve common everyday social problems (Lyubomirsky & Nolenhoeksema, 1995; Marx, 
Williams, & Claridge, 1992; Platt & Spivack, 1975). The task of the participants is to 
create a story that would allow her/him to resolve a given problem (e.g. an argument with 
one’s partner, making friends in a new neighbourhood). The MEPS is used to assess two 
distinct aspects of social problem solving: i) the ability to generate relevant means (RM) i.e. 
the number of specific steps that the participant provides to solve a given problem; ii) the 
overall efficiency of the story, a metric for individuals’ capacity to implement an 
appropriate and efficient strategy (Marx et al., 1992).  
As the SGT experience varies depending on the context in which it occurs (for a 
review, see Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013), we measured SGT during two 
cognitive tasks: a) a moderately-demanding Working Memory (WM) task and b) a non-
demanding Choice Reaction Time task (CRT; for previous use of these tasks see 
(Smallwood, Ruby, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Smallwood, Schooler, et 
al., 2011). The use of two tasks with variable difficulty allows us to manipulate SGT 
occurrence and to introduce within-subject variance, as SGT is routinely reduced in the 
WM task relative to the CRT task. Thought-sampling was used to measure participants’ 
SGT while they performed these tasks. Participants reported the content of their thoughts 
on a number of dimensions: i) their relevance to the task being performed, ii) their 
temporal focus (future or past), iii) their social focus (self- or other-related) and iv) the 
relative level of detail. Finally, task performance was also measured (response time (RT) 
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and accuracy) and provided a measure of individuals’ effectiveness at implementing 
cognition related to perceptual information.   
In this study we were motivated to understand whether patterns of variance in the 
content of SGT, as well as the conditions under which they arise provide informative 
information on the psychological nature of different types of thought (Smallwood & 
Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood, 2013a). The methodological approach used in the 
current study to describe SGT content is based on our prior published work (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). Using similar probe questions, we applied Principle 
Component Analysis (PCA) to decompose the probe ratings based on the pattern of 
covariance between the reports. This allowed us to define different categories of thoughts 
based on trial-by-trial changes in co-variance. Because we apply unconstrained PCA to 
decompose our data, this step captures both within-subject and between-subject sources of 
variance. Using these PCA components as dependent variables in subsequent analyses, we 
next quantify whether SGT are related to independent variables (such as the task context in 
which the measure was taken, or features of the individual who made the report). As this 
technique is relatively novel, we will compare the results obtained using the PCA 
components with results where rating averages were used in a more standard way. In the 
discussion we consider in detail the rationale for employing this approach. 
The main goal of the current experiment was to assess how social problem solving 
skills are related to individual differences in SGT. To assess this question we adopted an 
individual difference analysis and examined the co-variance between different elements of 
MEPS performance and different types of SGT. One possibility is that SGT, regardless of 
its content, may be related to performance on the MEPS. This would be the case if all types 
of SGT predicted MEPS performance in a similar way and would be reflected by a main 
effect of MEPS. A second possibility is that only SGT with specific content are related to 
social problem solving. This would be the case if our analysis revealed that only certain 
types of SGT significantly predict MEPS performance and would be reflected by an 
interaction between the specific form of SGT and performance on the MEPS. For example, 
as social problem solving is important for anticipating how others may react in the future it 
is possible that SGT directed towards the future or other people may be stronger predictors 
of MEPS performance compared to SGT directed towards the self or the past. Finally, our 
experimental design also allowed us to assess two subsidiary questions: i) the relation 
between MEPS and cognitive tasks performance and ii) the link between SGT and 
performance on the two cognitive tasks. 
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3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
The study was part of a broader research project which was approved by the Ethics 
Commission of the Medical Faculty of the University of Leipzig under the code 360-10-
13122010. 94 right-handed individuals were recruited from the database of the Max Planck 
Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany (Mean age = 29 
years, Age range 19–38 years, 49 females). All of them were native German speakers, had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of psychiatric or neurological conditions 
and no history of substance abuse. Ten participants were subsequently excluded from the 
analysis due to extreme scores on the CRT, the WM or the MEPS (scores were considered 
as extreme when higher than (Q3 + 1.5 x IQR) or lower than (Q1 – 1.5 x IQR), with Q1 
and Q3 the first and third quartiles, and IQR being the Interquartile Range).  
3.2.2 Experimental session 
The experimental session lasted 2 hours and was divided into three blocks (block 
order counterbalanced across subjects). Participants were allowed to take short breaks 
between the blocks if desired. One block consisted of performing the cognitive tasks; 
another block consisted of performing the MEPS. A number of other tasks were measured 
during the third block and results have been previously published (Smallwood, Ruby, et al., 
2013). All participants gave written consent before the beginning of the experiment and 
were remunerated at least 16 € for their participation (8 € per hour of participation plus an 
additional reward according to their performance during a temporal discounting task). E-
prime 2 was used for stimulus presentation (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). All 
statistical analyses were performed using R and results were plotted using the ggplot2 
package (R Core Team, 2012; Wickham, 2009).  
3.2.3 Cognitive tasks 
Participants performed two sessions of two cognitive tasks: a Choice Reaction 
Time Task (CRT) and a Working Memory Task (WM; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; 
Smallwood, Ruby, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). Each session lasted 400 s 
and participants could take a short break between sessions if desired. During the CRT task, 
participants observed a sequence of black digits on a computer screen while waiting for a 
target (a coloured digit) to appear, at which point they had to indicate the parity of this 
target (odd or even) with a button push. In the WM task, participants were exposed to the 
same sequence of black digits, and were intermittently probed with a coloured question 
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mark (‘?’). When the question mark was presented, participants had to make a button push 
to indicate the parity of the previous digit. Because the occurrence of the coloured question 
mark is randomly determined, this task requires participants to encode and retain in 
memory the parity of each non-coloured number and make a response only when probed 
by the question mark. In both tasks, black digits were presented for 1000 ms and coloured 
stimuli were presented for 2000 ms. Events were separated by a fixation cross of random 
duration (2200, 2800, 3200 or 4400 ms). Targets (or question marks) and non-targets were 
presented with a ratio of approximately 1/6. The average number of targets did not differ 
between CRT and WM tasks (mean target number, CRT task: M = 22.5, SE = .4; WM task: 
M = 22.8, SE = .5).  
During both the CRT and WM tasks, SGT was recorded using thought-sampling 
(average number of probes: CRT task, M = 7.10, SE = .2; WM task, M = 7.07, SE = .2). 
Intermittently throughout the tasks, participants were interrupted and asked to rate how 
much their thoughts were i) unrelated to the current task (i.e. “off-task”); ii) detailed; iii) 
future-focused; iv) past-focused; v) self-focused and vi) other-focused. Participants used 
Likert scales to answer the probes (1 to 9, a greater score indicating higher relevance. See 
(Christoff et al., 2009; Mrazek, Smallwood, Franklin, et al., 2012) for previous uses of this 
method). 
3.2.4 Means End Problem Solving Task 
Social problem solving ability was assessed using a modified version of the Means-
End Problem Solving task (MEPS; Platt and Spivack, 1975; Marx et al., 1992). The 
German version of the task was obtained from Svaldi et al. (2011). Participants read short 
scenarios presenting a problem (e.g. “you just moved into a new neighbourhood and you 
do not know anybody”) and a solution (e.g. “the story ends when you have several good 
friends and you feel at home in the new neighbourhood”). The task consists of creating a 
story that would allow the participant to reach the stated solution and therefore solve the 
problem. Participants are instructed to be as specific as possible, so that other people 
reading their story would easily understand how the solution was achieved. Following 
Lyubomirsky and Nolenhoeksema (1995), problems were written using second person 
pronouns and participants were asked to provide a story based on what they would actually 
do if they were indeed confronted with such problems. Four different scenarios were used. 
Each scenario was presented on a computer screen and participants had 4 minutes to type 
in a story that would link the stated problem to the solution.  
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Two independent raters coded each story according to two measures: i) number of 
relevant means (RM), representing the number of discrete steps that would allow the 
participant to get closer to the goal; ii) Efficiency, representing the global efficiency of the 
story proposed (how efficient the strategy would actually be at solving the problem) and 
rated using a 0 to 7 Likert scale. For each participant, a mean Efficiency score and a mean 
RM score was obtained by averaging the ratings across stories and across raters (Inter-rater 
reliability Cronbach’s α, Efficiency: α = .79; for RM: α = .79). 
3.3 Results  
3.3.1 Descriptive analyses 
3.3.1.1 MEPS performance  
Measures obtained during the MEPS were similar to previously-reported findings 
(e.g. Watkins and Baracaia, 2002). Mean efficiency was 3.39 (SE = .14) and mean RM was 
2.68 (SE = .11). Both measures were highly correlated (Pearson’s correlation coefficient r 
= 0.72, p < .001). Measures of MEPS Efficiency and RM were z-scored prior to 
performing subsequent analyses. 
3.3.1.2 Task performance 
The average Error rate for the CRT task was .053 (SE = .006) and for WM 
task .033 (SE = .005). The average RT was 799 ms (SE = 13 ms) for the CRT task and 759 
ms (SE = 22 ms) for the WM task. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Baird et al., 2012), 
both error rate and RT for correct responses were lower during the WM compared to the 
CRT task (paired sample t-test, Error rate: t = 2.62, p = .01, RT: t = 2.25 , p < .03). This 
confirms that during the WM task, participants were more focused on the task than during 
the CRT. 
3.3.1.3 Task modulation of SGT  
Off-task ratings were higher in the CRT than the WM task (paired sample t-test, t = 
4.84, p < .001). Regarding temporal questions, a repeated-measures 2 x 2 ANOVA with 
task (CRT, WM) and probe question (future, past) revealed two main effects and a 
significant interaction (task: F = 5.13, p = <.03; probe question: F = 76.54, p < .001; 
interaction: F = 5.02, p < .03). As can be seen in Figure 3-1, future ratings were higher than 
past ratings and ratings were higher in the CRT compared to the WM task. The difference 
in ratings across tasks was especially pronounced for the future probes. These results 
replicate previous findings of a future bias of SGT that has now been observed in several 
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different cultures (Baird et al., 2011; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; 
Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Song & Wang, 2012). A similar ANOVA was performed 
with social questions (Probe Question: self, other). We observed a significant main effect 
of task (F = 11.38, p = .001) and a trend for an effect of probe question (F = 3.01, p < .09). 
No significant interaction was obtained (F = 1.88, p = .17). This suggests that social-
related ratings are higher during the CRT compared to the WM task (Figure 3-1). Finally, 
we found no evidence for a difference of detail ratings across tasks (paired sample t-test, t 
= -0.89, p > .35). Overall, these results suggest that there is significant within-subject 
variance present in thought-probe ratings across cognitive tasks.  
 
Figure 3-1. Mean SGT ratings across mind-wandering (MW) cognitive tasks  
SGT in the CRT task was rated as more off-task, more self and other-related, and more future-related than 
SGT in the WM task. In addition, thoughts were overall more future than past-related. 
3.3.2 Link between social problem solving and SGT 
3.3.2.1 Decomposition of SGT content  
As it can be seen in Table 3-2, ratings from different probe questions were highly 
correlated, suggesting that there is a significant amount of shared variance that should be 
accounted for. Following Ruby et al. (2013) we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
to explore the co-variance between off-task ratings and measures of SGT content. PCA 
with Varimax rotation was applied on the off-task, future, past, self and other ratings of 
1200 thought probes i.e. regrouping probes from both tasks and all participants. Applying 
PCA at the thought-probe level allows to take into account both within- and between-
subject sources of variance and to compute a measure of the general patterns of SGT that 
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are present in our data. As our variable of interest is SGT i.e. “mental content that is 
unrelated to the task in hand” (Smallwood, 2013a) the off-task ratings were included in the 
PCA to appreciate whether the factors obtained were reflecting on-task or off-task thoughts. 
The detail ratings were excluded from the PCA to replicate the methods published by Ruby 
et al. (2013). Two principal components were obtained that explained 64% of the variance 
in our sample (Figure 3-2; Table 3-1). Both components reflected a combination of social 
and temporal aspects of SGT: The first socio-temporal component loaded positively on off-
task, future, self and other ratings (hereafter ST-FSO). The second socio-temporal 
component loaded positively on off-task, past and other ratings (hereafter ST-PO). The 
pattern of co-variance indicates that other-related thoughts are prevalent in both past- and 
future-related SGT which supports the assumption that both types of SGT may reflect 
attempts at social problem solving. 
To take into account the possibility that the context in which SGT is measured can 
have implications for its psychological correlates, we computed 4 SGT scores for each 
subject for subsequent analyses at the group level: mean ST-FSO in the CRT, mean ST-
FSO in the WM, mean ST-PO in the CRT and mean ST-PO in the WM. We performed a 2-
by-2 ANOVA with task (CRT, WM) and components (ST-SFO, ST-PO) which revealed a 
main effect of task (F(83) = 18.57, p < .001). This suggests that the amplitude of both 
components was larger in the CRT than in the WM task, in a similar manner than the 
ratings they load on (Figure 3-3). A trend for a task x component interaction (F(83) = 3.0, p 
= .087) was also observed. For each component, a difference measure was computed 
between CRT and WM tasks and a paired t-test between these measures revealed a trend 
for a difference across tasks for one component more than the other (t = 1.73, p = .09). 
Paired t-test for each component indicated that the difference observed across tasks may be 
especially pronounced for ST-FSO (paired t-test for ST-FSO, t = 4.33, p < .001; for ST-PO, 
t = 1.84, p = .07). The results obtained here are very similar to the results obtained from 
raw probe data: i.e. all probe questions had significantly higher ratings in the CRT vs. the 
WM task, and future ratings were higher than past ratings, especially in the CRT task. Our 
PCA approach therefore yields results that are consistent with standard group-level 
averages and replicates previous findings showing that future-related thinking is higher 
during easy vs. hard tasks. 
  51   
 
Figure 3-2. PCA on SGT ratings 
PCA revealed two Principal components, one loading positively on Off-task, Future, Self and Other ratings 
(ST-FSO) and one loading positively on Off-task, Past and Other (ST-PO). PCA with Varimax Rotation was 
applied on 1200 thought probes i.e. regrouping probes from both tasks and all participants. 
Table 3-1. Component loadings obtained from the PCA with Varimax rotation on the SGT measures  
This information is graphically represented in Figure 3-2. 
 ST-FSO ST-PO 
Off .602 .555 
Other .485 .617 
Past -.115 .875 
Self .623 .106 
Future .852 -.041 
 
 
Figure 3-3. Mean SGT scores across subjects for each Principal Component and each task  
SGT scores were higher in the CRT than the WM task.  
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Table 3-2. Correlation matrix for SGT ratings, task performance and MEPS measures  
Significance levels are represented with 
+ 
(p-value < .1), 
*
(p-value < .05), 
**
(p-value < .01), and
 ***
(p-value 
< .001).  
 
Efficiency RM RT Error rate Off-task Detail Self Other Future Past 
 
CRT task 
RT -.071 -.089 1.000 
       
Error rate -.069 -.094 -.063 1.000 
      
Off-task -.052 .109 .002 -.103 1.000 
     
Detail -.144 -.261* .138 -.076 .027 1.000 
    
Self -.214* -.166 -.019 .141 .306** .107 1.000 
   
Other -.057 .157 -.201+ -.162 .694*** .073 .250* 1.000 
  
Future -.097 .044 -.120 -.155 .565*** .127 .436*** .600*** 1.000 
 
Past -.136 .042 -.028 .123 .400*** .085 .338** .501** .308* 1.000 
 
WM task 
RT -.152 -.196+ 1.000        
Error rate -.334** -.168 .262* 1.000       
Off-task -.173 .058 .012 .113 1.000      
Detail -.265* -.331** .242* .065 -.066 1.000     
Self -.117 -.103 -.108 .072 .447*** -.035 1.000    
Other -.219* .071 -.105 .098 .702*** -.121 .266* 1.000   
Future -.052 .057 -.107 .149 .472*** -.169 .379*** .531*** 1.000  
Past -.119 .103 -.052 -.007 .307*** -.096 .368*** .274* .235* 1.000 
 
3.3.2.2 Link between SGT and MEPS performance  
Table 3-2 shows Pearson’s correlations between probe ratings and MEPS measures. 
Although informative, raw correlations do not take into account the shared variance 
between measures (e.g. the relation between MEPS measures) or the nested structure of 
our data (e.g. within-subject sampling across cognitive tasks). To that end, we favoured the 
use of repeated measures ANOVAs that allow accounting for within- and between-subjects 
effects. To investigate the link between SGT and MEPS, we first performed a 2-Way 
repeated measure ANOVA with task as a single factor (CRT vs. WM), predicting off-task 
ratings from MEPS scores. We observed two main effects (Efficiency: F = 4.60, p < .04; 
RM: F = 4.04, p < .05) but no significant interactions. We therefore computed a mean off-
task score and ran a linear regression with Efficiency and RM as covariates. We observed 
that an increase in off-task was negatively correlated with Efficiency (t = -2.13, p < .04) 
but positively correlated with RM (t = 2.0, p < .05). These results seem to contrast with the 
raw correlations presented in Table 3-2. However, the significant effects may emerge when 
applying the ANOVA because both MEPS measures are included in a single analysis and 
as a consequence, control for each other. Our results therefore suggest that only the 
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individual variance of each measure (rather than their shared variance) has an opposite 
relationship with off-task. 
To investigate whether the link between off-task and MEPS varies according to 
SGT content, we performed a repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA (task: CRT, WM; 
components: ST-FSO, ST-PO) predicting SGT with MEPS measures as between-
participant covariates. We observed main effects for both Efficiency and RM (Efficiency: 
F = 7.63, p = .007, RM: F = 5.72, p = .02) but no significant interactions, suggesting that 
MEPS predicted SGT regardless of content. Separate ANOVAs indicated that both ST-
SFO and ST-PO had similar relations to MEPS performance (ANOVA predicting mean 
ST-PO score from MEPS performance, Efficiency: t = -3.19, p= .002, RM: t = 3.07, p 
= .003; ANOVA predicting mean ST-SFO score from MEPS Performance, Efficiency: t = 
-1.470, p= .14, RM: t = 1.01, p =.3). To visualize the results we computed a mean SGT 
score (mean SGT between ST-SFO and ST-PO, across both tasks) and performed a 
univariate ANOVA predicting mean SGT score again with MEPS scores as covariates. 
Mean SGT score was negatively predicted by Efficiency (t = -2.76, p = .007) but positively 
predicted by RM (t = 2.39, p < .02, Figure 3-4). To confirm that these results are not an 
artefact of applying the analysis at the trial level, we computed 2 “pseudo-components” by 
averaging the ratings that characterized ST-FSO and ST-PO (i.e. averaging the probe 
questions that had a loading coefficient higher than .40). This resulted in two pseudo-
components: i) pseudo-FSO (average of off-task, other, future and self ratings) and ii) 
pseudo-PO (average of off-task, other and past-ratings). Each pseudo-component was 
computed separately for each subject and each task, therefore only containing within-
subject variance, unlike the group-level PCA components which contain within-subject 
and between-subject variance. When implementing the 2-by-2 ANOVA with the pseudo-
components, we obtained very similar results (main effect of Efficiency, F(83) = 7.07, p 
= .009, main effect of RM, F(83) = 5.32, p = .02). This again confirms that our PCA 
approach yields results that are consistent with a standard group level average and did not 
lead to artificial results.  
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Figure 3-4. Link between SGT and MEPS performance  
Mean SGT was associated with higher number of RM (left panel) but lower Efficiency (right panel). Mean 
SGT Score corresponds to the mean of [ST-FSO in CRT, ST-FSO in WM, ST-PO in CRT and ST-PO in 
WM] computed for each subject. Black lines represent best-fitted linear regressions and grey areas represent 
95% confidence intervals.  
3.3.3 Link between social problem solving and cognitive tasks performance 
3.3.3.1  Link between MEPS and CRT / WM performance  
In addition to the link between SGT and social problem solving, our data also 
allowed us to look at the relationship between the MEPS and cognitive task performance 
i.e. whether efficient problem solvers were also good at performing the CRT and WM 
tasks. Pearson’s correlations between MEPS measures and task performance are reported 
in Table 3-2. We computed a measure of task performance, by averaging Error Rate and 
RT (previously z-scored) and reversing the score. This was calculated separately for the 
CRT and WM task. We computed a repeated-measures 2-way ANOVA (task: CRT, WM) 
predicting task performance with Efficiency and RM as covariates. This analysis revealed 
a trend for a triple interaction (task x Efficiency x RM, F = 3.52, p = .06) but no significant 
main effects (Efficiency, F = .67, p > .4; RM, F = .84, p > .3). Separate ANOVAs for each 
task indicated that the interaction between Efficiency and RM was almost significant in the 
WM task (t = -1.9, p = .06) but not in the CRT task (t = .21, p > .8). To visualize the 
interaction, we performed median splits on both Efficiency and RM and plotted these 
against WM task performance. As can be seen in Figure 3-5, WM performance was 
particularly poor when both Efficiency and RM were low. Although our result is only at 
trend level, it suggests that participants with poor performance at the WM task, but not the 
CRT, also performed poorly on the MEPS.  
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Figure 3-5. Link between MEPS and cognitive tasks performance  
Participants with poor WM performance also had poor MEPS performance (low efficiency, low RM). We 
performed median splits on Efficiency and RM scores and computed a measure of mean WM performance 
for each of the 4 groups of participants (both low Efficiency and RM, both high Efficiency and RM, low 
Efficiency – high RM, high Efficiency – low RM). Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
3.3.3.2 Shared variance between SGT and cognitive task performance  
As both WM task performance and SGT significantly predicted the MEPS, we 
investigated whether these two measures explained shared or separate MEPS variance. We 
conducted a repeated measures 2-Way ANOVA predicting MEPS Efficiency and RM, with 
WM task performance and mean WM SGT score as covariates. Both measures still 
significantly predicted MEPS performance (main effect of WM performance, F = 7.32, p 
= .008; WM mean SGT x MEPS interaction, F = 11.05, p = .001). Similarly to the previous 
analysis, WM performance was associated with poor overall MEPS (univariate ANOVA 
predicting mean MEPS performance, main effect of WM task performance: t = 2.81, p 
= .006). SGT was associated with increased RM and reduced Efficiency (univariate 
ANOVA for RM controlling for Efficiency, mean WM SGT: t = 2.81, p = .006; univariate 
ANOVA for Efficiency controlling for RM, mean WM SGT: t = -3.34, p = .001). This 
suggests that both WM performance and SGT explain distinct features of MEPS variance. 
3.3.4 Link between SGT and cognitive tasks performance 
Finally, we investigated the relation between SGT and the cognitive tasks being 
performed. To account for the nested structure of our data, we used a linear mixed model 
(Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012) in order to predict performance on each task based on 
SGT. p-values were estimated using the pvals.fnc function provided in the languageR 
package (Baayen, 2008). ST-PO, ST-FSO and Task (CRT, WM) were defined as fixed 
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effects and subject as a random effect. We observed a significant positive effect of ST-FSO 
on performance (t = 1.99, p < .05) whereas ST-PO had no significant effect (t = -.59, p 
> .5). In addition, an interaction between task and ST-FSO was also observed at trend level 
(t = -1.88, p = .06). ANOVAs performed separately on each task revealed a trend for an 
effect of ST-FSO on CRT performance (t = 1.84, p < .07) but not on WM performance (t = 
-.62, p > 0.5, Figure 3-6). This suggests that an increase in SGT directed towards the future, 
and involving oneself and others, may be associated with better task performance, 
especially during the CRT task. Again, we confirmed that these resulted were not artefacts 
caused by our PCA by performing the linear mixed model again using the pseudo-
components calculated before. The results were again very similar (main effect of pseudo-
FSO, t = 2.13, p = .02; main interaction between task and pseudo-FSO, t = -2.01, p = .04; 
effect of pseudo-PO, t = -1.72, p = .09; task x pseudo-PO x pseudo-FSO interaction, t = -
1.79, p = .08).  
 
Figure 3-6. Link between SGT and cognitive task performance  
Task performance was plotted against the ST-FSO Score for each subject, separately for each cognitive task. 
Increase in ST-FSO was associated with increased performance during the CRT task (left panel, p < .07) but 
had no significant effect in the WM task (right panel). Black lines represent best-fitted linear regressions and 
gray areas represent 95% confidence intervals. 
3.4 Discussion 
This study sets out to explore the relationship between social problem solving and 
SGT. We were interested in examining whether general SGT levels or specific types of 
SGT are linked to problem solving abilities. To define types of SGT, we decomposed our 
thought-sampling data using PCA at the trial level, which revealed two components that 
were differentiated by temporal focus (past vs. future) and both loaded strongly on other-
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related thoughts. This pattern of co-variance suggests that regardless of temporal focus, 
SGT often involves thoughts about other people and so is consistent with the general 
premise that many of these experiences may reflect attempts at solving social problems. 
When investigating the link between SGT and MEPS, we observed that increases in SGT 
levels, regardless of the content, were linked to reduced efficiency but increases in RM. 
Our findings therefore do not support the hypothesis that different types of SGT may have 
different links to social problem solving. It is possible that the absence of differentiation 
between types of SGT reflects idiosyncratic features of our sample, or a failure to 
operationalize the content of SGT in an appropriate manner. However, as we replicated the 
finding that future-related thinking was higher in the non-demanding CRT vs. WM task, 
our German sample is broadly similar to groups studied in a number of different countries 
(Smallwood et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Iijima and Tanno, 
2012; Song and Wang, 2012). Moreover, our finding that ST-FSO (but not ST-PO) varied 
with task demands and was associated with better performance on the CRT task 
demonstrates that our different measures of content are operationalized sufficiently well as 
to be able to differentiate between experimental manipulations and objective-dependent 
measures. It seems reasonable to assume that our failure to find evidence of a clear 
differentiation between specific content of SGT and social problem solving cannot 
therefore be explained by unique features of our population or from a failure to 
operationalize the content of SGT. Importantly, we obtained very similar findings when 
using pseudo-components computed at the group level, therefore demonstrating that our 
results did not arise because of a possible artefact arising from our PCA approach (see the 
Limitations section for a complete discussion of this issue).  
Although it remains a possibility that the association between SGT and social 
problem solving may depend on the content of thought if we had operationalized our 
questions differently, it is also possible that our results illustrate a general relationship 
between SGT and social problem solving. Plausibly SGT and social problem solving share 
a common dependence on the capacity to generate mental content that is based on memory 
rather than a direct representation of reality as it is now. This is consistent with accounts of 
SGT that emphasize that the unique features of such experiences is the motivated 
generation of mental content that are distinct from perception (Smallwood, 2013a) and 
with formulations of problem solving which emphasize the importance of generative 
thinking in the production of novel solution steps. It is also consistent with prior work 
showing that individuals who engage in daydreaming (as assessed via a retrospective 
measure) generate more solutions to creative problems (Baird et al., 2012). More generally, 
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the positive association between SGT and RM is consistent with the Current Concerns 
Hypothesis proposed by Eric Klinger (Klinger, 1978, 1999). According to this hypothesis, 
cognition is often devoted to events that are salient to individuals, and when the external 
environment lacks sufficiently compelling input, individuals engage in SGT to provide a 
source of stimulation. As the Current Concerns Hypothesis assumes that the motivating 
feature for SGT is an attempt to resolve personal concerns, it elegantly captures our finding 
that individuals who habitually engage in SGT generate more RM in order to solve the 
MEPS problems. 
Not only was SGT associated with more RM, it was also associated with a 
reduction in the effectiveness of the solutions, as judged by our independent raters. One 
interpretation of this result is that the relation between SGT and social problem solving 
may take the form of Yerkes-Dodson relationship, with optimal problem solving being 
achieved by individuals who display a suitable balance between SGT and cognition 
derived from perceptual input. Plausibly, there may be three different populations of 
problem-solvers: one who generates low levels of SGT and produces short but efficient 
solutions to problems, a second who produces large numbers of solutions with reasonable 
levels of efficiency and a third who generates the most steps but whose solutions are 
ineffective. Although speculative, this interpretation of our data is consistent with evidence 
that SGT can have both costs and benefits to task performance (for a review, see 
Smallwood, 2013). Moreover, it suggests a reason why interventions that cultivate 
mindfulness and which reduce the tendency for mind-wandering (Mrazek, Franklin, 
Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012) may be 
beneficial in daily life. By restraining the mind’s habitual tendency to wander, 
interventions that emphasize being in the moment may help individuals gain a degree of 
control over SGT which may in turn allow them to employ this basic capacity for 
conscious thought to generate problem solutions in a more efficient manner. 
We also found that participants with poor problem solving abilities (characterized 
by both low RM and Efficiency) performed poorly on a moderately demanding WM task 
when controlling for SGT. As the WM task relies on greater controlled processing than 
does the CRT, this suggests that the capacity to deploy controlled processing to an external 
task and to social problem solving relies on similar cognitive processes (such as working 
memory or attentional resources). This is consistent with prior studies that have 
demonstrated that individuals high on measures of controlled processing are also good 
problem solvers, as well as fMRI investigations which link domain general processes of 
control to the solution of both spatial and autobiographical problems (Spreng et al., 2010). 
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Finally, a positive link between SGT and task performance was in particular observed 
during the non-demanding CRT task and may reflect the finding that future-related thought 
in the CRT is linked to higher working memory (Baird et al., 2011). Our result of better 
performance associated with ST-FSO is in contrast to other studies that find that in general, 
experience unrelated to a task elicits a negative influence on task performance (for a 
review see Smallwood, 2011). This result suggests that future studies understanding the 
negative influence of SGT on task performance should take in account both task context as 
well as the content of thoughts (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). 
3.5 Limitations  
The overarching framework guiding the current study is the hypothesis that 
meaningful psychological information is contained in the variation in SGT content across 
situations and individuals (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). As a consequence, we 
sought to define categories of SGT that have the potential to simultaneously vary within 
and between participants. We applied unconstrained PCA at the trial level and examined 
how the resultant components varied in a quantitative fashion across individuals and 
situations. This novel approach allowed us to investigate three types of psychological 
relationships to SGT: (i) possible within-subjects effects on the SGT content (e.g. “Does 
SGT vary depending on the task?”), (ii) between-subject effects (e.g. “Does SGT content 
vary according to MEPS performance?”) and (iii) their interaction (e.g. “Do certain 
individuals exhibit different patterns of thoughts in different contexts?”). Given the novelty 
of our data analysis strategy, it is worth explicitly considering its strengths and weaknesses. 
One practical question is whether our approach yields results that are either 
unreliable or inconsistent with what is known about SGT: this would provide 
straightforward evidence that this approach lacks utility. In terms of replicability, the PCA 
components we obtained in the current study have a striking resemblance to previously 
published SGT components obtained from an independent dataset (Ruby, Smallwood, 
Engen, et al., 2013). This consistency across datasets suggests that the components 
obtained from an unconstrained trial-level PCA are reasonably reliable. Our work using the 
trial-by-trial PCA also found results consistent with previous findings in the SGT literature. 
In terms of within-participant variance, ST-FSO was higher in a non-demanding task: this 
is consistent with a prospective bias to SGT found by several different laboratories 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2011; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Smallwood, Nind, 
et al., 2009; Song & Wang, 2012). Our PCA approach also yielded group-level effects that 
have been demonstrated by prior studies. Ruby and colleagues reported that ST-PO is 
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linked to higher BDI scores (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013), an observation that is 
consistent with the elevated retrospective focus found in dysphoria and unhappiness 
(Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011; Stawarczyk, Majerus, & 
D’Argembeau, 2013). The application of PCA at the trial level therefore captures both 
within and between-participant variation consistent with other methods of analysis. 
Altogether this suggests that trial level PCA can yield reliable results that are both 
replicable and are consistent with prior work. 
There are also theoretical questions regarding how to best decompose SGT in order 
to characterize the psychological correlates of the within and between-participant variance 
in thought content (for a review see Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 
2013). Dimension reduction techniques can be employed that control for both within and 
between-subject variance during data decomposition e.g. multi-level exploratory factor 
analysis (Reise, Ventura, Nuechterlein, & Kim, 2005). These provide a more generalizable 
description of the thoughts of the population because they seek covariance that is common 
across the sample (or to a particular context). These techniques make categorizing 
variation across individuals, or contexts, more difficult, because by optimizing the 
decomposition process to seek commonality, differences across people or context are a 
feature of the unexplained variance. As we are interested in describing the psychological 
significance of the co-variance between and within participants, we did not want to 
constrain the decomposition process using this information. Instead, we tested the 
psychological features of within and between-participant variance derived from our 
unconstrained PCA by including the individual and context as factors in the subsequent 
analysis. Our demonstration that ST-FSO was higher in the CRT task (i.e. within-
participant variance) for individuals who performed the task especially well (i.e. between-
participant variance, see Figure 3-6) indicates that we were successful in this regard. 
Although the specific features of SGT that we find using trial-by-trial PCA may not 
generalize to other samples, this result demonstrates that co-variance across both tasks and 
participants provide meaningful psychological information regarding the content of 
thought (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood, 2013a). A second alternative 
would be to employ PCA separately to each task at the group level; this would allow an 
investigation of qualitative differences in PCA structure in different contexts; however it 
would make it impossible to quantify how specific patterns of thought change across 
situations because the PCA components calculated in this fashion would not be directly 
comparable. While the possibility remains that the application of PCA at the trial level 
could lead to unrepresentative results, the available data suggests that the technique yields 
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results that are (i) reliable across independent data sets, (ii) provides valid accounts of 
existing phenomena, (iii) captures psychological differences that are contained in the 
patterns of covariance in multiple reports of SGT and (iv) allows the quantitative capture 
of both within and between-subject co-variation in different aspects of SGT. We suggest 
that future research should continue to use this technique in an exploratory fashion because 
of its potential value in mapping the heterogeneity of SGT that arises through the 
combination of the constraints placed by different environmental situations and the range 
of individual differences that contribute to the content of thought. 
There are a number of further limitations that should be borne in mind when 
considering our data. Concerning our methodological approach, we only administered a 
measure of social problem solving and it remains to be seen whether the link between 
problem solving and control processes or SGT is specific to the social domain or may 
generalize to other forms of problem resolution. In addition, although problems were 
chosen to mimic daily-life concerns, they remain hypothetical. Anderson and colleagues 
(Anderson, Goddard, & Powell, 2009) compared measures of problem solving abilities 
obtained from the MEPS and from a “Real-Life problem solving diary task”, in which 
participants’ reported a problem when it occurs and describe afterwards the strategy they 
used to solve it. Although they found that the performance at both tasks could predict 
future depressive symptoms, they also observed that both measures explained different 
portions of variance and did not correlate. This suggests that, although the MEPS remains 
an important tool as it measures the ability to generate responses to problems under 
laboratory conditions, Anderson notes that “it is the successful implementation of such 
strategies that ultimately impacts upon the situation’s outcome” (p. 54 Anderson et al., 
2009). Although our data suggests that individuals reporting more SGT may also have 
improved problem solving skills, it does not allow us to draw conclusions regarding their 
actual success in daily life. Our data is also correlational and though our results confirm 
links between social problem solving and SGT, we cannot identify whether fluency at 
social problem causes SGT or vice versa, nor can we specify the mechanism that links 
these two phenomena without further study. Based on studies showing a positive relation 
between MEPS performance and autobiographical memory retrieval (e.g. Evans et al., 
1992; Goddard et al., 1997, 1996) and the link between SGT and autobiographical memory 
(Baird et al., 2011; Smallwood, 2013a), the association between SGT and social problem 
solving may emerge through their mutual requirement of autobiographical memory. One 
important future direction would therefore be to assess memory capacities or to use 
neuroimaging methods to determine the specific cognitive processes that mediate the link 
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between social problem solving skills and SGT (e.g. Spreng et al., 2010). Given that social 
problem solving is important to the success of every member of society, understanding the 
mechanism that links this experience to states of perceptually-guided thought and 
particularly SGT are recommended. 
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Chapter 4.  
Relation between Self-Concept and SGT  
4.1 Introduction  
The evidence presented in Chapter 3 provides initial support for the predictions that 
distinct types of SGT can be statistically identified based on the content of the thoughts, 
and that these different SGT types may possess heterogeneous functional outcomes. The 
current chapter aims to gather further evidence in favour of these predictions by 
investigating the relation between SGT and the sense of self (or self-concept).  
A large body of research highlights that individuals’ SGT strongly relates to 
individuals’ sense of who they are and how they see themselves i.e. their self-concept 
(Markus, 1987). As reviewed by Gruberger, Ben-Simon, Levkovitz, Zangen, & Hendler 
(2011), SGT can be considered as a “continuous self-referential processing” which 
supports the ongoing creation and maintenance of a sense of self. Empirical evidence for 
this claim can be found in recently published studies. For example, D’Argembeau, Lardi, 
& Van der Linden (2012) found that projecting oneself into the past or the future has self-
defining properties i.e. both types of simulations provide individuals self-relevant 
information that can be used to create and shape one’s sense of self. In addition, SGT often 
involves projecting oneself into the past or the future (Baird et al., 2011; Engert et al., 
2014; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Nind, et 
al., 2009; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011; Tusche et al., 2014) and focuses on current concerns i.e. self-relevant, 
unresolved issues and ongoing goals (Baird et al., 2011; Cole & Berntsen, 2015; Klinger, 
1978, 1999; Mason & Reinholtz, 2015). These self-projections create a sense of continuity 
between one’s past, present and future self, therefore maintaining one’s self-concept 
(Gruberger et al., 2011). Taken together, these studies illustrate that SGT is strongly 
related to one’s sense of self.  
Nevertheless, evidence also suggests that the relation between SGT and self-
concept may vary according to the content of the thoughts generated. Baird et al. (2011) 
and Cole & Berntsen (2015) found that especially future-directed, rather than past-directed 
thoughts, were goal-related and self-relevant. Using experience sampling and Principal 
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Component Analysis (PCA), Ruby et al. (2013) identified distinct types of SGT based on 
the shared variance between the temporal, social and emotional dimensions of thoughts. 
Future SGT consisted in self-related future thoughts, whereas Past SGT was characterised 
by other-related past thinking. These results suggest that future thoughts may involve self-
related information more frequently than past thoughts. Altogether, both lines of evidence 
suggest that self-referential processes may be preferentially recruited during the simulation 
of future events rather than the reminiscence of past events.  
Smallwood and colleagues tested this hypothesis in two independent studies 
(Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). In the first study, they found that priming participants 
to reflect on themselves led to subsequent increases in future thinking, but not past 
thinking. In the second study, they found that participants who generated more future-
directed thoughts were better able to remember previously-presented self-related vs. other-
related words (i.e. they had a stronger self-reference effect). Altogether, these results 
support the idea that self-referential processes may be preferentially involved in future 
rather than past-focused SGT.  
Based on these findings, we propose that the link between SGT and self-concept 
may vary according to the content of the thoughts. For example, imagine Robert got 
recently fired from his job. Ruminating negatively about his lost job may lead Robert to 
carry a sense of failure and may therefore negatively affect his self-concept. On the 
contrary, planning his future actions with the goal of finding a job that fits better with his 
competences may lead Robert to reflect on his valuable skills and may therefore positively 
influence his self-concept. This example illustrates our hypothesis that SGT may have 
heterogeneous consequences on one’s sense of self depending on the content of the 
thoughts spontaneously generated. In addition to improving the understanding of the link 
between SGT and self-concept, findings in favour of this hypothesis will illustrate our 
prediction that different types of SGT can have heterogeneous functional outcomes, and 
therefore that SGT can be considered as a heterogeneous phenomenon.  
As well as providing evidence for SGT heterogeneities, the current study also aims 
to shed light on the mechanism underlying the link between SGT and self-concept. We 
propose that the mechanism supporting the relation between SGT and self-concept relies 
on the capacity of SGT to manipulate and consolidate information from a self-relevant 
event and to transfer this information into one’s sense of self (see also Gruberger et al., 
2011). For example, imagine Charlie got recently married. Remembering events such as 
the moment he and his partner said “yes”, or imagining moving in a new house with his 
partner may allow Charlie to start considering himself as a married man. We suggest that 
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these SGT may help him assimilate the wedding as part of his personal history, integrate it 
into his definition of who he is and who he will be in the future, which as a consequence 
will shape his self-concept.  
Current experiment 
The current study aims to shed light on i) the role of SGT content in the relation 
between SGT and self-concept, and ii) the mechanism underlying this relation. To this end, 
our experiment consisted in priming a particular mind-set in participants, followed by 
measuring SGT while they performed a short cognitive task. Subsequently, their self-
concept was assessed using the Twenty Statements Test (TST, Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 
1999; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954).  This experimental design allowed us to explore 
whether SGT support the transfer of information from an event (i.e. priming) into one’s 
self-concept, and whether this depends on the content of the SGT generated.  
In order to induce a particular mind-set, we used the pronoun circling task (Gardner 
et al., 1999; Kühnen & Haberstroh, 2004) which is traditionally used in social psychology 
to prime either independent or interdependent views of the self (defining oneself using 
personal characteristics and traits e.g. “I am a cheerful person”, or defining oneself by 
including relationships and other individuals e.g. “I am the mother of two children”). We 
hypothesised that priming would influence the social dimension of SGT (e.g. thinking 
about oneself, about others) as well as the temporal dimension of SGT, similarly to 
findings published by Smallwood, Schooler, et al. (2011). We also manipulated the content 
and occurrence of SGT by changing the demands of the cognitive task. Participants 
performed either an easy non-demanding Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task or a harder 
Working Memory (WM) task that requires more cognitive resources to be performed 
appropriately. These two tasks have been used extensively in the mind-wandering research 
to manipulate SGT occurrence (Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013; Smallwood, 
Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood, Ruby, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). In 
particular, SGT levels are lower during the WM vs. CRT task as less cognitive resources 
can be devoted towards internal mentation. Furthermore, the content of the thoughts is also 
altered by the task manipulation, with participants reporting SGT that are less future-, self- 
and other-related (Chapter 3 and Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Smallwood et al., 2009). Taken 
together, we propose that the effects of priming and task difficulty on SGT will depend on 
the interaction between the two manipulations. For example, whereas SGT occurrence may 
be reduced during the WM task, priming may overcome this effect and increase self or 
other-related SGT. Both manipulations therefore provide boundary conditions under which 
to investigate the potential links between SGT and self-concept. 
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Overall, our experiment had a 3 x 2 between-subject design, with participants first 
undergoing one of 3 priming conditions (independent, interdependent or no priming at all) 
and then performing one of the cognitive tasks (either CRT or WM task). The social (self, 
other), temporal (future, past) and emotional (negative, positive) content of SGT was 
measured using experience sampling and PCA was employed to characterise distinct types 
of thoughts (see Chapter 2 for more details). Mood levels were also recorded during the 
cognitive task as several lines of evidence have found a robust relation between SGT and 
mood (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood, 
Fitzgerald, et al., 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). Following the cognitive task, 
participants completed the TST which consists in participants providing 20 answers to the 
question “Who am I?”. Answers are usually rated according to whether they reflect an 
independent or interdependent sense of self (Gardner et al., 1999; Kühnen & Haberstroh, 
2004). We extended the TST coding scheme to also include coding of temporal (future, 
past) and emotional (negative, positive) features of the responses, paralleling the 
dimensions of SGT. This allowed us to investigate in more detail how different types of 
SGT may mirror different aspects of self-concept.    
The current study tested two hypotheses: i) the relation between SGT and self-
concept varies according to thought content and ii) SGT allows the transfer of information 
from a self-relevant event to participants’ self-concept. To this end, we first explored how 
priming and task manipulation influenced SGT. Next, we explored whether SGT and self-
concept were related, and how the experimental manipulations affected this link. For 
example, Future SGT but not Past SGT may relate to individual differences in TST 
measures, as predicted by (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). However, the content of 
SGT measured during the WM task may not relate to aspects of self-concept as thoughts 
might be constrained by the limited cognitive resources devoted to internal mentation (e.g. 
Smallwood et al., 2013). Finally, our experiment also allowed us to assess how priming 
and task manipulation affected the link between SGT content and i) mood levels and ii) 
task performance.  
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
The study was part of a broader research project which was approved by the Ethics 
Commission of the Medical Faculty of the University of Leipzig under the code 360-10-
13122010. We recruited 182 individuals from the database of the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany (mean age = 24.8 years, age 
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range 18–35 years, 113 females). All of them were native German speakers, had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, no history of psychiatric or neurological conditions and no 
history of substance abuse. Ten participants were subsequently excluded from the analysis 
due to low accuracy on the cognitive tasks (cut-off: .70). 
4.2.2 Experimental session 
Participants were randomly assigned to a priming condition (independent, 
interdependent, or no priming) and to a cognitive task (CRT or WM). The experiment 
lasted approximately one hour and participants were remunerated 7 Euro. Participants 
undergoing priming started with the pronoun circling task, followed by the cognitive task 
and finishing with the TST. Participants who did not undergo priming started the 
experiment directly with the cognitive task. Distribution of the participants across 
conditions was as follow: independent priming (CRT/WM): 30, 30; interdependent 
priming (CRT/WM): 29, 28; no priming (CRT/WM): 29, 26. Mean age and gender 
distribution did not differ across conditions (univariate ANOVA testing for age differences 
between conditions, F(5,163) = .66, p > .6; Pearson's Chi-squared test for gender 
distribution across conditions, X
2
(5) = 4.36, p > .4). 
4.2.3 Self-construal priming  
Priming was done using an adapted version of the pronoun circling task (Gardner et 
al., 1999; Kühnen & Haberstroh, 2004). The task consists in reading two short paragraphs 
and circling all 20 pronouns present in the text. In the independent condition, the pronouns 
represented the individual self (e.g., “I,” “me,” “mine”), while in the interdependent 
condition the pronouns represented the relational self (e.g., “we,” “our,” “us”). Previous 
studies have shown that this task is efficient at influencing individuals’ self-concept 
towards more independent or interdependent descriptions (Gardner et al., 1999; Kühnen & 
Haberstroh, 2004). In the current experiment, we hoped to prime the social dimension of 
SGT e.g. increase reports of self- or other-related thoughts.  
4.2.4 Cognitive task 
Participants performed either the CRT task (n = 88) or the WM task (n = 84) for 18 
min, during which SGT was recorded using experience sampling (average number of 
probes: CRT, M = 8.12, SE = .2; WM, M = 8.35, SE = .2). Participants reported whether 
their thoughts were on or off-task, future-focused, past-focused, self-focused, other-
focused, negative and positive. Before each probe, participants also rated how negative and 
how positive their mood was. Participants answered the questions using sliders ranging 
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from “Not at all” to “Completely”. In total, 1490 probes were recorded across 172 
participants. For more details regarding the cognitive task and experience sampling, the 
reader is referred to Chapter 2.  
4.2.5 Twenty Statements Test  
During the TST, participants were asked to provide 20 answers to the question 
“Who am I?” (Gardner et al., 1999; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Three independent raters 
blind to the conditions coded all answers on the following dimensions: other-related (if the 
description involved other individuals e.g. “I am the mother of two children”), future-
related, past-related, negative and positive. For each dimension, we then averaged the 
ratings across the three raters (Inter-rater reliability Cronbach’s α, Other: α = .75; Past: α 
= .78, Future: α = .81, Negative: α = .93, Positive: α = .88). We then computed three 
variables for each participant: i) Social score (averaged proportion of other-related 
statements), ii) Temporal score (averaged proportion of future-related minus proportion of 
past-related statements) and iii) Emotional score (averaged proportion of positive minus 
proportion of negative statements).   
4.3 Results  
4.3.1 Definition of SGT types  
4.3.1.1 Thought probe descriptives 
We first investigated how priming and task manipulation influenced participants’ 
SGT (Figure 4-1). We conducted a univariate ANOVA to determine whether off-task 
reports varied depending on priming (independent, interdependent, none) and/or Cognitive 
task (CRT, WM). We observed a trend for a main effect of cognitive task (F(1,166) = 3.63, 
p = .06). A post-hoc t-test revealed that off-task reports were higher during CRT vs. WM 
task at trend level (t(169) = 1.91, p = .06), replicating previous findings (e.g. Smallwood et 
al., 2013). 
Next, we tested whether the social content of SGT (i.e. self, other ratings) changed 
depending on the manipulations (Figure 4-1). We computed a repeated measures ANOVA 
with probe ratings predicted by probe type (self, other), cognitive task (CRT, WM) and 
priming (independent, interdependent, none). We observed a main effect of probe type 
(F(1, 166) = 18.24, p < .001), a main effect of cognitive task (F(1, 166) = 4.25, p = .04) and 
a trend for a main effect of priming (F(2,166) = 2.30, p = .1). Post-hoc t-tests were 
computed. SGT content was significantly more self- than other-related (t(342) = 3.19, p 
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= .002). Social ratings were overall higher in CRT vs. WM task (t(165) = 1.97, p = .05), 
replicating previous findings (Chapter 3 and Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013).  
Finally, social ratings were overall higher after independent vs. interdependent priming 
(t(114) = 2.07, p = .04). However, ratings after priming were not significantly different 
compared to no priming (independent vs. none, t(113) = 1.11, p > .2; interdependent vs. 
none, t(110) = 97, p > .3).  
We also investigated whether the temporal content of SGT changed according to 
priming and/or cognitive task (Figure 4-1). A repeated measures ANOVA predicting probe 
ratings from probe type (future, past), cognitive task (CRT, WM) and priming 
(independent, interdependent, none) revealed a main effect of probe type (F(1, 166) = 
137.25, p < .001) and a trend for an interaction between probe type and cognitive task (F(1, 
166) = 3.28, p = .07). Post-hoc t-tests showed that SGT content was more future- than past-
related (t(326) = 9.53, p < .001). In addition, there was a trend for SGT being more future-
related during CRT vs. WM task (t(170) = 1.78, p = .08). Both results are consistent with 
previous findings (Chapter 3 and Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Nind, 
et al., 2009; Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). 
Finally, we investigated the emotional content of SGT (Figure 4-1). A repeated 
measures ANOVA predicting probe ratings from probe type (negative, positive), cognitive 
task (CRT, WM) and priming (independent, interdependent, none) revealed a main effect 
of probe type (F(1, 166) = 131.18, p < .001) and a significant interaction between probe 
type and cognitive task (F(1, 166) = 6.92, p = .009). Thoughts were overall more positive 
than negative (t(342) = 14.83, p < .001), and more positive in the CRT vs. WM task (t(168) 
= 3.24, p = .001). 
Altogether, these results highlight that the characteristics of the SGT data are 
similar to previously published datasets (Baird et al., 2011; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood, Schooler, et 
al., 2011). In particular, participants reported SGT that were more future- than past related 
as well as more self- than other-related. However, the findings show that priming did not 
significantly increase social ratings contrary to our expectations.  
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Figure 4-1. Variations in thought content depending on priming and task manipulation 
The boxplots illustrate that off-task thinking was higher during the CRT task vs. WM task. SGT was 
significantly more future- than past-related, more self than other-related and more positive than negative. 
SGT was also more positive in the CRT vs. WM task.  Finally, SGT was more self- and other-related 
following an independent vs. interdependent priming. Abbreviations: CRT: choice reaction time, SGT: self-
generated thought, WM: working memory.  
4.3.1.2 Principal Component Analysis 
In order to statistically determine different types of thought, we computed a PCA 
with Varimax rotation on rating data obtained from the 1420 probes (i.e. pooling together 
data recorded across all participants and all conditions). We obtained 3 principal 
components (PC) that explained 70% of variance in our data (Figure 4-2; Table 4-1): i) 
Future SGT, loading positively on Future, Off-task, Other and Self questions; ii) Emotion 
SGT, loading positively on Negative and negatively on Positive questions; and iii) Past 
SGT, loading positively on Past, Other and Off-task questions. Our results were similar to 
findings obtained in Chapter 3 and to previously published data (Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). Overall, the PC represent three unique types of thoughts: 
prospective, retrospective and emotional processes.  
Using the PC loadings, we computed averaged SGT scores (see Chapter 2 for more 
details). We also reversed the average scores for Emotion PC, so that a higher average 
would reflect more positive SGT. These averages describe how much a participant’s SGT 
loads on the three types of thoughts identified by the PCA, and these scores will be used as 
regressors in subsequent analyses. 
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Figure 4-2. Principal Component Analysis of probe data 
The principal component analysis of the thought sampling data (n = 172 participants, 1420 probes) revealed 
three PC that explained 70% of the variance present in our data. The three PC can be described as: i) Future 
SGT, loading positively on off-task, future, self and other ratings; ii) Emotion SGT, loading positively on the 
negative ratings and negatively on the positive ratings, and iii) Past SGT, loading positively on off-task, past 
and other ratings. Abbreviations: PC: principal component, SGT: self-generated thought.  
Table 4-1. Results of the Principal Component Analysis 
The table presents the loadings of each probe question on the three principal components (PC) generated 
using principal component analysis. 70% of variance in the probe data was explained by the three PC. See 
Figure 4-2 for a graphical representation of the loadings.  
 
Principal Components 
Future Emotion Past 
Off-task 0.65 0.13 0.33 
Other 0.47 -0.16 0.63 
Past 0.03 0.12 0.90 
Self 0.70 0.13 0.12 
Future 0.86 -0.07 -0.04 
Negative 0.16 0.87 0.12 
Positive 0.04 -0.90 0.06 
 
Eigen values 2.35 1.60 0.96 
 
4.3.2 Effects of priming and task manipulation  
The following sections will explore the effect of task manipulation and priming on 
SGT. Based on previous findings, we hypothesised that SGT scores will be lower in the 
WM vs. CRT task, especially for Future SGT (Chapter 3 and Iijima & Tanno, 2012; 
Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009). In addition, we also hypothesised that priming may 
influence Future and Past SGT, similarly to findings provided by Smallwood, Schooler, et 
al. (2011). We also explored the relation between SGT and mood levels, as well as the 
relation between SGT and task performance, with the aim to highlight potential effects of 
priming and task manipulation.  
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4.3.2.1 SGT occurrence 
First, we investigated whether SGT scores varied according to priming and/or 
cognitive task (Figure 4-3). A Multivariate ANOVA predicting SGT scores (Future, 
Emotion, Past) from priming (independent, interdependent, none) and cognitive task (CRT, 
WM) revealed a main effect of cognitive task (F(1,166) = 5.12, p = .002). Post-hoc t-tests 
showed that SGT was more future-related and more positive during the CRT vs. WM task 
(Future SGT, t(170) = 2.54, p = .01; Emotion SGT, t(168) = 2.71, p = .007), replicating 
Chapter 3 results. Past SGT did not vary between tasks (t(169) = .23, p > .8). Altogether, 
this shows that our task manipulation (but not priming) had a significant effect on 
participants’ SGT.   
 
Figure 4-3. Influence of task manipulation on SGT scores  
Individuals reported thoughts that were significantly more future-related and more positive during the CRT 
vs. the WM task.  Abbreviations: CRT: choice reaction time, SGT: self-generated thought, WM: working 
memory.  
4.3.2.2 Mood levels  
Previous studies have shown that mood levels and SGT are linked, and that this 
relation varies according to the content of the thoughts (e.g. Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). In the current study, we 
were able to investigate whether this relation was influenced by priming and task 
manipulation. Beforehand, we explored whether mood levels varied across groups. A 
univariate ANOVA predicting mood from cognitive task (CRT, WM) and priming 
(independent, interdependent, non) revealed a significant effect of cognitive task (F(1, 166) 
= 9.6, p = .002). Subsequent t-test revealed that participants’ mood levels were higher 
during the CRT vs. WM task (t(170) = 3.06, p = .003).  
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4.3.2.3 Relation between mood levels and SGT 
Next, we explored the link between SGT content and mood levels, as well as the 
effect of task manipulation and priming. We ran a repeated measures ANOVA with SGT 
scores as dependent variables and mood, SGT type (Future, Emotion, Past), priming 
(independent, interdependent, none) and cognitive task (CRT, WM) as independent 
variables. We observed a significant interaction between SGT type and cognitive task 
(F(2,320) = 5.40, p = .005). We also observed a significant interaction between SGT type 
and mood (F(2,320) = 111.79, p < .001), and a triple interaction between SGT type, 
priming and mood (F(4,320) = 2.66, p = .03). Post-hoc univariate ANOVAs were carried 
out, predicting each SGT type from priming and mood. 
The univariate ANOVA predicting Emotion SGT revealed a significant effect of 
mood (F(1,166) = 588.75, p < .001) and an interaction between priming and mood 
(F(2,166) = 2.63, p = .08). However, correlations separate for each priming condition 
showed that Emotion SGT and mood levels were strongly correlated across all situations 
(all r >.85 and p < .001).  
The univariate ANOVA predicting Past SGT revealed a significant interaction 
between mood and priming (F(2, 166) = 3.54, p = .03). Separate correlations for each 
priming condition revealed that Past SGT was negatively correlated with mood only after 
interdependent priming, but not after independent or no priming (Figure 4-4a; Independent, 
r = .12, p > .3; interdependent, r = -.30, p = .02; none, r = .14, p > .3). No significant effect 
was observed when computing the univariate ANOVA for Future SGT.    
 
Figure 4-4. Link between Past SGT, mood levels and cognitive task performance  
Following interdependent priming, Past SGT significantly predicted low mood levels (a, right panel) and was 
associated with reduced cognitive task efficiency (b, right panel). These negative effects were not observed 
following independent priming or without priming. Abbreviation: SGT: self-generated thought.  
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4.3.2.4 Relation between cognitive task performance and SGT 
Prior studies also provide evidence that the relation between SGT and task 
performance varies according to thought content (Chapter 3 and Baird et al., 2011). We 
therefore investigated whether a relationship existed in our data between SGT content and 
cognitive task performance, and whether this was influenced by priming and/or cognitive 
task. 
First, we computed a measure of task efficiency by z-scoring the error rate and RT, 
computing an average of the two measures and reversing this score. We then performed a 
repeated measures ANOVA predicting SGT scores from task efficiency, SGT type (Future, 
Emotion, Past), priming (independent, interdependent, none) and cognitive task (CRT, 
WM). We observed a triple interaction (SGT type x task efficiency x priming, F(4,320) = 
3.59, p = .007) as well as a quadruple interaction (SGT type x task efficiency  x priming x 
cognitive task, F(4,320) = 3.91, p = .004). Post-hoc univariate ANOVAs were carried out 
for each SGT type separately.  
For Future SGT, we observed a significant interaction between task efficacy, 
priming and cognitive task (Figure 4-5, F(2,160) = 4.80, p = .009). To follow-up this 
interaction, we ran additional univariate ANOVAs separately for each cognitive task. In 
the CRT condition, we observed a significant interaction (task efficiency x priming, 
F(2,82) = 3.53, p = .03), caused by task efficiency and Future SGT being negatively 
correlated after independent priming (although at a non-significant level, r = -.29, p = .12), 
but positively correlated without priming (r = .40, p = .03). No correlation was observed 
between the two variables after interdependent priming (r = .05, p > .7). In the WM 
condition, the task efficiency x priming interaction was also significant (F(2,78) = 7.80, p 
< .001). Task efficiency and Future SGT were positively correlated after independent 
priming or without priming (independent, r = .35, p = .06; none, r = .39, p = .05), but 
negatively correlated after interdependent priming (r = -.48, p = .01). In summary, these 
results show that Future SGT predicted better task performance without priming, 
replicating previous findings (Chapter 3). In addition, interdependent priming changed this 
relationship, causing Future SGT and WM task performance to become negatively 
correlated.  
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Figure 4-5. Link between Future SGT and cognitive task performance  
Without priming, Future SGT predicted significant increases in CRT and WM task efficiency (middle panels). 
Following interdependent priming, Future SGT predicted significant decreases in WM task efficiency 
(bottom right panel). On the contrary, independent priming led to a positive correlation between Future SGT 
and WM task efficiency (left bottom panel). Abbreviations: CRT: choice reaction time, SGT: self-generated 
thought, WM: working memory.  
Next, the univariate ANOVA predicting Past SGT from task efficiency, priming 
(independent, interdependent, none) and cognitive task (CRT, WM) revealed a significant 
interaction between priming and task efficiency (F(2,160) = 4.40, p = .01). Past SGT and 
task efficiency were positively correlated at trend level without priming (r = .23, p = .09) 
but negatively correlated after interdependent priming (Figure 4-4b; r = -.43, p < .001). The 
variables were not significantly correlated after independent priming (r = -.01, p > .9).   
Finally, the univariate ANOVA predicting Emotion SGT from task efficiency, 
priming (independent, interdependent, none) and cognitive task (CRT, WM) revealed a 
significant interaction between cognitive task, priming and task efficiency (F(2,160) = 4.10, 
p = .02). Univariate ANOVAs separate for each cognitive task revealed a significant 
interaction between priming and task efficiency only in the CRT condition (CRT: F(2,82) 
= 3.43, p = .04; WM: F(2,78) = 1.38, p > .2). There was a trend for positive SGT being 
associated with poor CRT task efficiency, only without priming (independent: r = .15, p 
> .4; interdependent: r = .25, p = .19, none: r = -.36, p = .06).  
Overall, our data suggest that both Future and Past SGT are linked to better task 
performance under “normal” conditions. On the contrary, interdependent priming causes 
both types of SGT to be associated with poor task efficiency. This suggests that 
interdependent priming may lead to more cognitive resources being devoted towards 
internal vs. external mentation, leading to decreases in task performance.   
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4.3.2.5 Link between Past SGT, mood and cognitive task performance  
The results described above suggest that Past SGT is associated with both low 
mood and poor task efficiency after interdependent priming (Figure 4-4). To test whether 
these two effects are independent from each other, we conducted a regression analysis on 
data obtained from the interdependent priming condition (n = 57 participants), predicting 
Past SGT from mood and task efficiency. Both covariates significantly predicted Past SGT, 
but no significant interaction was observed (Model: F(3,53) = 5.82, R
2
= .25, p = .001; 
Mood: t = -2.08, p = .04; task efficiency: t = -2.92, p = .005; Mood x Cognitive task 
efficiency: t = .65, p > .5). This result suggests that the negative relation between Past SGT 
and poor task performance is not mediated by low mood levels.  
4.3.3 Relation between SGT types and self-concept 
In the last set of analyses, we explored whether SGT allowed the transfer of 
information from the prime to self-concept. To this end, we explored whether TST 
measures varied due to priming and/or task manipulation, and whether individual 
differences in SGT content predicted individual differences in TST measures.  
4.3.3.1 TST descriptives 
Altogether, 22.8% of the answers provided by participants were classified as 
interdependent / other-related. In addition, answers were positively biased (t(171) = 8.85, p 
<.001. Average Emotional TST: .14, range: [-.58; .80]), consistent with the theory that 
individuals have a natural tendency to maintain positive views of themselves (Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008). Reports were also directed towards the future rather than the past (Temporal 
TST: t(171) = 7.02, p < .001. Average proportion: .03, range: [-.10;.18]). TST measures 
were z-scored prior to performing subsequent analyses.  
4.3.3.2 Effect of priming and task manipulation on TST  
Next, we examined whether priming or cognitive task manipulation had significant 
effects on TST. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA predicting TST scores from 
priming (independent, interdependent, none), cognitive task (CRT, WM) and TST type 
(Temporal, Social, Emotional). We found a between-subject effect of priming (F(2,166) = 
3.46, p = .03). Post-hoc t-test between priming conditions showed that TST scores were 
overall higher without priming (Figure 4-6; independent vs. none, t(106) = -2.55, p = .01; 
none vs. interdependent, t(109) = 2.08, p = .04; independent vs. interdependent, t(112) = -
.68, p = .5).  
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Figure 4-6. Influence of priming on self-concept reports 
Our data show that Temporal, Social and Emotional Twenty Statements Test (TST) scores were significantly 
lower following independent or interdependent priming compared to no priming.  
4.3.3.3 Relation between SGT types and TST  
Next, we investigated whether TST reports and SGT content were linked and 
whether their relation was influenced by our manipulations. We computed three separate 
repeated measures ANOVAs predicting TST scores from TST type (Temporal, Social, 
Emotional), priming (independent, interdependent, none) and cognitive task (CRT, WM). 
Each ANOVA also included one of the three SGT scores as covariate (note that we did not 
include all SGT scores in a single ANOVA as this would have led to an extensive number 
of interactions). 
Future SGT. The ANOVA with Future SGT as covariate revealed a trend for an 
interaction between TST type, priming, cognitive task and Future SGT (F(4,320) = 2.32, p 
= .06). We computed post-hoc univariate ANOVAs separately for each TST score. These 
analyses revealed a significant interaction between priming, cognitive task and Future SGT 
only for Temporal TST (Figure 4-7; F(2, 160) = 5.88, p = .003). To follow this interaction, 
we ran subsequent ANOVAs separately for the CRT and WM tasks. We observed a 
significant interaction between priming and Future SGT only during the WM task (WM: 
F(2,78) = 5.25, p = .007; CRT: F(2,82) = 1.14, p > .3). In the WM task, Future SGT and 
Temporal TST were positively correlated after independent priming but negatively 
correlated without priming (independent: r = .37, p = .05; none: r = -.42, p = .03; 
interdependent: r = .24, p = .22). The correlation was significantly different under no 
priming compared to independent and interdependent priming conditions (independent vs. 
none, t(52) = 3.04, p = .004; none vs. interdependent, t(50) = -2.54, p = .01; independent vs. 
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interdependent, t(54) = .85, p = .4). In the CRT task, Future SGT predicted increased 
Temporal TST at trend level (F(1,82) = 2.49, p = .12). Although not significant, these data 
show that the negative relation between Future SGT and Temporal TST was only observed 
in the WM task under no priming conditions, and not following priming or when Future 
SGT occurred in the CRT task.  
 
Figure 4-7. Relation between Future SGT and Temporal TST scores  
The relation between Future SGT and TST was affected by both priming and task manipulations. Without 
priming (central panels), Future SGT experienced during the CRT task was associated with TST reports that 
were more directed towards the future than the past (top central panel). On the contrary, in the WM task and 
without priming, Future SGT predicted significantly less future-directed TST answers (bottom central panel). 
This suggests that out task manipulation affected the link between individuals’ SGT and the temporal 
direction they adopted to describe themselves. However, the effect of the task manipulation was limited in 
primed participants: both independent (left panels) and interdependent priming (right panels) prevented the 
negative relation between Future WM SGT and Future TST. Abbreviations: CRT: choice reaction time, SGT: 
self-generated thought, TST: twenty statements test, WM: working memory. 
Emotion SGT. The repeated measures ANOVA including Emotion SGT as 
covariate and predicting TST scores revealed a trend for an interaction between TST type 
and Emotion SGT (F(2,320) = 2.93, p = .06) and a significant interaction between priming, 
TST type and Emotion SGT (F(4,320) = 2.87, p = .02). Post-hoc univariate ANOVAs 
separately for each TST type revealed an interaction at trend level for Social TST (priming 
x Emotion SGT, F(2,166) = 2.72, p = .07). Positive SGT predicted more social TST only 
after independent priming (independent, r = .29, p = .03; none: r = .00, p = 1; 
interdependent: r = -.05, p > .7). Univariate ANOVA predicting Emotional TST from 
Emotion SGT and priming revealed a significant main effect of Emotion SGT (F(1,166) = 
13.08, p < .001) and an interaction at trend level between Emotion SGT and priming 
(F(2,166) = 2.63, p = .08). Overall positive SGT predicted more positive TST (r = .26, p 
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< .001), especially after interdependent priming (independent: r = .18, p = .18; none: r 
= .11, p = .4; interdependent: r = .54, p < .001). These results are in line with previously 
published data (Krans, de Bree, & Moulds, 2015). Finally, the repeated measures ANOVA 
predicting TST scores with Past SGT as covariate did not yield any significant result. 
4.3.3.4 Link between Emotion SGT, Emotional TST and mood levels 
Finally, we explored how the relation between positive SGT and positive self-
concept may be influenced by participants’ mood levels (Figure 4-8). We computed a 
univariate ANOVA predicting Emotional TST from Emotion SGT, mood and priming 
(independent, interdependent, none). As before, we observed that more positive SGT was 
linked to more Positive TST reports (main effect of Emotion SGT: (F(1,160) = 5.5, p 
= .02). However, the interaction Emotion SGT x priming was not significant anymore (F(2, 
160) = 1.48, p > .2). Instead, we observed a significant interaction between Emotion SGT 
and mood (F(2,160) = 5.92, p = .02). In order to understand the interaction, we computed a 
median split of mood levels. We found that, when mood levels were high, TST were 
overall more positive and Emotion SGT did not predict Emotional TST (t(70) = 1.00, p 
> .3; Figure 4-8 right panel). On the other hand, when mood levels were low, more positive 
thoughts were associated with more positive TST reports (t(98) = 6.93, p = .009; Figure 
4-8 left panel). This suggests that individuals’ SGT may alleviate the negative relation 
between low mood levels and negative views of oneself.    
 
Figure 4-8. Relation between Emotion SGT, mood levels and TST valence 
TST answers were overall more positive when participants’ mood levels were high (right panel). However, 
when mood levels were low, participants experiencing more positive SGT also provided more positive 
descriptions of themselves (i.e. higher Emotion SGT scores predicted higher Emotional TST scores, left 
panel). Abbreviations: TST: twenty statements test, SGT: self-generated thought.  
  80   
4.4 Discussion 
The current study was designed to shed light on two research questions. First, we 
explored whether the relation between SGT and individuals’ sense of self varied according 
to the content of thoughts, in order to provide further evidence for our prediction that 
different types of SGT have heterogeneous functional outcomes. Second, we aimed to 
investigate the mechanism supporting the relation between SGT and individuals’ sense of 
self. In particular, we hypothesised that SGT allows the transfer of information from an 
external event (e.g. the prime) into one’s sense of self (as measured using the TST).  
Using PCA, we generated three distinct types of SGT (Future, Past and Emotion 
SGT), thus replicating previous findings (Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et 
al., 2013). We observed that individuals reporting more Future SGT tended to provide 
descriptions of themselves that were focused on the future rather than the past. This effect 
was blocked for participants performing a demanding task (which limited Future SGT 
occurrence), unless they were primed with either an independent or interdependent self-
concept. These results suggest that priming influenced participants’ SGT and restored the 
link between Future SGT and self-concept, providing support for our hypothesis that the 
information elicited by priming was consolidated during SGT and transferred to 
individuals’ sense of who they are.  
We also investigated how the emotional content of SGT and mood levels interacted 
to determine how individuals described themselves. Participants with high mood levels 
provided self-definitions that were more positive, independent of the emotional tone of 
their SGT. On the contrary, for participants with low mood levels, thinking more positive 
thoughts allowed them to alleviate the negative effects of a low mood and they described 
themselves with a more positive view. Our data therefore show that the emotional content 
of SGT is related to individuals’ self-esteem (similar to D’Argembeau, Lardi, & Van der 
Linden, 2012), adding further support to our claim that SGT and self-concept are linked.  
Taken together, the results described above show that different types of SGT relate 
to different aspects of self-concept, therefore supporting our claim that the relation 
between SGT and self-concept is influenced by the content of the thoughts, replicating 
(Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). Particularly, our data suggest that Future SGT, but not 
Past SGT, may have provided individuals the chance to transfer self-relevant information 
from an external event (the prime), to consolidate it and to integrate it into their sense of 
self . We speculate that certain but not all types of SGT may have consolidating properties 
due to the different processes involved in the recollection of past experiences and the 
simulation of future events. Future SGT involves the manipulation of previously-acquired 
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information in order to generate new sequences of events and to predict what might happen 
(Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009), whereas Past SGT only requires the retrieval 
of information. This may explain why only the former but not the later type of SGT may be 
linked to consolidation and may influence individuals’ self-concept.  
Our data also show that priming and task manipulation interacted when influencing 
the relation between Future SGT and self-concept. This relation was hindered when the 
cognitive task required more cognitive resources (i.e. during the WM task). One reason 
might be that in addition to reducing the occurrence of Future SGT, the task manipulation 
might have interfered with other qualities of the thoughts generated. Although speculative, 
it is possible that the limited cognitive resources available for internal mentation while 
performing the WM task may have induced participants’ to experience Future SGT that 
were over-general or not self-relevant, thus reducing the capacity of these thoughts to 
affect one’s self-concept. However, we found that priming alleviated the negative effect of 
the task manipulation. One possibility is that influencing the social dimension of the SGT 
via priming may have restored the qualities of Future SGT necessary for the consolidation 
of self-relevant information. However, our results show that independent and 
interdependent primes had opposite effects on self- and other-related thoughts (with 
independent priming overall increasing both types of ratings and interdependent priming 
decreasing them). It therefore remains unclear why both types of priming seem to have had 
similar influences on Future SGT. Follow-up studies are required to clarify the 
mechanisms involved.  
Our results also suggest that priming and task manipulation influenced Past and 
Future SGT differently. Unlike Future SGT, we did not find an effect of task manipulation 
on the occurrence of past-focused thoughts, replicating previous findings (Chapter 3 and 
Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2013; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). 
However, we found that interdependent priming led to Past SGT being linked to both low 
mood levels and reduced task performance, and these results deserve further consideration. 
Regarding the link to low mood levels, our data are concordant with previous studies 
reporting similar effects, whether mood was considered as a transient state or as a chronic 
trait (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). With regard 
to task performance, it is to our knowledge the first reported evidence that Past SGT may 
be linked to poor task implementation. Nevertheless, this is consistent with studies 
showing that inducing dysphoric participants to ruminate (i.e. to dwell on negative past 
experiences) leads to poor academic performance (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003). 
The mechanisms linking interdependent priming and negative consequences of Past SGT 
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remain unclear. Because interdependent priming is commonly used to activate inter-
personal views of the self, but self and other-related ratings were reduced following this 
type of priming, we speculate that the negative consequences of Past SGT might arise 
because of the type of inter-personal information retrieved rather than due to the frequency 
of the retrieval. For example, interdependent priming may have induced participants to 
remember negative rather than positive past events, therefore causing SGT to have 
negative effects on mood and task performance. Additional investigations are required to 
shed light on these different possibilities.  
Despite our results showing that independent and interdependent priming 
influenced the functional outcomes of SGT, their effects on the social and temporal 
dimensions of SGT were less clear. We only observed that self- and other-related ratings 
were higher following an independent vs. interdependent priming, but ratings were not 
significantly different under priming and no priming conditions. Moreover, no significant 
effect on the future and past ratings were observed. As a consequence, subsequent studies 
aiming at manipulating the social or temporal content of SGT may consider using other 
forms of manipulations, for example using self-reflection (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 
2011) or prompting individuals to think about personal goals (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, 
et al., 2011). We suspect that these manipulations may have stronger effects on individuals’ 
SGT.  
Finally, the finding that distinct types of SGT had a different relation to self-
concept (e.g. Emotion SGT linked to self-esteem, Future SGT linked to the temporal focus 
of self-concept) adds to a growing body of evidence that SGT can have heterogeneous 
properties when the content of the thoughts is taken into account (Chapter 3 and Engert et 
al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011; 
Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). In the current experiment, defining different types of 
SGT using PCA allowed us to investigate how each type of thought related to various 
aspects of TST and this therefore provided us the chance to observe heterogeneous 
relations between SGT and self-concept. These data and other findings therefore highlight 
the importance of considering SGT as a heterogeneous phenomenon, and support our 
prediction that taking into account the content of the thoughts allows a better 
understanding of the functional outcomes of SGT (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; 
Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013).  
To conclude, our findings provide novel evidence that the thoughts and emotions 
spontaneously generated by individuals shape how they define themselves and may 
support a sense of continuity between their past, present and future selves. For healthy 
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individuals, the natural tendencies of projecting oneself into the future and having positive 
views of oneself may be part of the “arsenal of psychological mechanisms” supporting 
self-enhancement and psychological well-being (D’Argembeau et al., 2012; Nes & 
Segerstrom, 2006; Scheier & Carver, 1992; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). However, this 
relation may become deleterious under psychopathological conditions such as depression. 
Negative cycles between ruminative thoughts and negative views of oneself may emerge, 
strengthening depressive symptoms (Ciesla & Roberts, 2007). Further investigations of the 
neurocognitive substrates underlying SGT and self-concept are required in order to 
improve the understanding of self-enhancing cognitions and to allow the development of 
new strategies alleviating deleterious cycles present under certain pathological conditions.  
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Chapter 5.  
Phenomenological Properties of SGT  
5.1 Introduction 
The empirical studies presented in previous chapters as well as published findings 
highlight the importance of taking the content of SGT into account when investigating its 
functional outcomes. In particular, we found using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
that the temporal, social and emotional dimensions of SGT interact in order to generate 
three distinct types of thoughts, namely Future, Past, and Emotion SGT (Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 and Engert, Smallwood, & Singer, 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 
2013). Identifying different types of SGT allowed us to examine their properties 
individually. For example, we observed that Future but not Past SGT was linked to better 
performance at the Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task (Chapter 3; Chapter 4). In addition, 
Future SGT was linked to subsequent increases in mood levels, whereas Past SGT was 
related to subsequent decreases in mood (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). Finally, 
our data and others suggest that Future but not Past SGT is related to self-referential 
processes (Chapter 4 and Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Cole & Berntsen, 2015; 
Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). Altogether, these findings support our prediction that 
the content of SGT can influence the functional outcomes of mind-wandering episodes, in 
line with the content regulation hypothesis (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).   
Nevertheless, the mechanisms supporting SGT heterogeneities remain unclear. 
According to the component process hypothesis proposed by Smallwood and colleagues, 
the rich variety of mental experiences is made possible via the flexible combination of 
cognitive and neural processes (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & 
Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, 2013a). Thus, different types of SGT may have heterogeneous 
functional outcomes because these thoughts rely on distinct neurocognitive processes. 
Shedding light on these neurocognitive correlates may allow us to gain insight into the 
mechanisms supporting SGT heterogeneities. In the current chapter, we focus on the 
cognitive correlates of SGT. To this end, we investigated the phenomenology of different 
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types of thoughts, with the rationale that distinct phenomenological properties rely on 
specific cognitive processes.  
An extended body of research highlights important phenomenological aspects of 
SGT, including the modality employed to represent the thoughts i.e. inner speech or visual 
mental imagery (Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Krans et al., 2015; Singer & Antrobus, 1972; 
Singer, 1966; Smallwood et al., 2003; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 
2013), their structure and specificity (Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 
2013), their purpose e.g. if they are goal-directed or involve planning (Baird et al., 2011; 
Cole & Berntsen, 2015; D’Argembeau, Renaud, & Van Der Linden, 2011; Stawarczyk, 
Cassol, et al., 2013), the control exerted over the them e.g. whether they are spontaneous, 
intrusive or voluntary (Brewin & Smart, 2005; Forster & Lavie, 2009) and their persistence 
e.g. perseverative cognitions (Ottaviani et al., 2014). We suggest that thoughts with distinct 
phenomenological properties rely on a specific set of cognitive processes. For example, 
inner speech recruits semantic processes (Shergill et al., 2001) whereas visual mental 
imagery relies on visual processes (Thompson & Kosslyn, 2000). Consequently, we 
suspect that thoughts employing inner speech and those using visual imagery will rely on 
distinct cognitive substrates. Similar predictions can be made for other phenomenological 
properties e.g. voluntary and specific thoughts may recruit executive control processes, 
whereas intrusive thoughts may occur due to reduced executive functions. Altogether, we 
suggest that assessing the phenomenology of SGT may provide insight into its cognitive 
correlates.  
In the current chapter, we propose that different types of SGT (Future, Past, 
Emotion) may have heterogeneous phenomenological properties. A limited number of 
studies have investigated the relation between the content and phenomenology of SGT. 
Findings show that future-directed thoughts are more personally relevant and goal-oriented 
than other types of thoughts (Baird et al., 2011; Cole & Berntsen, 2015; Stawarczyk, 
Cassol, et al., 2013). In addition, future thoughts may rely more on inner speech compared 
to non-future oriented thoughts (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). These findings provide 
preliminary support for our hypothesis that different types of SGT may have different 
phenomenological properties. The current chapter will draw one these findings to shed 
light on the relationship between the content and phenomenology of SGT. Exploring the 
phenomenological similarities and differences across SGT types may allow us to find 
evidence for our prediction that distinct types of thoughts rely on specific cognitive 
processes (i.e. the component process hypothesis), which may in turn provide insight into 
the mechanisms supporting SGT heterogeneities. 
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Current study  
Overall, the current study aims at investigating the relation between the content and 
phenomenology of SGT. Both aspects were measured using experience sampling while 
participants performed the CRT task (see Chapter 2 for more details). The number of 
features probed was kept to a minimum so as to facilitate introspection. One set of 
questions assessed the phenomenological properties of SGT and focused on the modality 
of the thoughts (whether they were in the form of words, in the form of images), how 
intrusive the thoughts were perceived and how vague / specific the thoughts were 
considered. The second set of questions targeted the content of participants’ SGT, in 
particular the temporal (future, past), social (self, other) and emotional dimensions of 
thoughts. We performed PCAs on the thought probe data separately for each set of 
questions in order to: i) statistically identify the pattern of phenomenological properties, 
and ii) replicate the pattern of SGT content previously observed (Chapter 3; Chapter 4 and 
Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013).  
After defining the different types of SGT and the distinct phenomenological 
properties, we investigated their relationship using two sets of analyses. The first set 
explored the phenomenological characteristics of SGT types and was conducted at the 
probe level used linear mixed models
2
 (LMMs, Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012). These 
analyses allowed us to investigate whether different types of thoughts (namely Future, Past 
and Emotion SGT) had similar or distinct phenomenological properties e.g. whether Future 
SGT is more in the form of words (as suggested by Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). The 
second set of analyses explored the relation between individual differences in SGT content 
and in SGT phenomenology. These analyses were computed at the participant level. For 
example, they explored whether individuals who tend to think about the future also tend to 
use inner speech rather than visual imagery. Finding a relation between individual 
differences in SGT content and in SGT phenomenology will indicate that both SGT 
features rely on common underlying processes.  
In addition to the CRT task, participants also filled in various questionnaires and 
performed additional tasks. These additional measures were employed in order to provide 
further insight into the cognitive correlates and functional outcomes of SGT. In particular, 
we measured depressive tendencies using the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
Scale Revised (Eaton, Smith, Ybarra, Muntaner, & Tien, 2004) as previous findings 
                                                 
 
2
 LMMs are statistical analyses which allow the investigation of fixed effects i.e. effects that one is interested 
in, whilst controlling for random effects i.e. effects that arise due to multiple sampling within participants, 
such as when several thought probes are collected from a single participant. 
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suggest that the relation between depressive symptoms and SGT may depend on thought 
content (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). Next, 
SGT has also been associated with both lower and higher cognitive task performance 
(Chapter 3; Chapter 4; McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007; 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011). We explored this 
relation using the CRT task as well as the stop signal response task (SSRT), which assesses 
response inhibition (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). Finally, we also investigated the link 
between SGT and self-referential processes using the self-reference task (SRT; Rogers, 
Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). Altogether, these analyses aim 
at replicating previous findings, which would provide support for the replicability and 
reliability of the methodology employed to measure the content of SGT. 
5.2 Methods  
5.2.1 Participants 
The study was approved by the York NeuroImaging Centre (YNiC) Research 
Ethics & Governance. 40 participants were recruited using the YNIC participant mailing 
list (mean age = 22.7 years, age range = 18–31 years, 17 females). All were native English 
speakers, right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of psychiatric 
or neurological conditions and no history of substance abuse. 
5.2.2 Experimental session  
The experiment was divided into three sessions, each session lasting approximately 
one hour. The first session consisted in the recording of structural and functional MRI data. 
The two remaining sessions involved the completion of various cognitive tasks and a 
battery of questionnaires. Sessions usually took place on three consecutive days or within a 
week. Participants were remunerated £20 or 4 course credits for taking part in the 
experiment.  
5.2.3 Cognitive task 
Participants performed the CRT task during 15 min during which SGT was 
recorded using experience sampling. Intermittently throughout the task, participants were 
interrupted and asked to rate how much their thoughts were unrelated to the current task 
(i.e. “off-task”). Five questions also assessed the content of SGT (future, past, self, other, 
emotion) and four assessed the phenomenology of SGT (images, words, intrusive, vague). 
Participants answered the questions using sliders ranging from “Not at all” to 
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“Completely”. In previous studies, we recorded the emotional aspect of SGT using two 
questions (“How negative” and “How positive are your thoughts?”). Because we 
repeatedly observed that the two questions shared a very high amount of variance (Chapter 
3; Chapter 4 and Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013), we used a 
single question in the current experiment: “The content of my thoughts was:”. Participants 
answered using a slider ranging from “Negative” to “Positive”.  
5.2.4 Additional tasks  
5.2.4.1 Stop signal response task 
We also administered the stop signal response task (SSRT) to measure response 
inhibition as a proxy for cognitive control (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). The task 
consisted in sequentially presenting arrowheads pointing either towards the left (<) or the 
right (>) on a computer screen for 1000 ms, separated by a 500 ms fixation cross. 
Participants were instructed to indicate the direction of the arrow as fast as possible using 
the corresponding arrow key. In 20% of the trials, a beeping sound (the stop signal) 
preceded the presentation of the arrow and participants had to inhibit their response.  The 
stop signal was initially presented 250 ms after the visual stimulus and varied according to 
the participants’ performance. If the participant accurately inhibited her response, the stop 
signal delay (SDD) was increased by 50 ms; if she responded to the arrow despite hearing 
the stop signal, the SDD was decreased by 50 ms. Overall, the task consisted of 150 
experimental trials and lasted approximately 7 min.  
5.2.4.2 Self-reference task 
Participants also completed the SRT (Rogers et al., 1977; Smallwood, Schooler, et 
al., 2011). The SRT is designed to measure self-reflection tendencies and consisted in two 
phases. During the first phase, trait adjectives were sequentially presented on a computer 
screen and participants were asked to judge whether the words applied to a particular 
referent i.e. themselves, their best friend or to David Cameron (the UK prime minister at 
the time of the experiment). In total, 3 lists of 18 adjectives were presented, each list being 
associated to one referent. The order in which adjectives and lists were presented was 
randomized, and word presentation was self-paced. In addition, lists were rotated across 
conditions. 
The second phase of the SRT consisted in a surprise memory test. 108 trait 
adjectives were sequentially presented and participants had to indicate using a key press 
whether each word was “new” or “old” (i.e. they had seen it during the first phase).  Half 
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of the adjectives were new. Words were presented in a random order and presentation was 
self-paced.  
5.2.5 Questionnaires  
A battery of questionnaires was administered at the end of the second testing 
session. It included the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Revised 
(CESDR, Eaton et al., 2004), and questionnaires assessing mind-wandering tendencies: the 
Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS, Singer & Antrobus, 1970), the Mind Wandering 
Spontaneous (MWS) and the Mind Wandering Deliberate Scales (MWD; Seli, Carriere, & 
Smilek, 2014). Participants also completed the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale 
(MAAS), which assessed participants’ tendencies to be aware and attend to present 
experiences (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Definition of SGT types  
5.3.1.1 Thought probe descriptives 
We first investigated whether the current data had similar characteristics to 
previously published datasets. Boxplots of the averaged probe data are represented in 
Figure 5-1. Participants’ reported off-task thoughts half of the time (M = 49.9, SE = 3.13). 
SGT was more self vs. other-related (paired t-test, t(39) = 4.57, p < .001). SGT was also 
more directed towards the future vs. past (paired t-test, t(39) = 5.81, p < .001). In addition, 
SGT was in general considered as positive rather than negative (average Emotion ratings: 
M = 61.21, SE = 2.10). These results are in line with previously published findings (Iijima 
& Tanno, 2012; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; 
Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013).  
Regarding the phenomenology of SGT, we did not find a significant bias towards 
thinking in images or thinking in words (paired t-test, t(39) = -.48, p > .6; Figure 5-1). In 
addition, participants did not consider their SGT as intrusive (M = 20.87, SE = 2.62) or 
particularly vague (M = 40.66, SE = 3.35).   
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Figure 5-1. Boxplots of average content and phenomenology ratings  
Self-generated thought (SGT) was rated as more self- than other-related and was more directed towards the 
future than the past. There was no significant difference between images and words ratings. 
5.3.1.2 Principal Component Analysis of SGT content 
Next, we used PCA with Varimax rotation to determine how the ratings from the 
different content questions related to each other (n = 351 probes, 40 participants, 6 probe 
questions: Off-task, Self, Other, Past, Future, Emotion; see Chapter 2 for more details). We 
obtained 3 principal components (PC) that explained 68% of variance in our data (Figure 
5-2a; Table 5-1). The first PC loaded positively on Off-task, Self, Other and Future (Future 
SGT). The second loaded positively on Off-task, Other and Past as well as negatively on 
Future (Past SGT). Finally, the third PC loaded positively on Emotion, Future and Other, 
and negatively on Off-task (Emotion SGT). These results broadly replicate previous 
findings (Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). 
SGT scores were computed based on the PC loadings, therefore allowing us to describe 
how much each thought was future-related, past-related and negative or positive (see 
Chapter 2 for more details). 
5.3.1.3 Principal Component Analysis of SGT phenomenology 
We also used PCA to determine how the different phenomenology ratings (Words, 
Images, Vague, Intrusive) related to each other. The PCA revealed three PC that explained 
80% of variance in our data (Figure 5-2b; Table 5-2). The first PC represented SGT’s 
Modality, and loaded positively on Words and negatively on Images. The second 
represented Intrusiveness (loading on Intrusive and on Images) and the last one represented 
Vagueness (loading positively on Vague). These data suggest that thoughts are rarely in the 
form of images and in the form of words (replicating Stawarczyk et al., 2013) and that 
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intrusive thoughts may be more in the form of images rather than words. Based on the 
PCA results, we computed three phenomenology scores in order to determine how much 
each thought was in the form of words or images, intrusive and vague.  
 
Figure 5-2. Principal Component Analyses of probe data 
a) The PCA on the 6 content questions revealed three PC, explaining 68% of variance in the probe data. 
Future SGT loaded positively on future, self, other and off-task ratings. Past SGT loaded positively on past 
and other, and negatively on future ratings. Finally, Emotion SGT loaded positively on emotion ratings and 
negatively on off-task ratings. b) The PCA on the 4 phenomenology questions revealed three PC explaining 
80% of variance in our data. The Modality PC loaded positively on the words ratings and negatively on the 
images ratings. The Intrusiveness PC loaded positively on the intrusive and images ratings. Finally, the 
Vagueness PC loaded positively on vague ratings. Abbreviations: PC: principal components, PCA: principal 
component analysis, SGT: self-generated thought. 
Table 5-1. Results of the Principal Component Analysis computed on content ratings 
The table presents the loadings of each probe question on the three principal components (PC) generated 
using principal component analysis. 68% of variance in the probe data was explained by the three PC. See 
Figure 5-2a for a graphical representation of the loadings.  
 
Principal Components 
Future Past Emotion 
Off-task 0.59 0.26 -0.34 
Other 0.48 0.58 0.39 
Past -0.04 0.89 -0.06 
Self 0.72 0.07 0.09 
Future 0.69 -0.31 0.35 
Emotion 0.07 0.03 0.89 
 
Eigen values 1.88 1.26 .93 
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Table 5-2. Results of the Principal Component Analysis computed on phenomenology ratings 
The table presents the loadings of each probe question on the three principal components (PC) generated 
using principal component analysis. 80% of variance in the probe data was explained by the three PC. See 
Figure 5-2b for a graphical representation of the loadings.  
 
Principal Components 
Modality Intrusiveness Vagueness 
Words 0.83 0.14 0.1 
Vague 0.03 0.02 0.99 
Images -0.69 0.31 0.07 
Intrusive -0.05 0.96 0.01 
 
Eigen values 1.26 1.06 .88 
 
5.3.2 Relation between Content and Phenomenology of SGT 
Altogether, PCA identified three types of SGT content (Future, Past, Emotion SGT) 
and three types of phenomenological properties (Modality, Intrusiveness and Vagueness). 
We first investigated the relation between the content and the phenomenology of the 
thoughts. The first set of analyses aimed at examining this link at the thought probe level, 
for example whether future-focused thoughts tended to rely on a specific modality. The 
second set of analyses investigated the link at the participant level i.e. examining whether 
individual differences in SGT content relate to individual differences in SGT 
phenomenology.  
5.3.2.1 Thought probe level  
In order to examine the link between SGT content and phenomenology at the probe 
level, we used linear mixed models (LMMs). LMMs allow estimating both fixed effects 
(i.e. effects that one is interested in, such as the relation between Intrusiveness and Future 
SGT) while controlling for random effects (effects arising due to the presence of groups 
within the data e.g. repeated sampling within participants). Each LMM predicted a single 
SGT type (e.g. Future SGT) from the three phenomenological properties (Modality, 
Intrusiveness, Vagueness) and one random effect (the intercept of each participant) and 
was fitted using maximum likelihood (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012).  
Content. We first investigated whether Future SGT was predicted by SGT 
phenomenology. To estimate whether an independent variable had a significant effect on 
Future SGT, we ran several LMMs, adding one fixed effect at a time (see Table 5-3). We 
then compared each new model to the previous one, using the likelihood ratio test. This 
consists in a Chi-square test that determines whether the log-likelihood (-2LL) of the new 
model is significantly lower than the -2LL from the previous model (i.e. whether adding an 
independent variable to the model significantly increases the fit of the model). A 
significant result indicates that the newly added independent variable has a significant 
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effect on the dependent variable. For example, our initial model predicting Future SGT 
only contained one random effect (the intercept of each subject, Model 1). Model 2 
contained one fixed effect (Intrusiveness). As it can be seen in Table 5-3, adding 
Intrusiveness to Model 1 significantly decreased the log-likelihood (X2 (1) = 29.69, p 
< .001), therefore showing that Intrusiveness significantly predicted Future SGT. Next, we 
added Vagueness as independent variable. Because the log-likelihood of Model 3 was not 
significantly lower than the log-likelihood of Model 2 (X2(1) = 0, p > .9), we can conclude 
that Vagueness is not a significant predictor of Future SGT. As can be seen in Table 5-3, 
the best-fitted LMM contained 5 fixed effects and revealed a significant effect of 
Intrusiveness and two significant interactions (Intrusive x Vagueness and Intrusive x 
Modality, Table 5-4
3
). To understand the interaction effect between Intrusiveness and 
Vagueness, we computed a median split of Vagueness scores. As can be seen in Figure 
5-3a, Future SGT was linked to increased Intrusiveness, especially when the thoughts were 
more specific (left panel; LMM for specific thoughts: t = 6.78, coefficient c = .41, SE 
= .06; LMM for vague thoughts: t = .1.81, c = .12, SE = .07). When computing a median 
split of Modality scores, we observed that Future SGT was more intrusive, especially when 
the thoughts were in the form of images (left panel; LMM: t = 8.0, coefficient c = .47, SE 
= .06) rather than in the form of words (right panel, Figure 5-3b; LMM: t = .48, c = .03, SE 
= .07).  
A similar LMM was computed to investigate the relation between Past SGT and 
phenomenology. Both Intrusiveness and Modality had significant effects (respectively, 
X2(1) = 15.97, p < .001 and X2(1) = 5.24, p = .02). As it can be seen in Table 5-5, thoughts 
that were more past-related were also more intrusive (Figure 5-4) and more in the form of 
images rather than words.  
 
                                                 
 
3
 Note that we do not report p-values for our best-fitted LMMs because controversies persist with regard to 
the best way of estimating these p-values and as a consequence, R functions do not generally provide them. 
We determined whether the fixed effects were significant using the Chi-square tests (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, 
& Walker, 2014). 
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Figure 5-3. Relation between Future SGT and phenomenology (probe level) 
a) Self-generated thoughts (SGT) that were more intrusive were also more future-related, especially when the 
thoughts were more specific (left panel) rather than vague (right panel). b) This relation was also observed 
when thoughts were in the form of images (left panel) rather than in the form of words (right panel). 
Table 5-3. Log-likelihood and Chi-squares for LMMs predicting Future SGT from phenomenology 
(probe level) 
“+” indicates the addition of a fixed effect, “*” indicates full-factorial effects between two independent 
variables. The best-fitted LMM is indicated in bold and is described in Table 5-4. 
Models 
Log-
likelihood 
X2 X2 df p-value 
1. Intercept Subject -491.34    
2. Intrusiveness -476.49 29.69 1 0.000 
3. Intrusiveness + Vagueness -476.49 0.00 1 0.988 
4. Intrusiveness * Vagueness -472.52 7.94 1 0.005 
5. Intrusiveness * Vagueness + Modality -470.90 3.24 1 0.072 
6. Intrusiveness * Vagueness + Intrusive * Modality -466.41 8.98 1 0.003 
7. Intrusiveness * Vagueness + Intrusiveness * Modality + Vagueness * 
Modality 
-466.40 0.03 1 0.872 
8. Intrusiveness * Vagueness * Modality -466.09 0.61 1 0.435 
 
Table 5-4. Best-fitted LMM predicting Future SGT from phenomenology (probe level) 
 Coefficient CI (95%) SE t value 
Mean Future SGT 0.02 -0.13; 0.16 0.07 0.23 
Intrusiveness 0.29 0.18; 0.40 0.05 5.32 
Vagueness -0.05 -0.15; 0.06 0.05 -0.84 
Modality -0.09 -0.20; 0.02 0.06 -1.58 
Intrusiveness x Vagueness -0.16 -0.26; -0.06 0.05 -3.08 
Intrusiveness x Modality -0.15 -0.25; -0.05 0.05 -3.04 
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Figure 5-4. Relation between Past SGT and phenomenology (probe level) 
Self-generated thoughts (SGT) directed towards the past were more intrusive (left panel) and were more in 
the form of images than words (right panel). Note that a positive modality score indicates that SGT was more 
in the form of words than images.  
Table 5-5. Best fitted LMM predicting Past SGT from phenomenology (probe level) 
 Coefficient CI (95%) SE t value 
Mean Past SGT 0.00 -0.14; 0.14 0.07 0.00 
Intrusiveness 0.23 0.12; 0.34 0.06 4.14 
Modality -0.13 -0.25; -0.02 0.06 -2.38 
 
We also computed a LMM to predict Emotion SGT from SGT phenomenology 
(Table 5-6). We observed a significant effect of Vagueness (X2(1) = 7.75, p = .005) and of 
Modality (X2 (1) = 8.19, p = .004) as well as a significant triple interaction between 
Vagueness, Modality and Intrusiveness (X2(1) = 6.08, p = .01). As seen in Figure 5-5a, 
positive SGT was more specific and in the form of images. Moreover, positive SGT was 
specific especially when in the form of images and when intrusive (Figure 5-5b; bottom 
left panel; LMM for intrusive thoughts in images: t = -4.11, e = -.48, SE = .12; LMM for 
other thoughts: t = -1.29, e = -.05, SE = .04). 
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Figure 5-5. Relation between Emotion SGT and phenomenology (probe level)  
a) Positive self-generated thoughts (SGT) were more specific (left panel) and were more in the form of 
images than in the form of words (right panel). In addition, positive thoughts were especially specific if they 
were intrusive and in the form of images (b, bottom left panel). Note that a positive modality score indicates 
that SGT was more in the form of words than images; a positive emotion score indicates that SGT was more 
positive.  
Table 5-6. Best fitted LMM predicting Emotion SGT from phenomenology (probe level) 
 Coefficient CI (95%) SE t value 
Mean Emotion SGT 0.05 -0.16; 0.25 0.10 0.44 
Vagueness -0.16 -0.26; -0.05 0.05 -3.03 
Modality -0.13 -0.24; -0.02 0.06 -2.25 
Intrusiveness -0.02 -0.12; 0.08 0.05 -0.38 
Modality x Intrusiveness -0.01 -0.11; 0.09 0.05 -0.18 
Modality x Vagueness 0.06 -0.03; 0.15 0.05 1.28 
Vagueness x Intrusiveness -0.06 -0.16; 0.03 0.05 -1.29 
Modality x Vagueness x Intrusiveness 0.12 0.02; 0.21 0.05 2.48 
 
In summary, these analyses revealed that Future SGT was more intrusive, 
especially when the thoughts were more specific or were in the form of images rather than 
words. We also found that Past SGT was more in the form of images and more intrusive, 
and positive SGT was more in the form of images and more specific. The analyses 
described above shed light on the phenomenological properties of each SGT type. 
However, because the LMMs only predict one dependent variable, they cannot ascertain 
the shared variance between the different types of SGT with regard to phenomenology 
scores. The next set of analyses will explore how each phenomenological property is 
predicted by the three SGT types in order to determine whether different types of SGT 
explain distinct or overlapping variance in SGT phenomenology scores.   
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Phenomenology. The previous analyses revealed that both Future and Past SGT are 
significantly predicted by Intrusiveness. To determine whether the two types of SGT 
explain shared or distinct variance in Intrusiveness, we ran a LMM predicting 
Intrusiveness from the three SGT scores. As can be seen in Table 5-7, both Future and Past 
SGT were significant predictors of Intrusiveness (respectively, X2(1) = 30.74, p < .001 and 
X2(1) = 19.79, p < .001). Thoughts that were considered as more intrusive were also more 
future and more past-related (Figure 5-6). This result suggests that both Future and Past 
SGT explain distinct aspects of Intrusiveness variance. 
 
Figure 5-6. Relation between Intrusiveness and SGT content (probe level) 
Self-generated thoughts (SGT) that were rated as more intrusive were also more future-related (left panel) 
and more past-related (right panel).  
Table 5-7. Best fitted LMM predicting Intrusiveness from SGT scores (probe level) 
 Coefficient CI (95%) SE t value 
Mean Intrusiveness 0.02 -0.18; 0.22 0.10 0.17 
Future SGT 0.26 0.18; 0.35 0.04 5.99 
Past SGT 0.20 0.11; 0.28 0.04 4.52 
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Figure 5-7. Relation between Vagueness and SGT content (probe level) 
Vague thoughts were also more negative (a). This relation was especially true for self-generated thoughts 
(SGT) that were neither focused on the past nor on the future (b, top left panel). Note that a positive emotion 
score indicates that SGT was more positive.  
Table 5-8. Best fitted LMM predicting Vagueness from SGT scores (probe level) 
 Coefficient CI (95%) SE t value 
Mean Vagueness 0.00 -0.20; 0.20 0.10 0.00 
Emotion SGT -0.21 -0.32; -0.10 0.06 -3.71 
Future SGT -0.04 -0.14; 0.07 0.05 -0.70 
Past SGT -0.06 -0.15; 0.04 0.05 -1.15 
Emotion x Future SGT -0.04 -0.15; 0.07 0.06 -0.77 
Emotion x Past SGT 0.08 -0.01; 0.18 0.05 1.74 
Future x Past SGT -0.07 -0.19; 0.04 0.06 -1.27 
Emotion x Future x Past SGT -0.20 -0.29; -0.10 0.05 -3.94 
 
Next, we investigated the relation between Vagueness and SGT types (Table 5-8). 
We observed a main effect of Emotion SGT (X
2
(1) = 7.66, p = .006) as well as a triple 
interaction between Emotion, Future and Past SGT (X
2
(1) = 15.09, p < .001). Thoughts 
rated as vague were also negative in tone (Figure 5-7a), especially if they were neither 
future nor past-focused (Figure 5-7b, top left panel; LMM for top left panel: t = -2.93, e = -
.26, SE = .09; LMM for other thoughts: t = -.95, e = -.05, SE = .05).  
Finally, we investigated whether Modality was linked to the content of the thoughts 
(Table 5-9). The best-fitted LMM included a main effect of Emotion SGT (X
2
(1) = 9.12, p 
= .003) and a triple interaction (Emotion x Future x Past, X
2
(1) = 4.04, p = .04). Figure 5-8 
indicates that thoughts in the form of images were more positive (a), especially if they 
were future-related (Figure 5-8b, bottom panels; LMM for future and past-related SGT: t = 
-2.1, c = -.19, SE = .09; LMM for future and non-past-related SGT: t = - 2.65, c = -.15, SE 
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= .06; LMM for non-future related thoughts: t = -.11, c = .0, SE = .06)
4
. This model also 
highlights that, when controlling for the emotional aspect of the thoughts, Past SGT alone 
is not a significant predictor of Modality anymore.  
 
Figure 5-8. Relation between Modality and SGT content (probe level) 
a) Self-generated thoughts (SGT) that were in the form of images were also more positive. b) Thoughts were 
in the form of images especially if they involved future thinking and if they were positive (bottom panels). 
Note that a positive modality score indicates that SGT was more in the form of words than images; a positive 
emotion score indicates that SGT was more positive. 
Table 5-9. Best fitted LMM predicting Modality from SGT scores (probe level) 
 Coefficient CI (95%) SE t value 
Mean Modality 0.01 -0.21; 0.22 0.11 0.05 
Emotion SGT -0.16 -0.27; -0.06 0.05 -3.11 
Future SGT -0.04 -0.14; 0.05 0.05 -0.91 
Past SGT -0.07 -0.16; 0.03 0.05 -1.42 
Emotion x Future SGT -0.07 -0.17; 0.03 0.05 -1.39 
Emotion x Past SGT 0.01 -0.08; 0.09 0.04 0.14 
Future x Past SGT -0.05 -0.16; 0.05 0.05 -0.98 
Emotion x Future x Past SGT -0.09 -0.18; 0.00 0.05 -2.02 
 
Altogether, our analyses show that both Future and Past SGT are more intrusive. In 
addition, thoughts that are more positive are also more specific and more in the form of 
                                                 
 
4
 Note that although the LMM revealed a triple interaction, Figure 5-8 illustrates that the interaction Emotion 
x Future SGT was significant whether thoughts were less past-related (bottom left) or more past-related 
(bottom right). This may be due to the fact that we employed a median split to visualize the data whereas the 
triple interaction is based on continuous variables.   
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images rather than words. These analyses provide evidence that different types of SGT can 
have similar and distinct phenomenological properties.  
5.3.2.2 Differences between Future and Past SGT  
Although the previous set of analyses are important to identify the potential 
relations between the content and the phenomenology of SGT, they do not provide insight 
into potential differences between Future and Past SGT. For example, Stawarczyk and 
colleagues found that Future SGT was overall more in the form of words than images 
compared to non-future oriented thoughts (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). To investigate 
these differences, we first categorized the 351 probes into either Future SGT or Past SGT. 
As the PC are z-scores, a thought was considered as either: i) Future, if it had a Future 
score equal or above 1 or ii) Past, if it had a Past score equal or above 1; thought probes 
that were neither Future or Past SGT (n = 241) and thoughts that could be considered as 
both future and past-oriented (n = 3) were discarded from the subsequent analyses. A total 
of 51 future-directed and 59 past-directed thoughts remained.  
LMM predicting Modality scores from SGT temporal direction (Future, Past) did 
not reveal any significant effect (X
2
(1) = .48, p > .4). Likewise, there was no significant 
effect on Vagueness (X
2
(1) = 0, p > .9) or on Intrusiveness (X
2
(1) = .11, p > .7). Overall 
these results suggest that future and past-directed thoughts did not differ in terms of 
modality, vagueness or intrusiveness.  
5.3.2.3 Participant level  
The next set of analyses was designed to investigate the relation between individual 
differences in the content and phenomenology of SGT. For example, these may help 
answer questions such as “Do future thinkers also have more intrusive thoughts?”. To this 
end, we employed average SGT scores and to parallel the LMMs computed at the probe 
level (i.e. one dependent variable predicted by several independent variables), we 
computed one hierarchical linear regression predicting the average scores of one SGT type 
(e.g. Future SGT) from the three other measures (e.g. Intrusiveness, Vagueness and 
Modality).  
Content. When predicting Future SGT from phenomenology, we observed a main 
effect of Modality (X
2
(1)
 
= 6.07, p = .019) and an effect of Intrusiveness at trend level 
(X
2
(1)
 
= 3.55, p = .07). Table 5-10 indicates that future thinkers thought in general more in 
images than in words, and that their thoughts tended to be more intrusive (Figure 5-9a). A 
similar hierarchical regression predicting Past SGT revealed that past thinkers also thought 
more in images than in words (X
2
(1)
 
= 9.77, p = .004; Table 5-11; Figure 5-9b). Finally, 
  102   
we did not find any significant relation between Emotion SGT and the phenomenology of 
the thoughts at the participant level.  
 
Figure 5-9. Relation between Content SGT and phenomenology (participant level) 
a) Future thinkers used more frequently visual imagery than inner speech (left panel) and rated their thoughts 
as more intrusive (right panel). b) Past thinkers also used visual imagery more frequently than inner speech. 
Note that a positive modality score indicates that individuals used inner speech more than visual imagery to 
generate their thoughts. Abbreviation: SGT: self-generated thought.  
Table 5-10. Best-fit linear regression predicting Future SGT from phenomenology (participant level) 
F(2,37) = 4.95, p = .01, R
2 
= .21. 
 Coefficient SE t value p-value 
Constant .03 .07 .41 .685 
Modality -.24 .10 -2.45 .019 
Intrusiveness .20 .10 1.91 .064 
 
Table 5-11. Best-fit linear regression predicting Past SGT from phenomenology (participant level) 
F(1,38) = 4.95, p = .004, R
2 
= .20. 
 Coefficient SE t value p-value 
Constant .01 .07 .09 .693 
Modality -.30 .10 -3.05 .004 
 
Phenomenology. Similar analyses were computed to predict each SGT 
phenomenology scores from the content SGT. In particular, we explored whether Future 
and Past SGT explained separate or overlapping variance in Modality. Table 5-12 indicates 
that both Future and Past SGT significantly predicted Modality, suggesting that these two 
types of content explain separate variance. The hierarchical regression predicting 
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Vagueness from content SGT did not reveal any significant effect, and the regression 
predicting Intrusiveness only confirmed the trending relation to Future SGT (X
2
(1)
 
= 3.08, 
p = .09; Table 5-13).  
Table 5-12. Best-fit linear regression predicting Modality from SGT content (participant level) 
F(2,37) = 7.42, p = .002, R
2 
= .29. 
 Coefficient SE t value p-value 
Constant .01 .10 .12 .908 
Future SGT -.45 .21 -2.15 .038 
Past SGT -.59 .21 -2.82 .008 
 
Table 5-13. Best-fit linear regression predicting Intrusiveness from SGT scores (participant level) 
F(1,38) = 3.43, p = .07, R
2 
= .08.  
 Coefficient SE t value p-value 
Constant .02 .10 .17 .863 
Future SGT .40 .22 1.85 .072 
 
In summary, this set of linear regressions highlight that participants experiencing 
more mental time travel (either towards the past or towards the future) also had more 
thoughts in the form of images rather than words. In addition, future thinkers also 
experienced their thoughts as being more intrusive. No significant relation was observed 
between the overall valence of individuals’ thoughts and their phenomenology. Altogether, 
these analyses reveal similarities between future and past thinkers in terms of 
phenomenological properties. 
5.3.3 Relation between SGT and task performances  
5.3.3.1 CRT task efficiency 
As previous chapters highlight a link between SGT content and task performance, 
we investigated whether different types of SGT predicted CRT task performance. We 
computed a measure of task efficiency by z-scoring the error rate and RT, computing an 
average of the two measures and reversing this score (so that higher scores would indicate 
higher efficiency). The multivariate ANOVA predicting SGT Content scores (Future, Past, 
Emotion) from task efficiency did not reveal any significant effect (F(3,36) = .14, p > .9).  
No significant effect was found between the phenomenology of SGT and task efficiency 
either (F(3,36) = 1.12, p > .3).  
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5.3.3.2 Stop signal response task 
We were also interested in investigating the link between individual differences in 
SGT and performance at the Stop Signal Response Task (SSRT, Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009). For each participant, we computed a measure of SSRT efficiency as following 
(SSD: Stop Signal Delay (ms); RT: Reaction Time (ms); Accuracy: percentage of correct 
stop-signal trial responses): 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑇 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =  ((𝑆𝑆𝐷 − 𝑅𝑇) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦⁄ )𝑥100 
One participant was excluded from the analysis due to a technical error during the 
performance of the task. We found no evidence that individual differences in SGT content 
or phenomenology related to individual differences in SSRT efficiency (multivariate 
ANOVA predicting three SGT content scores: F(3,35) = .29, p > .8; Multivariate ANOVA 
predicting three phenomenology scores: F(3,35) = .55, p > .6).  
5.3.3.3 Self-reference task  
Previous studies report that self-referential processes may be preferentially 
involved during Future vs. Past SGT (Chapter 4 and Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011) 
and we explored this question using the Self Reference Task (SRT, Rogers et al., 1977). 
First, we computed: i) for each condition, the sum of “old” items correctly identified as 
“old” and ii) the total number of “new” items falsely identified as “old”. This latter score 
was then divided by three and subtracted from each accuracy score in order to control for 
participants tendency to falsely recognise items. Data from two participants were excluded 
from the analysis as their accuracy scores in the “best friend” conditions were extremely 
low (i.e. below 4.5, with an average sample score of 10.2).  
Replicating previous findings, participants displayed a self-reference effect i.e. their 
memory for adjectives was higher in the Self condition (Repeated measures ANOVA 
predicting accuracy from referent (Self, Best friend, David Cameron), F(2,74) = 25.25, p 
< .001, Self: M = 11.80, SE = .3; Best friend: M = 10.54, SE = .28; David Cameron: M = 
9.32, SE = .34). We explored how SGT content and SRT performance were linked by 
computing a multivariate ANOVA predicting SGT content scores from the three accuracy 
scores. We found a main effect of Self accuracy (F(1,32) = 4.88, p = .007). Post-hoc 
analyses revealed that Future SGT was significantly predicted by memory for Self items 
(F(1,36) = 15.54, p < .001; Figure 5-10). We did not find an effect for either Past or 
Emotion SGT. Finally, a multivariate ANOVA predicting phenomenology scores from 
SRT scores did not yield any significant effect. Altogether, our data replicate previous 
findings showing that self-referential processes preferentially relate to Future SGT rather 
Past or Emotion SGT (Chapter 4 and Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011).  
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Figure 5-10. Relation between Future SGT and self-reference task performance 
Participants who generated more SGT about the future during the CRT task were better able to remember 
self-related words presented during the SRT. Abbreviations: Acc: Accuracy, CRT: choice reaction time, 
SGT: self-generated thought, SRT: self-reference task. 
5.3.4 Relation between SGT and questionnaires  
5.3.4.1 CESDR 
The mind-wandering literature highlights a link between SGT tendencies and well-
being (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood, 
Fitzgerald, et al., 2009; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). Although some studies report that 
tendencies to mind-wander is associated with low mood levels (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 
2010), other studies highlight that this relationship depends on the content of the thoughts 
(Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 
2011). The following analysis explored whether a relationship existed between depressive 
symptoms (as assessed using the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 
Revised [CESDR], Eaton et al., 2004) and the content as well as the phenomenology of 
SGT. Two participants were excluded due to extremes score on the CESDR (above 30, 
with a sample median of 11.5).  
A multivariate ANOVA predicting the three types of SGT Content from CESDR 
scores revealed an effect of CESDR at trend level (F(3,34) = 2.59, p = .07). Post-hoc 
univariate ANOVAs revealed that depressive tendencies were associated with more 
negative thoughts (F(1,36) = 7.48, p = .009; Figure 5-11a), replicating previous findings 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). No significant effect 
was observed for either Past or Future SGT.  
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We also explored whether individual differences in the phenomenology of thoughts 
were related to depressive symptoms. We computed a multivariate ANOVA predicting the 
three phenomenology scores from CESDR scores but no significant relation was observed 
(F(3,34) = .17, p > .9).  
 
Figure 5-11. Relation between SGT content and questionnaires  
a) Individuals reporting more negative thoughts also had higher depressive symptoms as measured using the 
CESDR. b) Individuals reporting more specific thoughts also had larger MAAS scores, indicating that they 
had more mindful tendencies. Note that a positive emotion score indicates that individuals generated more 
positive SGT. Abbreviations: CESDR: Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Revised, MAAS: 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale, SGT: self-generated thought.   
5.3.4.2 Mind-wandering questionnaires 
We also investigated whether mind-wandering tendencies (as assessed using 
questionnaires) related to either the content or the phenomenology of SGT (as measured 
under laboratory conditions). Two Multivariate ANOVAs predicting the content of SGT 
were computed, one with Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DDFS, Singer & Antrobus, 
1970) and one with Mind Wandering Spontaneous (MWS) and Mind Wandering 
Deliberate (MWD, Seli et al., 2014) as covariates. Neither analysis revealed a significant 
relationship. Similarly, we ran multivariate ANOVAs predicting the three types of 
phenomenology from i) MWD and MWS, and ii) from DDFS scores. Again, no significant 
effect was observed.  
5.3.4.3 MAAS 
Finally, we investigated whether mindfulness tendencies, as measured using the 
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS, Brown & Ryan, 2003) related to SGT. We 
log-transformed MAAS scores prior to performing analyses as they did not follow a 
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normal distribution. The multivariate ANOVA predicting three types of SGT Content from 
the MAAS score did not reveal any significant effect. Regarding the phenomenology of 
SGT, we found an effect at trend level (F(3,38) = 2.77, p = .06). Follow-up univariate 
ANOVAs separate for each phenomenology type revealed that higher MAAS scores were 
associated with more specific thoughts (F(1,38) = 6.47, p = .02;  Figure 5-11b).    
5.4 Discussion  
The aim of the study was to investigate the phenomenological properties of Future, 
Past and Emotion SGT in order to highlight potential similarities and differences. First, by 
computing two separate PCAs for the content and phenomenological ratings, we gained 
insight into the organization of the different features of the mind-wandering experience. 
We replicated the pattern of SGT types observed in previous chapters and studies (Engert 
et al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013), with three PC corresponding to Future, 
Past and Emotion SGT. Overall, the pattern of SGT content was observed across 5 
independent datasets, confirming that our approach for defining types of thought content is 
reliable. In addition, the resemblance between the current SGT pattern and previous 
findings also suggests that individuals were equally able to introspect on the features of 
their thoughts, whether we assessed 5 (Chapter 3), 7 (Chapter 4) or 10 dimensions. It also 
suggests that replacing the two Negative and Positive questions by a single one has no 
detrimental consequence on the PCA outcomes.  
Performing a separate PCA on the Words, Images, Intrusive and Vague ratings 
allowed us to determine the shared variance between different phenomenological 
properties of SGT. One PC represented the modality employed to represent the thoughts 
(i.e. whether SGT was in the form of words or images), indicating that thoughts are 
generally represented in a single modality and replicating Stawarczyk et al. (2013b). In 
addition, our data also suggest that intrusiveness and visual imagery share overlapping 
variance. Although this result is preliminary, it hints at the possibility that the relation 
between intrusive thoughts and visual imagery observed in debilitating conditions such as 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & 
Burgess, 2010) may be extreme forms of a phenomenon that is naturally present in healthy 
populations.  
By investigating the relation between the content and phenomenological qualities 
of the thoughts (using data from 351 probes), we gained a better understanding of the 
common and distinct properties of Future, Past and Emotion SGT. Our set of LMMs 
revealed that Future and Past SGT (i.e. mental time travel, MTT) were both considered as 
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more intrusive. However, we did not find evidence for a link between negative thinking 
and Intrusiveness. Although speculative, this suggests that participants did not consider 
MTT as negative intrusions but rather as involuntary or spontaneous experiences, perhaps 
interfering with the performance of the task at hand. This result may have implications for 
the investigation of the neural correlates of SGT (Chapter 6), as previous studies have 
found that distinct neural processes support the generation of voluntary and involuntary 
MTT (Berntsen, 2010). In particular, involuntary future and past thoughts involve 
associative processes supported by the hippocampus and the medial temporal lobe, 
whereas voluntary simulations rely on additional goal-directed and executive processes 
(involving regions of the prefrontal cortex). Our result also provides insight into the results 
obtained in Chapter 3, where we observed that both Future and Past SGT were related to 
individual differences in the creative aspect of social problem solving (i.e. generating steps 
to reach a given solution). Arguably, the generation of involuntary MTT may be related to 
the creation of steps to resolve a problem because of the shared involvement of associative 
processes necessary to generate creative mental content. 
We also observed that Emotion SGT was characterised by distinct 
phenomenological properties. Positive thoughts were more in the form of images and 
negative thoughts more in the form of words. This is in line with early daydreaming studies 
showing a link between positive thoughts and vivid imagery (Singer, 1974). In addition, 
results obtained from a Multi-level Exploratory Factor analysis published by Stawarczyk 
and colleagues revealed one factor loading positively on inner speech, and negatively on 
imagery as well as affective content (Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). Evidence also 
suggests that certain types of inner speech are linked to anxiety (McCarthy-Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2011) and that visual mental imagery is impaired during worry (Hirsch, 
Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, 2012). LMMs also revealed that positive thoughts 
were considered as more specific, which is consistent with findings highlighting a relation 
between depressive symptoms and a tendency to generate non-specific and over-general 
memories or prospections (O’Connor & Cassidy, 2007; Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010).  
Our data also highlight potential similarities between Future and Emotion SGT. As 
mentioned above, positive thoughts relied on visual imagery and were in general more 
specific. Paralleling these findings, we observed that Future SGT was especially intrusive 
when the thoughts were specific or in the form of images. Our PCA results also show that 
data obtained from future and emotion probe questions shared variance, as indicated by the 
fact that the Emotion SGT loaded positively on future ratings. These results suggest a link 
between prospective cognition and positive thinking, in line with a growing body of 
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evidence (Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2013; Plimpton, Patel, & Kvavilashvili, 2015; 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2012; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013).  
Additional analyses were also computed to investigate the relation between 
individual differences in SGT content and in SGT phenomenology. We observed that 
individuals who frequently experienced MTT also tended to represent their thoughts using 
imagery rather than inner speech. This suggests an overlap in the cognitive processes 
involved in MTT and visual mental imagery, and is consistent with (D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2006).  In addition, this result also shows that common cognitive processes 
support Future and Past SGT, and provides additional evidence for the claim that 
simulations of the past and the future rely on shared cognitive processes (Addis et al., 
2009; Schacter et al., 2007).  
Finally, two others results replicated previous findings. First, we observed that 
negative thinking predicted depressive symptoms, in line with (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2013; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). Note that we 
did not observe a significant relation  between the CESDR and Past SGT (on the contrary 
to previous studies e.g. Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Smallwood & O’Connor, 
2011) and this may be due to the difference in questionnaires employed (CESDR vs. Beck 
Depression Inventory, Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1993).  Second, we also found that 
individual differences in Future SGT (but not other types of thoughts) was related to self-
referential processing, in line with Chapter 4 and Smallwood, Schooler, et al. (2011). 
These results confirm that our approach for operationalizing SGT content is reliable and 
replicable, and therefore provides a solid basis for the investigation of its neural correlates. 
To conclude, the current chapter provides evidence that distinct types of SGT 
possess heterogeneous phenomenological properties and may therefore recruit differences 
cognitive correlates. Similarities were observed between Future and Past SGT (e.g. they 
were both considered as more spontaneous), whereas mental time travel and Emotion SGT 
had distinct properties (e.g. Emotion SGT but not MTT was considered more specific). 
These similarities and differences support the theoretical approach employed throughout 
the thesis, whereby we consider Future and Past SGT as more similar to each other than to 
Emotion SGT (see Chapter 2 for more details). Moreover, they provide evidence for our 
prediction that distinct types of SGT recruit heterogeneous cognitive correlates. Although 
preliminary, our findings also hint at the possibility that these heterogeneous cognitive 
correlates may support SGT heterogeneous functional outcomes and future studies will be 
required to examine this relationship in more detail.  
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Chapter 6.  
Neural Correlates of SGT  
6.1 Introduction  
The studies presented throughout this thesis provide evidence that distinct types of 
SGT can be identified based on the interaction between the temporal, social and emotional 
dimensions of SGT and represent Future, Past and Emotion SGT. Our studies as well as 
published findings highlight that different SGT types can have heterogeneous functional 
outcomes (Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Chapter 5 and e.g. Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; 
Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011) as well as heterogeneous phenomenological properties 
(Chapter 5; Cole & Berntsen, 2015; Stawarczyk, Cassol, & D’Argembeau, 2013). 
Altogether, these provide support for our predictions that i) distinct types of thoughts can 
be identified based on their content and ii) that they possess heterogeneous functional 
outcomes. The present chapter will test our last prediction i.e. distinct types of SGT rely on 
specific neural correlates. Evidence in favour of this prediction will provide final support 
for our claim that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon.  
We will adopt the component process hypothesis as a theoretical framework to 
guide the examination of the neural mechanisms supporting SGT (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2014; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, 
2013a; Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015). The model states that the large range of SGT 
that individuals can experience (e.g. planning, worry, rumination, reminiscence and so on) 
may emerge via the flexible selection and recruitment of a variety of neurocognitive 
processes, including episodic memory, emotion or executive processes (see Chapter 1 for 
more details). Rather than a single common neural mechanism supporting all forms of SGT, 
the component process hypothesis postulates that specific sub-processes may be recruited 
depending on the specificities of the SGT generated.  
Throughout the PhD, we have focused on the role of thought content in gaining a 
better understanding of SGT heterogeneities. Likewise, the current chapter will investigate 
how the content may shape the neural processes related to distinct types of thoughts. For 
example, autobiographical planning (i.e. projecting oneself into the future and planning 
means to achieve one’s goals) may require different processes compared to rumination (i.e. 
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focussing one’s attention on negative past experiences) and may therefore rely on distinct 
neurocognitive substrates to be generated. In addition, we also suggest that the context in 
which these different SGT types occur may influence the processes recruited. The context 
regulation hypothesis states that individuals regulate their SGT tendencies depending on 
the demands dictated by the external environment (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, 2013a). In particular, SGT is more frequent 
when the environment is less demanding (e.g. during the Choice Reaction Time (CRT) 
task comparted to the Working Memory (WM) task) and this effect is preferentially 
observed for future-focused rather than past-focused thoughts (Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Iijima 
& Tanno, 2012; Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; 
Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, & Singer, 2013; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009; 
Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). This suggests that 
individuals are able to suppress SGT tendencies under more demanding conditions, and 
this capacity may require additional control and inhibitory processes. In the current study, 
we will explore how the neural correlates of SGT vary according to the content of thoughts 
and the context in which they occur, with the aim to provide support for the component 
process hypothesis and for our prediction that SGT can have heterogeneous neural 
correlates. 
Role of DMN and non-DMN regions in SGT 
 An extensive body of research has investigated the neural mechanisms of SGT and 
highlights the role of the Default Mode Network (DMN
5
) in supporting spontaneous 
internal mentation. For example, Christoff et al. (2009) probed participants’ SGT while 
they performed a non-demanding task in the scanner. Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) revealed that DMN regions, including the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and angular gyrus (AG), were more active prior to off-
task vs. on-task reports. This study and others demonstrate the ubiquitous role the DMN 
plays in SGT (Allen et al., 2013; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010, 2014; Mason, Norton, et al., 
2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maquet, et al., 2011).  
                                                 
 
5
 The DMN is a large-scale brain network more active at rest or when individuals are performing non-
demanding tasks. The main hubs of the DMN are the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the anterior 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Additional regions include the hippocampus and parahippocampus, 
ventromedial and dorsomedial PFC (dmPFC and vmPFC), retrosplenial cortex (RSC), posterior inferior 
parietal cortex (pIPL), temporal pole, lateral temporal cortex (LTC), and temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). See 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Raichle et al., 2001) for reviews.  
  113   
Additional brain areas not traditionally considered as part of the DMN are also 
recruited during SGT. For example, future planning (which frequently occurs during SGT) 
relies on the interaction between the DMN and regions of the Frontoparietal Network 
(FPN), in particular the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) and insula (Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Gerlach, Spreng, Madore, 
& Schacter, 2014; Spreng et al., 2010). Similar findings have been observed in studies 
investigating SGT. For example, Christoff et al. (2009) observed activations in the ACC 
and dlPFC in addition to activations within the DMN (in line with Bernhardt et al., 2014; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2009) and Mason, 
Norton, et al. (2007) also reported activations in the insula and the cingulate alongside 
activations in the PCC and mPFC. Altogether, these studies highlight that non-DMN 
regions also support SGT.  
Although these studies have shed light on the neural correlates of SGT, little is 
known regarding SGT heterogeneities emerging due to SGT content. Using fMRI, Mason, 
Bar, & Macrae (2007) observed that individual differences in future-directed thought were 
linked to increased fMRI activity in several regions including the mPFC and hippocampus, 
whereas individual differences in past-directed thought were linked to increased activity in 
regions such as the insula and cingulate gyrus, providing preliminary evidence for potential 
differences in neural correlates. In another study, Gorgolewski et al. (2014) employed 
resting state fMRI (rsfMRI
6
) to examine variations in intrinsic brain activity depending on 
individual differences in SGT content and phenomenology. Their results highlight 
heterogeneities, with certain thought types associated with within-DMN regions (e.g. 
visual imagery recruiting the mPFC) and others associated with non-DMN regions (e.g. 
social cognition linked to the insula). The current study builds on these studies and aims to 
provide further evidence for differences in the neural substrates of SGT depending on 
thought content.  
Taking into account the component process hypothesis, and based on the findings 
demonstrating the ubiquitous role of the DMN in SGT as well as the importance of non-
DMN areas, the current study proposes that interactions between the DMN and non-DMN 
regions may support SGT varieties, in line with Andrews-Hanna et al. (2014). In particular, 
we propose that the DMN hubs (PCC and mPFC) are essential to all types SGT and that 
additional regions may be recruited according to the specific requirements of the SGT 
                                                 
 
6
 RsfMRI is a neuroimaging technique which estimates brain activity at rest based on spontaneous 
fluctuations in the blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signal. 
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generated. Our study will test the hypothesis that the interaction between DMN and non-
DMN regions may vary for different types of thoughts and according to the context in 
which they occur.  
Current experiment 
To assess the interaction between the DMN and non-DMN regions, we used 
rsfMRI and seed-based whole-brain functional connectivity (FC). FC can be measured by 
correlating the time courses of the BOLD signal between one region (the seed) and all the 
other voxels measured. A positive correlation indicates that the seed and the voxel 
examined are functionally connected (i.e. they are part of the same network) whereas a 
negative correlation indicates that they may be part of anti-correlated networks. Thus FC 
provides a quantitative description of how the seed interacts with other brain regions. 
Previous studies have shown that individual differences in FC can be predicted by 
individual differences in behavioural and subjective measures e.g. task performance or 
self-reports (Hampson, Driesen, Skudlarski, Gore, & Constable, 2006; Smallwood, 
Gorgolewski, et al., 2013). The current study will take advantage of this technique in order 
to examine how the DMN and other regions interact, and how this interaction is predicted 
by SGT.  
Whole-brain FC of the two mains hubs of the DMN (PCC and mPFC) will be 
computed and we will examine how individual differences in these FC patterns relate to 
individual differences in SGT tendencies. In particular, the current experiment will 
determine how the content and context of SGT influences the FC patterns. To this end, we 
probed the temporal, social and emotional content of SGT while participants performed the 
CRT / WM cognitive task and we identified distinct SGT types using Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA; see Chapter 2 for more details). Following previous findings, we expected 
that SGT, in particular directed towards the future, would be reduced during the WM 
compared to the CRT task (Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Iijima & Tanno, 2012; Smallwood et al., 
2009; Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011). 
The main aim of the study was to provide evidence for the component process 
hypothesis, as instantiated by the proposition that the interaction between the DMN and 
other non-DMN regions vary according to the content and context of SGT. Hypothesis 1 
states that the individual differences in SGT types will predict individual differences in the 
FC of the DMN. To this end, our analyses will explore whether differences exist between 
Future, Past and Emotion SGT. Hypothesis 2 states that the context in which SGT occurred 
will be related to individual differences in DMN’s FC patterns. Our analyses will therefore 
test whether generating SGT during easier and harder conditions rely on different neural 
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processes. Finally, hypothesis 3 will test whether an interaction exists between the content 
and context in relation to the DMN FC. For example, as previous studies have shown that 
Future but not Past SGT is reduced during WM vs. CRT task, it is possible that the 
generation of Future SGT during the WM task may be associated with particular DMN FC 
patterns compared to CRT. Altogether, evidence in favour of these hypotheses will 
demonstrate that the content and context of SGT influence the neural processes involved in 
SGT, thus supporting the component process hypothesis and our general claim that SGT is 
a heterogeneous phenomenon. 
6.2 Materials and Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
The study was approved by the Ethics Commission of the Medical Faculty of the 
University of Leipzig (Ref # 360-10-13122010). 49 right-handed individuals were 
recruited from the database of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain 
Sciences, Leipzig, Germany (Mean age = 28 years, Age range 19–46, 30 females). All of 
them were native German speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history 
of psychiatric or radiological conditions and no history of substance abuse. Participants 
provided written informed consent prior to their participation.  
6.2.2 Experimental session 
Prior to the behavioural experiment, all participants had taken part in various 
neuroimaging studies during which at least one resting-state scan had been recorded and 
was accessible from the database. During the experimental session, participants performed 
three computer tasks in a counter-balanced order. One task consisted of the CRT / WM 
cognitive task; data from the two other tasks have been described elsewhere and will not be 
described in the current study (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013; 
Smallwood, Gorgolewski, et al., 2013). The information regarding task order will be 
included as a covariate in behavioural and rsfMRI analyses in order to control for potential 
order effects.  
6.2.3 Cognitive task 
Participants performed both the CRT and WM tasks (see Chapter 2 for more 
details). Each task lasted 14 min and the order of the conditions was counterbalanced. 
Again, this information will be included as a covariate in statistical analyses in order to 
control for potential order effects.  
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6.2.4 Experience sampling  
Participants were probed about the content of their thoughts while performing the 
cognitive task. Intermittently throughout the task, participants were interrupted and asked 
to rate how much their thoughts were unrelated to the current task (i.e., “off-task”), future-
focused, past-focused, self-focused, other-focused, negative and positive. To answer these 
seven questions, participants used a slider ranging from “Not at all” (0) to “Completely” 
(100). In total, 613 probes were recorded in 49 participants (average number of probes per 
participant: CRT, M = 6.3, SE = 0.2; WM, M = 6.2, SE = 0.2).  
6.2.5 Functional MRI data acquisition  
The rsfMRI scans of the 49 participants were retrieved from the existing Max 
Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences database. The data from 8 
participants were subsequently excluded because one or more scanning parameters were 
too extreme compared to the other scans, leaving data from 41 participants. The remaining 
scans were collected on either a 3.0 Tesla Siemens Tim Trio (n = 26) or a Siemens Vario 
scanner (n = 15), several months up to a few weeks before the behavioural testing session. 
Scan duration varied from 360 to 600 seconds and two different slice order acquisitions 
were employed (ascending, n = 37, interleaved, n = 4). We controlled for differences in 
scan type, slice order and scan duration by including these variables as nuisance covariates 
in group-level whole-brain FC analyses. For all participants, the remaining scan parameters 
were the same (TR = 2000 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 90°; acquisition matrix = 64×64; 
FOV = 192 mm; acquisition voxel size = 3×3×4 mm). Participants were instructed to relax, 
to hold as still as possible, and to keep their eyes open. High-resolution T1-weighted 
anatomical scans were also acquired for all participants (MPRAGE, TR = 2300 ms; TE = 
2.96 ms; TI = 900 ms; flip angle = 9°; FOV = 256 mm; acquisition voxel size = 1×1×1 
mm).  
6.2.6 fMRI pre-processing 
Cortical surface reconstruction was performed on the T1 scans using FreeSurfer 
(Behzadi, Restom, Liau, & Liu, 2007; Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 1999; Fischl et al., 2002; 
Fischl, Liu, & Dale, 2001; Reuter, Rosas, & Fischl, 2010). For each subject, nonlinear 
transformation from T1 to MNI template (created from 152 subjects, resampled at 2mm, 
provided with FSL) was calculated using ANTs (Avants et al., 2011). To remove scanner 
instability effects the first four volumes of each EPI sequence were removed. Slice-timing 
and motion correction using 4DRealign was implemented in nipy (http://nipy.org/nipy; 
Roche 2011). Affine transformation from mean EPI image to T1 volume was calculated 
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using BBRegister (Greve & Fischl, 2009). Brain, cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and white 
matter masks were extracted from FreeSurfer parcellation and transformed into EPI space 
(thresholded at 0.5 after interpolation). Realigned time series were masked using the brain 
mask. Principal components of physiological noise were estimated using the CompCor 
(Behzadi et al., 2007). Joined white matter and CSF masks and voxels of highest variance 
were used to extract two sets of principal components (a.k.a. aCompCor and tCompCor). 
Using both of those strategies ensured robust estimation of physiological noise. Outliers in 
the EPI sequence were discovered based on intensity and motion parameters (ArtDetect - 
http://www.nitrc.org/projects/artifact_detect/). This was followed by denoising of the time 
series using a GLM model with motion parameters, CompCorr components, and outliers as 
regressors (note that global signal was not regressed). Time series were also smoothed 
using SUSAN with 5mm full width half minimum (FWHM) kernel (Smith S.M, 1992). 
Finally high-pass (0.1 Hz) and low-pass (0.01Hz) filters were applied using FSL. Quality 
of scans and pre-processing was assessed visually by looking at EPI to T1 coregistration 
overlay, motion parameters plots and temporal signal to noise ratio volumes (tSNR). Pre-
processing was performed with a workflow from Brain Imaging Pipelines 
(https://github.com/INCF/BrainImagingPipelines) and all data processing integrated using 
Nipype (Gorgolewski et al., 2011). 
6.2.7 Functional connectivity analysis 
Based on the graph theoretical analysis of the DMN from Andrews-Hanna et al. 
(2010), spherical ROIs of 6 mm radius were computed for left and right mPFC and left and 
right PCC, centred at the following MNI coordinates (x,y,z): left mPFC: -6, 52, -2; right 
mPFC: 6, 52, -2; left PCC: -8, -56, 26; right PCC: 8, -56, 26. These correspond to the 
major hubs of the DMN in the left hemisphere and we transformed them to the right 
hemisphere to reflect the fact that the DMN has a complex bilateral structure in healthy 
individuals (Swanson et al., 2011).  
ROI masks were transformed back to each subject’s EPI space using combined 
inverse nonlinear MNI to T1 transform and affine T1 to EPI (thresholded after 
interpolation at 0.5). Translated ROIs were restricted within the brain mask. ROIs time-
series were estimated by averaging voxels within each ROI. Full brain connectivity 
(correlation) maps were calculated using AFNI. Connectivity maps were Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformed and spatially transformed to MNI space for group-level analysis. Finally, 
maps were averaged across hemispheres separately for each seed region to provide 
averaged FC maps. These averaged maps were used in subsequent analyses. Data 
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processing pipelines were put together using Nipype (Gorgolewski et al., 2011) and the 
code is available at https://github.com/NeuroanatomyAndConnectivity/pipelines/tree/ 
reading_by_default/src/reading_by_default.  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Definition of SGT types  
6.3.1.1 Thought probe descriptives 
We first investigated whether the current data had similar characteristics to 
previously published datasets. Note that we included the task order and CRT / WM task 
order as covariates in all analyses to control for potential order effects. We found that 
participants reported more off-task thinking during the CRT vs. WM task (Figure 6-1, 
paired sample t-test, t(48) = 4.76, p < .001), similar to previous findings (Levinson et al., 
2012; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Teasdale et al., 1995).  
Next, we investigated whether the temporal dimension of the thought varied 
according to the cognitive task. A repeated measures ANOVA predicting ratings from 
probe type (Future, Past), cognitive task (CRT, WM) and controlling for task order 
revealed a main effect of probe type (F(1,48) = 22.97, p < .001). Post-hoc paired t-test 
revealed that thoughts were in general more future than past-related (t(48) = 4.79, p < .001). 
However, unlike Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and previous studies, we did not observe that 
thoughts were more future-related during the CRT vs. WM task (main effect cognitive task, 
F(1,48) = .57, p > .4; interaction probe type x cognitive task, F(1,48) = .26, p > .6). This 
may be due to the fact that participants performed the CRT and WM conditions one after 
the other (in counterbalanced order), whereas participants in previous experiments 
performed twice each condition, therefore providing them the chance to adapt their SGT 
tendencies according to task demands.  
Regarding the social dimension of thoughts, we observed a main effect of cognitive 
task (F(1,48) = 5.49, p = .02). A paired t-test indicated that ratings were higher during the 
CRT vs. WM task (t(48) = 2.34, p = .02), in line with previous findings. However, contrary 
to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al. (2013), we did not observe 
any significant difference between self and other ratings (main effect of probe type, 
F(1,48) = .48, p < .5).  
Finally, we also explored the emotional content of participants’ thoughts. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with probe type (negative, positive) and cognitive task (CRT, 
WM) revealed that thoughts were in general more positive than negative (main effect of 
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probe type, F(1,48) = 58.47, p < .001; paired sample t-test, t(48) = 7.65, p < .001). 
However, we did not observe an effect of cognitive task (F(1,48) = 1.80, p = .19).  
 
Figure 6-1. Boxplots of average probe ratings  
Participants reported significantly more off-task thinking during the CRT vs. WM task. In addition, thoughts 
were also significantly more future than past-related, and social ratings (self, other) were significantly higher 
during the CRT vs. WM task. Abbreviations: CRT: Choice Reaction Time, WM: Working Memory. 
6.3.1.2 Principal Component Analysis  
Similarly to previous chapters, we investigated the shared variance between 
different probe types using PCA. We computed PCA with Varimax rotation on 613 probes 
and obtained 3 principal components (PC) explaining 70% of the variance in our data 
(Figure 6-2a; Table 6-1). The first PC, Future SGT, loaded positively on future, self, other 
and off-task ratings. The second, Emotion SGT, loaded positively on negative ratings and 
negatively on positive ratings. The third PC, Past SGT, loaded positively on past, other and 
off-task ratings. These three types of thoughts are highly similar to the results obtained 
from previous datasets (Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Chapter 5; Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). Using the PC loadings, we averaged the SGT scores for 
each participant (see Chapter 2 for more details). We also reversed the average scores for 
the Emotion SGT so that a higher score would reflect more positive SGT.  
We then investigated whether SGT types were influenced by the cognitive task 
(Figure 6-2b). A repeated measures ANOVA with SGT type (Future, Emotion, Past), 
cognitive task (CRT, WM) and controlling for task order revealed a main effect of 
cognitive task (F(1, 48) = 5.83, p = .02). Post-hoc paired sample t-test showed that SGT 
scores were overall higher during the CRT vs. WM task (t(48) = 3.34, p = .001). Although 
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we did not observe a significant interaction between SGT types and cognitive task, our 
data are in line with previous studies showing that SGT is reduced during the WM vs. CRT 
task (Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011; Teasdale et al., 1995). 
Table 6-1. Results of the Principal Component Analysis  
The table presents the loadings of each probe question on the three principal components (PC) generated by 
Principal Component Analysis. 70% of variance in the probe data was explained by the three PC. See Figure 
6-2 for a graphical representation of the loadings.  
 
Principal Components 
Future Emotion Past 
Off-task 0.63 0.07 0.31 
Other 0.54 0.07 0.58 
Past 0.12 0.06 0.92 
Self 0.70 0.04 0.25 
Future 0.86 0.05 -0.06 
Negative 0.21 0.85 0.14 
Positive 0.06 -0.91 0.02 
 
Eigen values 2.53 1.40 .89 
 
 
Figure 6-2. Principal Component Analysis of probe data and SGT task differences  
a) The principal component analysis on the seven questions revealed three principal components, explaining 
70% of variance in the probe data (n = 613 probes). Future SGT loaded positively on future, self, other and 
off-task ratings. Emotion SGT loaded positively on negative ratings and negatively on positive ratings. 
Finally, Past SGT loaded positively on off-task, past and other ratings. b) SGT scores were overall higher 
during the CRT task vs. the WM task but we did not observe any significant difference between the SGT 
types. Note that Emotion SGT scores were reversed so that higher scores indicate more positive thoughts. 
Abbreviations: CRT: choice reaction time, SGT: self-generated thought, WM: working memory.  
6.3.2 Functional connectivity analyses  
We computed FC group-level analyses using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Department 
of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London). A voxelwise multiple regression 
was computed separately for each seed and included 6 SGT covariates (3 from CRT, 3 
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from WM task) as well as 5 nuisance covariates (scan type, slice order, scan duration, CRT 
/ WM order, and task order). We report results obtained from whole-brain analyses 
computed with a cluster forming threshold k of p = .005 and corrected for false discovery 
rate FDR at q < .05 (Chumbley, Worsley, Flandin, & Friston, 2010). 
6.3.2.1 Whole brain functional connectivity analysis  
Prior to examining the relationship between FC and the patterns of thought, we 
examined the intercept of the multiple regression models for the PCC and mPFC seeds to 
confirm that they are both embedded in the DMN. Figure 6-3a and Figure 6-3c show the 
results for PCC (cluster forming threshold, positive FC: k = 160, negative FC: k = 138) and 
for mPFC (positive FC: k = 411, negative FC: k = 191). Both seeds are part of a large scale 
network composed of the main regions of the DMN, including PCC, mPFC and bilateral 
AG, hippocampus and anterior temporal lobe (ATL). Both seeds are also anti-correlated 
with regions such as the bilateral supra-marginal gyrus (SMG), bilateral inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG), bilateral precuneus and left posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG), 
replicating previous findings (e.g. Fox et al., 2005; Raichle et al., 2001).  
Figure 6-3 also illustrates that PCC is significantly anti-correlated with the ACC, 
bilateral middle-lateral PFC (mlPFC) and bilateral Insula, whereas the mPFC does not 
display significant negative FC to these regions. These results are in line with previous 
findings highlighting differences in anti-correlations between the main hubs of the DMN 
(Uddin, Kelly, Biswal, Castellanos, & Milham, 2009).  
For each seed, we transformed the positive and negative FC maps into two masks, a 
positive network (N
+
) and a negative network (N
-
) mask (PCC masks: Figure 6-3b; mPFC 
masks: Figure 6-3d). These masks will be used to guide the interpretation of the 
subsequent results. In particular, the following analyses will investigate how individual 
differences in SGT scores predict individual differences in PCC and mPFC FC, and the 
masks will be used to identify whether SGT is related to changes in FC within the DMN 
(N
+
), outside the DMN (N
-
) or at the junction between the two.  
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Figure 6-3. Whole brain functional connectivity patterns for PCC and mPFC  
Whole-brain FC analyses for the PCC (a) and mPFC (c) confirmed that both seeds were embedded in a 
network composed of the main DMN regions, including midline regions and bilateral hippocampus, 
retrosplenial cortex, angular gyrus, dorsorostral PFC and striatum (hot colours). Although positive correlation 
patterns were similar across DMN seeds, spatial differences can be observed for the anti-correlation patterns 
(cool colours). PCC was negatively correlated to the ACC, bilateral insula and middle-lateral PFC, whereas 
we did not observe significant negative correlations between the mPFC and these areas. The masks generated 
from the whole-brain FC maps can be seen in (b) and (d). These masks represent the positive (N
+
) and 
negative networks (N
-
) of each seed. Significant clusters were obtained with a cluster forming threshold k of 
p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q < .05 (PCC, positive FC: k = 160, negative FC: k = 138; mPFC, positive FC: 
k = 411, negative FC: k = 191). Abbreviations: ACC: anterior cingulate cortex, DMN: default mode network, 
FC: functional connectivity, FDR: false discovery rate, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, N
-
: negative network 
mask, N
+
: positive network mask, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, PFC: prefrontal cortex.  
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6.3.2.2 Hypothesis 1: Role of the content in SGT neural correlates 
The first set of analyses will test the hypothesis that the interaction between the 
DMN and other regions vary according to the content of SGT. These analyses will identify 
whether individual differences in SGT content (measured across both CRT and WM tasks) 
are linked to individual differences in PCC and mPFC FC.  
Mental time travel. We first examined the similarities between Future and Past 
SGT (i.e. mental time travel, MTT, Table 6-2). As can be seen in Figure 6-4 we observed 
that individuals reporting more MTT had increased FC between PCC and vmPFC (k = 
540), suggesting that MTT was associated with a more cohesive DMN. In addition, MTT 
was also associated with decreased FC between mPFC and bilateral lingual gyrus and 
cuneus (k = 2777). As shown in Figure 6-4, the negative FC pattern was located at the 
junction between mPFC N
+
 and mPFC N
-
. This suggests that, although individuals 
generally display negative FC between mPFC and lateral occipital at rest (Figure 6-4, pale 
blue), MTT may be accompanied by additional decreases in FC to visual areas (Figure 6-4, 
dark green).  
Table 6-2. Functional connectivity peaks for PCC and mPFC for Mental Time Travel  
See Figure 6-4 for abbreviations.  
Relation Seed Code Brain Region 
Peak region Peak voxel 
(z-value) 
MNI Coordinates 
p(FDR-corr) cluster size (k) x y z 
Mean increase PCC A vmPFC < .001 540 4.25 -10 44 -8 
Mean decrease mPFC B lingual gyrus < .001 2777 4.56 8 -62 8 
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Figure 6-4. Mental Time Travel functional connectivity patterns  
Increases in overall MTT were linked to significant changes in FC between the PCC seed (purple) and 
vmPFC (A). Decreases in overall MTT were related to reduction in FC between the mPFC seed (black) and 
visual areas, including bilateral lingual gyrus and cuneus (B). When overlapping the mPFC FC pattern on 
mPFC N
+
 and N
-
, we found that the visual cluster was located between the two. Significant clusters were 
obtained with a cluster forming threshold k of p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q < .05, see Table 6-2 for more 
details. Scatterplots represent the averaged PCC and mPFC FC for the two significant clusters (A, B) 
according to individual differences in MTT scores. Abbreviations: FC: functional connectivity, FDR: false 
discovery rate, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, MTT: mental time travel, N
-
: negative network mask, N
+
: 
positive network mask, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, SGT: self-generated thought, vmPFC: ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex.  
Future > Past SGT. Next, we investigated whether Future and Past SGT were 
linked to distinct FC patterns. The Future > Past contrast revealed a significant cluster for 
PCC in a region of the left superior frontal cortex (Brodmann Area BA8, k = 258, Table 
6-3). As can be seen on Figure 6-5a, the area was located between PCC N
- 
(pale blue) and 
PCC N
+ 
areas (pale red). Post-hoc analyses revealed that this effect was due to Past SGT 
significantly predicting decreased FC between PCC and BA8 (k = 320, Figure 6-5b). On 
the contrary, overall increase in Future SGT was linked to increased FC between PCC and 
vmPFC (k = 472) i.e. the DMN was more integrated for future thinkers (Figure 6-5c).  
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Figure 6-5. Future > Past SGT functional connectivity patterns  
a) The Future > Past SGT contrast revealed one significant PCC cluster located in BA8 (A). When 
overlapping the significant cluster on PCC N
+
 and N
-
 masks, we found that it was located at the junction 
between the two. b) Overall Past SGT scores significantly predicted decreases in FC between PCC and BA8 
(B). c) Future SGT scores significantly predicted increases in PCC FC to the vmPFC (C). Significant clusters 
were obtained with a cluster forming threshold k of p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q < .05, see Table 6-3 for 
more details. The scatterplot represents the averaged PCC FC for the significant cluster (A) according to 
individual differences in Future and Past SGT scores. Abbreviations: BA: Brodmann Area, FC: functional 
connectivity, FDR: false discovery rate, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, N
-
: negative network mask, N
+
: 
positive network mask, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, SGT: self-generated thought, vmPFC: ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex.  
Table 6-3. Functional connectivity peaks for PCC and mPFC for Future > Past SGT 
See Figure 6-5 for abbreviations.  
Relation Seed Code Brain Region 
Peak region 
Peak voxel 
(z-value) 
MNI 
Coordinates 
p(FDR-
corr) 
cluster 
size (k) 
x y z 
Future > Past PCC A BA8 0.034 258 3.93 -26 8 54 
Mean Past decrease PCC B BA8 0.014 320 4.24 -26 8 54 
Mean Future increase PCC C vmPFC 0.001 472 3.88 -10 46 -8 
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Past > Future SGT. Next, we observed that individuals reporting overall more Past 
than Future SGT had increased FC between mPFC and regions of the frontal lobe (k = 179), 
including bilateral anterior insula, mlPFC and ACC, as well as right SMG (Figure 6-6; 
Table 6-4). Post-hoc analyses revealed that this effect was related to both increases in FC 
with Past SGT (k = 225, Figure 6-6b) as well as decreases in FC for Future SGT (k = 205, 
Figure 6-6c). Figure 6-6a illustrates that the ACC cluster was located within mPFC N
+
. 
Other clusters were located either at the junction between mPFC N
-
 and mPFC N
+
 (mlPFC, 
right SMG) or overlapping with both mPFC N
-
 and mPFC N
+
 (bilateral Insula). Taken 
together, these results suggest that Past SGT is linked to increases in FC between mPFC 
and regions not traditionally considered as part of the DMN.  
Table 6-4. Functional connectivity peaks for PCC and mPFC for Past > Future SGT 
See Figure 6-6 for abbreviations.  
Relation Seed Code Brain Region 
Peak region Peak 
voxel 
(z-
value) 
MNI Coordinates 
p(FDR-
corr) 
cluster 
size (k) 
x y z 
Past > Future mPFC 
A vlPFC < .001 493 4.63 -42 48 12 
B ACC < .001 499 4.33 10 30 22 
C right anterior insula < .001 1778 4.32 30 18 2 
D left anterior insula < .001 775 4.31 -30 18 -10 
E right SMG  0.041 179 3.63 56 -32 16 
Mean Past 
increase 
mPFC 
F dmPFC < .001 694 4.01 -8 38 0 
G left anterior insula 0.002 386 3.88 -40 16 -12 
H ACC 0.021 225 3.68 4 -8 38 
I right putamen 0.021 234 3.66 28 16 0 
Mean Future 
decrease 
mPFC  
J vlPFC 0.001 411 4.5 -42 48 12 
K right frontal operculum < .001 1746 4.43 46 20 -8 
L right SMG  < .001 472 4.03 62 -34 38 
M left anterior insula 0.001 420 3.79 -30 18 -10 
N right pars opercularis 0.025 205 3.29 62 16 18 
 
Figure 6-6. Past > Future SGT functional connectivity patterns (next page) 
a) The Past > Future SGT contrast revealed five significant mPFC clusters, located in vlPFC (A), ACC (B), 
right anterior insula (C), left anterior insula (D) and right SMG (E). When overlapping the significant clusters 
on mPFC N
+
 and N
-
, we found that cluster B was located within mPFC N
+
, whereas clusters A, C – E were 
all located at the N
+
 and N
-
 junction. b) Overall Past SGT scores significantly predicted increases in mPFC 
FC to dmPFC (F), left anterior insula (G), ACC (H) and right putamen (I). c) Overall Future SGT scores 
significantly predicted decreases in FC between mPFC and vlPFC (J), right frontal operculum (K), right 
SMG (L), left anterior insula (M) and right pars opercularis (N). Significant clusters were obtained with a 
cluster forming threshold k of p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q < .05, see Table 6-4 for more details. 
Scatterplots represent the averaged mPFC FC for the significant clusters (A – E) according to individual 
differences in Future and Past SGT scores. Abbreviations, ACC: anterior cingulate cortex, dmPFC: 
dorsomedial PFC, FC: functional connectivity, FDR: false discovery rate, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, N
-
: negative network mask, N
+
: positive network mask, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, SGT: self-generated 
thought, SMG: supramarginal gyrus, vlPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. 
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Emotion SGT. Finally, we observed a main effect of Emotion SGT on PCC FC (k = 
505, Figure 6-7, Table 6-5), indicating that individuals who reported more positive 
thoughts had increased FC between the PCC and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) / vmPFC. 
 
Figure 6-7. Emotion SGT functional connectivity patterns 
Emotion SGT was related to significant increases in FC between PCC and OFC / vmPFC (A). The significant 
cluster was obtained with a cluster forming threshold k of p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q < .05, see Table 
6-5 for more details. The scatterplot represents the averaged PCC FC for the cluster A according to individual 
differences in Emotion SGT. Abbreviations, FC: functional connectivity, FDR: false discovery rate, mPFC: 
medial prefrontal cortex, OFC: orbitofrontal cortex, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, SGT: self-generated 
thought, vmPFC: ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
Table 6-5. Functional connectivity peaks for PCC and mPFC for Emotion SGT  
See Figure 6-7 for abbreviations. 
Relation Seed Code Brain Region 
Peak region Peak 
voxel 
(z-
value) 
MNI Coordinates 
p(FDR-
corr) 
cluster 
size (k) 
x y z 
Mean increase PCC A vmPFC 0.001 505 4.34 10 36 -14 
 
6.3.2.3 Hypothesis 2: Role of the context in SGT neural correlates 
We also investigated whether the FC patterns of the seeds varied according to the 
cognitive task being performed. To this end, we explored whether PCC and mPFC FC 
patterns were predicted by SGT recorded in the CRT and WM task. We ran one set of 
analyses for MTT and one set for Emotion SGT.  
Figure 6-8. MTT WM > CRT task functional connectivity patterns (next page) 
a) The MTT WM > MTT CRT contrast revealed one significant PCC cluster located in mPFC (A) and 4 
significant mPFC clusters, located in PCC (B), right ATL (C), right TPJ (D) and left TPJ (E). When 
overlapping the significant clusters on mPFC N
+
 and N
-
, we found that all clusters were located within mPFC 
N
+
, i.e. within the DMN. b) MTT WM scores significantly predicted increases in PCC FC to the mPFC (F) 
and increases in mPFC FC to the PCC (G), right ATL, (H) and right TPJ (I). c) MTT CRT scores 
significantly predicted decreases in FC between the PCC and vmPFC (J), and decreases in FC between 
mPFC and PCC (K) as well as the right TPJ (L). Significant clusters were obtained with a cluster forming 
threshold k of p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q < .05, see Table 6-6 for more details. Scatterplots represent 
the averaged PCC or mPFC FC for the significant clusters (A – E) according to individual differences in 
MTT CRT and MTT WM scores.  
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Abbreviations: ATL: anterior temporal lobe, CRT: choice reaction time, DMN: default mode network, FC: 
functional connectivity, FDR: false discovery rate, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, MTT: mental time travel, 
N
-
: negative network mask, N
+
: positive network mask, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, TPJ: 
temporoparietal junction, WM: working memory.  
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Mental time travel. As can be seen in Figure 6-8a and Table 6-6, the contrast MTT 
WM > MTT CRT revealed significant effects for PCC (k = 921) and for mPFC (k = 174). 
Post-hoc analyses revealed that MTT was associated with increased FC within DMN 
regions during the WM task (PCC, mPFC, right TPJ, right ATL, Figure 6-8b) and 
decreased FC between DMN regions during the CRT task (PCC, mPFC, right TPJ, Figure 
6-8c). This pattern of results suggests that the generation of MTT during a harder task is 
supported by the strengthening of the DMN integrity. The contrast MTT CRT > MTT WM 
did not reveal any significant effect. 
Table 6-6. Functional connectivity peaks for PCC and mPFC for MTT, WM > CRT task 
See Figure 6-8 for abbreviations.  
Relation Seed Code Brain Region 
Peak region 
Peak voxel 
(z-value) 
MNI Coordinates 
p(FDR-
corr) 
cluster 
size 
(k) 
x y z 
WM > 
CRT 
PCC A mPFC < .001 921 5.06 -6 52 0 
mPFC 
B PCC < .001 1476 4.55 10 -50 20 
C right ATL 0.047 174 4.17 50 -8 -18 
D right TPJ < .001 489 3.86 52 -60 20 
E left TPJ 0.017 234 3.78 -52 -54 34 
WM 
increase 
PCC F mPFC < .001 1240 5.1 -6 52 0 
mPFC 
G PCC / Precuneus < .001 1367 4.48 -4 -66 34 
H right ATL 0.03 218 4.1 50 -8 -18 
I right TPJ 0.009 302 3.68 38 -58 18 
CRT 
decrease 
PCC J mPFC < .001 525 4.69 -6 52 0 
mPFC 
K PCC < .001 1251 4.36 -4 -68 34 
L right TPJ < .001 551 4.08 52 -50 20 
 
Emotion SGT. Regarding Emotion SGT, we found a significant task effect on the 
FC of PCC (k = 325) and mPFC (k = 350, Figure 6-9, Table 6-7). PCC was significantly 
more connected to the mPFC; mPFC was significantly more connected to the PCC and 
right TPJ
7
. The PCC cluster was overlapping with the PCC seed and the TPJ cluster was 
located within mPFC N
+
, suggesting that both clusters are part of the DMN (Figure 6-9a). 
Subsequent post-hoc analyses revealed that positive thinking during the CRT task was 
linked to increased FC between i) PCC and mPFC and ii) between mPFC and PCC as well 
as right TPJ (Figure 6-9b). No significant effect was observed for Emotion WM.  
 
                                                 
 
7
 To ensure that the extreme data point from one participant (i.e. low Emotion SGT score in the CRT task) 
was not driving the positive correlations, we ran the analyses again excluding the participant’s data and 
confirmed that results were still significant (mPFC: cluster forming threshold at p = .01, k = 372; PCC: 
cluster forming threshold at p = .005, k = 284). 
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Figure 6-9. Emotion CRT > WM functional connectivity patterns 
a) The Emotion CRT > WM contrast revealed increased FC between PCC and mPFC (A), and increased FC 
between mPFC and PCC (B) as well as right TPJ (C). The significant mPFC clusters (B, C) all overlapped 
with mPFC N
+
, highlighting that they are part of the DMN. b) Emotion CRT was linked to increased FC 
between PCC and mPFC (D). It was also related to increases in FC between mPFC and right TPJ (E), 
cerebellum (F) and PCC / precuneus (G). Significant clusters were obtained with a cluster forming threshold 
k of p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q < .05, see Table 6-7 for more details. Scatterplots represent the 
averaged PCC or mPFC FC for the significant cluster (A – C) according to individual differences in Emotion 
CRT and Emotion WM. Abbreviations: CRT: choice reaction time, DMN: default mode network, FC: 
functional connectivity, FDR: false discovery rate, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, N
-
: negative network 
mask, N
+
: positive network mask, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, SGT: self-generated thought, TPJ: 
temporoparietal junction, WM: working memory.  
Table 6-7. Functional connectivity peaks for PCC and mPFC for Emotion SGT, CRT > WM task 
See Figure 6-9 for abbreviations.  
Relation Seed Code Brain Region 
Peak region 
Peak voxel 
(z-value) 
MNI Coordinates 
p(FDR-
corr) 
cluster 
size (k) 
x y z 
CRT > WM  
PCC A mPFC 0.01 325 4.33 -4 42 10 
mPFC 
B right TPJ 0.005 350 4.69 54 -48 18 
C PCC 0.001 489 3.94 4 -56 56 
CRT increase 
PCC D mPFC < 0.001 591 4.37 -6 36 8 
mPFC 
E right TPJ 0.013 312 4.8 54 -48 18 
F cerebellum 0.034 243 4.6 -10 -62 -48 
G precuneus < .001 991 4.33 4 -56 56 
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6.3.2.4 Hypothesis 3: Interaction between content and context in SGT neural 
correlates 
Finally, we investigated the role of the interaction between the content and context 
in the relation between SGT and FC patterns. In particular, we explored whether Future 
and Past SGT had distinct neural correlates when generated during the CRT and WM tasks 
(Table 6-8). We found a significant interaction between SGT type (Past > Future) and 
cognitive task (CRT > WM) for the mPFC seed, with increased FC to the right SMG (k = 
321, Figure 6-10a). When overlapping the significant cluster on mPFC N
+
 (pale red) and 
N
-
 (pale blue), we found that it was located at the junction between the two. As can be seen 
on the scatterplots showing the relation between individual differences in SGT and in FC, 
Future SGT generated in both the CRT and WM tasks predicted a negative correlation 
between mPFC and right SMG, whereas Past SGT in the CRT task was linked to a positive 
correlation and Past SGT in the WM with a negative correlation. Post-hoc analyses indeed 
revealed that increases in Past SGT during CRT were related to more FC between mPFC 
and right SMG, as well as with bilateral insula and dlPFC (Figure 6-10b). On the contrary, 
Past SGT during the WM task was linked to significant decreases in FC between mPFC 
and cuneus (Figure 6-10c).  
Table 6-8. Functional connectivity peaks for PCC and mPFC for Past > Future SGT, CRT > WM task 
See Figure 6-10 for abbreviations.  
Relation Seed Code Brain Region 
Peak region Peak 
voxel 
(z-
value) 
MNI Coordinates 
p(FDR-
corr) 
cluster 
size (k) 
x y z 
Past > Future x 
CRT > WM  
mPFC A right SMG 0.016 321 4.1 52 -32 24 
Past CRT increase mPFC 
B right anterior insula < .001 941 4.43 30 26 10 
C right SMG < .001 722 4.42 52 -32 24 
D dlPFC 0.018 229 4.1 -24 46 30 
E left anterior insula 0.002 374 3.61 -44 12 -4 
Past WM decrease mPFC F lingual gyrus < .001 822 3.93 -4 -92 18 
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Figure 6-10. Past > Future x CRT > WM functional connectivity patterns  
a) The Past > Future x CRT > WM contrast revealed one significant mPFC cluster located in right SMG (A). 
When overlapping the significant cluster on mPFC N
+
 and N
-
, we found that it was located at the junction 
between the two. The scatterplots indicate that Future SGT generated in both the CRT and WM tasks 
predicted a negative correlation between mPFC and right SMG, whereas Past SGT in the CRT task was 
linked to a positive correlation and Past SGT in the WM to a negative correlation. b) Past CRT scores 
significantly predicted increases in mPFC FC to the right anterior insula (B), right SMG (C), dlPFC (D) and 
left anterior insula (E). c) Past WM scores significantly predicted decreases in FC between mPFC and cuneus 
(F). Significant clusters were obtained with a cluster forming threshold k of p = .005 and FDR-corrected at q 
< .05, see Table 6-8 for more details. Scatterplots represent the averaged mPFC FC for the significant cluster 
(A) according to individual differences in Past CRT, Past WM, Future CRT and Future WM scores. 
Abbreviations: CRT: choice reaction time, dlPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, FC: functional connectivity, 
FDR: false discovery rate, mPFC: medial prefrontal cortex, N
-
: negative network mask, N
+
: positive network 
mask, PCC: posterior cingulate cortex, SGT: self-generated thought, SMG: supramarginal gyrus, WM: 
working memory.  
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6.4 Discussion  
The current study aimed to test the hypothesis that different types of SGT are 
related to different neurocognitive substrates, as proposed by the component process 
hypothesis (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2015). To this end, we used rsfMRI and seed-based whole-brain FC in order 
to explore whether the content and context of SGT were associated with individual 
differences in DMN FC patterns.  
6.4.1 DMN and perceptual decoupling in SGT  
The PCA computed on the current dataset allowed us to identify three distinct types 
of SGT (Future, Past and Emotion SGT), thus replicated previous findings (Chapter 3; 
Chapter 4; Chapter 5 and Engert et al., 2014; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013). First, 
we observed that MTT was related to increases in within-DMN FC. These results add to a 
growing body of evidence showing that the DMN is involved in SGT (Allen et al., 2013; 
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010, 2014; Christoff et al., 2009; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013; Stawarczyk & 
D’Argembeau, 2015; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, et al., 2011) and this pattern is also 
consistent with studies highlighting the role of the DMN in episodic processes (Addis et al., 
2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Our data also show that MTT was associated with 
reduced FC between the mPFC and visual areas (including the cuneus and lingual gyrus). 
Although mPFC and PCC are generally anti-correlated with visual areas, our data indicate 
that SGT may require a supplementary dissociation between sensory areas and the DMN. 
These data are consistent with the perceptual decoupling hypothesis, which states that SGT 
requires the decoupling of attentional processes from externally-generated information in 
order to insulate the stream of thought (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, 2013a; 
Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011). In addition, these results also support the component 
process hypothesis and in particular the claim that specific sub-processes are selected and 
other inhibited during the generation of SGT (Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Taken together, these findings highlight that our seed-
based FC approach yields results that are consistent with previously published studies.  
6.4.2 Role of content and context in SGT neural correlates   
In support for hypothesis 1, our results show that individual differences in SGT 
types were related to individual differences in PCC and mPFC FC patterns. In particular, 
Emotion SGT was associated with the specific recruitment of the OFC / vmPFC. This is in 
line with previous studies showing that the OFC is involved in the spontaneous generation 
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of emotional thoughts (Tusche, Smallwood, Bernhardt, & Singer, (2014), as well as in 
emotion processing and emotion regulation (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; Etkin, Egner, 
& Kalisch, 2011; Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). In addition, we observed that Past SGT, 
compared to Future SGT, was associated with an increase in FC between the mPFC and 
frontal regions (ACC, bilateral Insula and mlPFC) as well as a decrease in FC between 
PCC and BA8. These results are in line with Mason, Bar, et al. (2007) who reported that 
brain activity in these regions was predicted by past thinking tendencies. Previous studies 
have reported the involvement of the ACC in SGT (Bernhardt et al., 2014; Christoff et al., 
2009; Wang et al., 2009) and our data suggest that the ACC may be particularly relevant 
for past-related SGT rather than other types of thoughts. Taken together, our findings 
provide support for the hypothesis that individual differences in thought content is related 
to variations in SGT neural correlates and therefore, that different types of SGT may rely 
on different neural processes. 
Note that although these results are consistent with previous neuroimaging studies, 
discrepancies can also be observed between the current data and findings published by 
Gorgolewski et al. (2014). Using rsfMRI and a retrospective questionnaire to assess SGT 
content, they observed that past thinking was related to increased fractional amplitude of 
low frequency fluctuations (fALFF) in visual areas; they also found that both past and 
positive thinking were linked to decreases in fALFF in the mPFC. Although these results 
are at odds with our findings, it is possible that differences in the methodological 
approaches employed may have led to inconsistencies (e.g. use of FC vs. fALFF, and use 
of experience sampling vs. a retrospective questionnaire).   
Next, our data also provide evidence for the hypothesis that the context of SGT 
influences its neural correlates. We found that MTT was related to an increase in within-
DMN FC when SGT was generated during the WM task. This indicates that the 
strengthening of the DMN integrity may support the generation of MTT under more 
constraining external conditions. On the contrary, Emotion SGT was associated with 
increased within-DMN FC during the CRT task. This may be related to the observation 
that individuals generally experience more positive thoughts when performing an easy vs. 
harder task (e.g. Chapter 3; Chapter 4 and current data). Altogether, this set of results show 
that the neural correlates of SGT also varied according to the context in which they 
occurred, therefore supporting our second hypothesis.  
Finally, our results also hint at a possible interaction between the content and 
context of SGT. We observed that Past SGT (but not Future SGT) occurring during the 
CRT vs. WM task predicted increased FC between mPFC and right SMG, an area located 
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within the somatosensory cortex and overlapping with the ventral-attention network (Fox, 
Corbetta, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2006). One potential explanation for this finding can 
be provided using data published by D’Argembeau and colleagues, who found that 
memories are more vividly experienced and possess more sensory details compared to 
prospective simulations. In addition, evidence suggests that performing a concurrent task 
can impact the vividness of visual mental images (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Taken 
together, we speculate that Past SGT might be experienced more vividly when task 
demands are low (i.e. in the CRT task) and this may be supported by the specific 
recruitment of the SMG. Although future studies will be required to better understand the 
role of the right SMG in Past SGT, these data suggest that the content and context of SGT 
may interact and conjointly influence SGT neural patterns.  
In summary, our results support the three hypotheses we tested and illustrate that 
different neural correlates are related to SGT depending on the content and context of the 
thoughts. These findings are in favour of the component process hypothesis and indicate 
that specific neural processes may be recruited in order to support the variety of SGT 
experiences.  
6.4.3 Interaction between DMN and others networks in Past SGT  
In addition to supporting the component process hypothesis, our data show that 
some types of thought (in particular Past SGT) may rely on the recruitment of regions not 
traditionally considered as part of the DMN. Compared to Future SGT, Past SGT was 
linked to increased FC between mPFC and ACC, mlPFC and bilateral Insula, in line with 
results published by Mason, Bar, et al. (2007). The regions are located between the mPFC 
N
+
 and mPFC N
-
, and are anti-correlated with the PCC seed. In addition, PCC FC to BA8 
(a region of the FPN) was also reduced for Past SGT compared to Future SGT. Two 
potential explanations are provided to clarify these results.  
The first possibility is that the DMN integrity may be compromised for individuals 
with past-thinking tendencies. Indeed, Past SGT was associated with changes in FC 
between the mPFC and regions located at the junction between DMN and non-DMN areas, 
suggesting that the common segregation between DMN and other networks may be 
diminished for past thinkers. In addition, this pattern of results was observed for mPFC but 
not for PCC seed. Previous studies as well as data presented here show that the PCC is 
negatively correlated with frontal regions (including the ACC, Insula and mlPFC), whereas 
mPFC does not display significant anti-correlations (Figure 6-3; Uddin, Kelly, Biswal, 
Castellanos, & Milham, 2009). The FC between mPFC and frontal areas may therefore be 
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more easily modulated than PCC FC, facilitating the disorganization of the DMN based on 
mPFC FC changes.  
In addition, Past SGT may also rely on the interaction between the DMN and the 
salience / ventral-attention network. By examining the position of the areas involved in 
Past SGT (ACC, mlPFC, Insula), we observed that these are all overlapping with regions 
of the ventral-attention network, as defined by Yeo et al. (2011). This network is involved 
in the detection of salient stimuli and supports the subsequent redirection of attention 
(Seeley et al., 2007). Despite having been traditionally linked to externally-driven 
cognitive processes, Andrews-Hanna et al. (2014) suggest that this network may support 
the switching between externally- and internally-driven cognition, in particular during the 
occurrence of salient internally-generated information. Although preliminary, our data 
provide initial evidence for this hypothesis. Following this view, it is therefore possible 
that Past SGT may be particularly salient. Indeed, our behavioural data showing that Past 
SGT is considered as intrusive are in line with this interpretation (Chapter 5). Although 
future research will be required to shed light on the potential role of the salience network in 
Past SGT, our data provide evidence that certain types of SGT rely on the recruitment of 
additional regions outside the DMN, as previously reported (Bernhardt et al., 2014; 
Christoff et al., 2009; D’Argembeau et al., 2005; Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Mason, Bar, et 
al., 2007; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2009).  
6.4.4 Conclusions  
To conclude, the current study provides evidence that the content and context of 
SGT predict differences in neural correlates as assessed using rsfMRI. The data presented 
here support the component process hypothesis and show that different types of thoughts 
may rely on a variety of sub-processes to be generated. Investigating the neural correlates 
of separate types of SGT or under different contexts therefore provides a more refined 
characterisation of the neural processes involved in SGT. In line with previous chapters, 
the present dataset highlights that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon and that 
considering SGT characteristics allows a better understanding of the neurocognitive 
substrates supporting this subjective experience.  
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Chapter 7.  
General Discussion 
7.1 Recap of research questions  
Self-generated thought (SGT) has been traditionally considered as a homogeneous 
phenomenon although evidence described in the literature challenges this perspective. In 
particular, SGT has been associated with both advantages and disadvantages (i.e. 
heterogeneous functional outcomes) and has been linked to both increases and decreases in 
executive functions (i.e. heterogeneous cognitive correlates). To reconcile these conflicting 
findings, the current PhD proposed the hypothesis that SGT is in fact a heterogeneous 
phenomenon. In particular, we sought to test whether considering SGT as heterogeneous 
allows a better understanding of the cognitive and neural processes involved in this 
subjective experience. 
To explain how SGT heterogeneities may emerge, we proposed that different types 
of SGT exist and are characterised by differences in thought content. In addition, these 
different types may rely on distinct cognitive and neural processes, following the 
component process hypothesis (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-
Hanna, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). The current PhD aimed to test three 
predictions emerging from the view that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon: 
i. Different types of SGT can be statistically identified based on the content of the 
thoughts. This prediction was tested across all five empirical chapters.  
ii. Different types of SGT have heterogeneous functional outcomes. To this end, 
Chapter 3 examined the relation between SGT and social problem solving and 
Chapter 4 explored its relation to self-concept.  
iii. Different types of SGT have heterogeneous cognitive and neural correlates. 
This prediction was investigated in Chapter 5, where the phenomenological 
properties of SGT were examined. Finally, Chapter 6 investigated the neural 
correlates of SGT using resting state fMRI (rsfMRI).  
The following sections will highlight the evidence accumulated throughout the 
empirical chapters in favour of each prediction and will demonstrate the importance of the 
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component process hypothesis for understanding SGT heterogeneities. The discussion will 
conclude by presenting avenues for future research.  
7.2 Identification of SGT types using Principal Component Analysis  
Throughout the PhD, we have adopted a holistic approach to SGT content by taking 
into account the temporal, social and emotional dimensions of SGT when investigating 
thought content. The studies we have conducted aimed to provide novel evidence that 
distinct types of SGT could be identified based on the interaction between these three 
dimensions.  
7.2.1 Identification of types of thoughts  
Across the five empirical chapters, we found evidence that Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) can be used to statistically identify different types of SGT according to the 
content of the thoughts. Using the covariance between the probe questions, PCA assessed 
how the temporal, social and emotional dimensions interacted and in each dataset, three 
principal components (PC) were obtained
8
. These PC represent three independent types of 
thoughts, namely Future SGT, Past SGT and Emotion SGT.  
As can be seen in Figure 7-1, Emotion SGT mainly loads on negative and positive 
questions. It consists of a continuous dimension with negative and positive questions as its 
two extreme anchors. Loadings for the temporal and social questions are low for Emotion 
SGT, highlighting that the emotional dimension does not interact with the temporal and 
social dimensions. These findings therefore support previous approaches which have 
considered the emotional content of SGT as a continuous dimension (Andrews-Hanna et 
al., 2013; Song & Wang, 2012; Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013; Tusche et al., 2014). In 
addition, because Emotion SGT does not load on temporal and social questions, this 
suggests that the emotional content of SGT and other aspects such as mental time travel 
(MTT) are independent and can easily interact. An example of this interaction has been 
observed when predicting individuals’ mood levels (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013).  
                                                 
 
8
 Note that only two PC were obtained in Chapter 3 as the emotional dimension of SGT was not measured.   
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Figure 7-1. Heat maps generated from the five datasets employed in the current thesis  
Heat maps obtained from five independent datasets are regrouped (a – e, respectively data from Chapters 2 – 
6). Very similar patterns are observed across the different heat maps. In particular, Emotion SGT constitutes 
a separate PC, not interacting with the temporal and social dimensions. Future and Past SGT are defined by 
two distinct PC, and both consist of interactions between the temporal and social dimensions of SGT. Note 
that the PC have been reordered to reflect similarities across datasets. Abbreviations: PC: principal 
component, SGT: self-generated thought.  
The two other PC revealed by PCA relied on the interaction between the temporal 
and social dimensions. Future SGT loaded on future as well as self and other questions, 
and Past SGT loaded on past as well as other questions. The fact that PCA revealed two 
independent PC may seem surprising as one might expect that future and past constitute 
the two extremes of a single temporal dimension (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; McVay, 
Unsworth, McMillan, & Kane, 2013; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Song & Wang, 2012; 
Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). However, this approach implies that SGT can be either 
future or past-directed, but not simultaneously both. Contrary to this assumption, the PCA 
results show that Future and Past are in fact independent e.g. thoughts that have a high 
score on Future SGT do not necessarily have a low score on Past SGT. Indeed, thoughts 
directed towards the future require individuals to simulate potential events using 
previously acquired knowledge stored as semantic or episodic memory. We suggest that 
individuals may sometimes be aware of the past events they are using to build their 
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simulation of the future (therefore leading to SGT with both high Future and Past scores), 
and sometimes may generate Future SGT without being conscious of the source of the 
information they are manipulating (leading to SGT with high Future scores but low Past 
scores). Thus, our findings contradict traditional experience sampling approaches which 
consider Future and Past as opposite or categorical constructs (Andrews-Hanna et al., 
2013; McVay et al., 2013; Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Song & Wang, 2012; 
Stawarczyk, Cassol, et al., 2013). Our results should therefore be taken into account when 
designing thought probes targeting the temporal dimension of SGT.   
Our data also show that Future and Past SGT both involve the interaction between 
temporal and social dimensions. Based on these findings, we suggest that considering the 
temporal and social dimensions separately does not take into account the complexities of 
SGT content and as a consequence, may limit the understanding of this subjective 
experience. Previous studies have commonly considered separately different aspects of 
SGT content e.g. investigating the characteristics and functional outcomes of temporal 
thoughts (Baird et al., 2011; McVay et al., 2013; Song & Wang, 2012) or  social thoughts 
(Poerio et al., 2015) but not both simultaneously. Our PCA data however suggest that 
taking into account the covariance among different aspects of SGT content allows a better 
understanding of this experience. As a consequence, future investigations should adopt a 
more holistic approach by considering different aspects of SGT simultaneously. 
Altogether, our findings show that using a statistical approach such as PCA allows 
a more objective characterisation of different types of SGT and avoids assumptions 
commonly made in the literature. Subsequent sections will provide evidence that the types 
of SGT identified using PCA are replicable and can be validated using independent 
measures.  
7.2.2 Replication of PCA patterns  
Applying PCA to five independent datasets revealed consistent SGT patterns 
despite several differences across the samples (Figure 7-1). In particular, SGT was 
measured in two different countries (the UK and Germany) and the populations tested had 
varied demographics. The UK dataset consisted primarily of young undergraduate students, 
whereas the German datasets were obtained from individuals with a larger age range and 
more diverse occupations. Despite these population differences, similar PCA patterns were 
obtained, which suggests that the types of SGT identified using PCA are robust.  
Thoughts were also measured across different conditions and using different probes. 
SGT was assessed while participants performed an easy non-demanding Choice Reaction 
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Time (CRT) task or a more demanding Working Memory (WM) task. Nevertheless, 
similar patterns were observed across both conditions and when only one condition was 
implemented (Chapter 5). In addition, similar types of SGT were obtained despite 
substantial changes in the probing questions employed. For example Chapter 2, Chapter 4 
and Chapter 6 assessed the emotional dimension of SGT using 2 questions (negative and 
positive), whereas Chapter 5 employed a single question and Chapter 3 did not include this 
dimension. Moreover, similar thought types were obtained even when increasing the 
number of probe questions (e.g. in Chapter 5, a total of 10 questions probed SGT content 
as well as its phenomenological properties). Altogether, the studies presented in the current 
PhD show that the SGT types were replicated despite methodological changes and 
population differences, providing evidence that the thought patterns identified using PCA 
are robust.  
7.2.3 Validation using independent measures  
We validated the PCA patterns using independent measures. In particular, we found 
that Emotion SGT was related to emotion processes and individuals’ well-being. For 
example, Chapter 4 showed that Emotion SGT predicted individuals’ self-esteem and 
Chapter 5 replicated the findings that Emotion SGT was linked to depressive symptoms. 
Regarding the other types of SGT, we found that Future but not Past SGT was linked to the 
temporal dimension of self-concept and predicted individual differences in the self-
reference effect, therefore replicating previous findings (Smallwood, Schooler, et al., 2011).  
In addition to behavioural data, neuroimaging data provide further evidence 
validating the types of SGT obtained using PCA. Chapter 6 shows that Emotion SGT was 
related to increased functional connectivity (FC) between the posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC) and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a region previously identified as playing a role 
in Emotion SGT (Tusche et al., 2014) and involved in valence and reward processing 
(Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; Kringelbach, 2005). In addition, our results show that 
individual differences in MTT predicted FC within the Default Mode Network (DMN). 
These findings are in line with an extended body of literature highlighting the role of the 
DMN in SGT and in episodic processes (Addis et al., 2007; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010, 
2014; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Smallwood, Tipper, et al., 2013). 
Taken together, these findings provide further evidence that the types of SGT obtained 
using PCA are valid and reflect objective individual differences in thought content.  
  144   
7.2.4 Manipulation of SGT  
In addition to replicating and validating SGT types, our data also show that SGT 
occurrence and content can be manipulated by changing the experimental conditions. In 
particular, SGT was measured while participants performed a cognitive task under two 
conditions: a non-demanding CRT and a more demanding WM task. As a consequence of 
task difficulty, SGT scores were overall reduced during the WM compared to the CRT task, 
in particular Future and Emotion SGT whereas levels of Past SGT did not significantly 
change (Chapter 3; Chapter 4, Chapter 6). Altogether these results are in line with previous 
findings (Smallwood, Nind, et al., 2009; Smallwood, Ruby, et al., 2013; Smallwood, 
2013b; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 2011) and highlight that the PC generated by PCA are 
sensitive to task manipulations.  
In Chapter 4, we also found that priming individuals to adopt a more independent 
or more interdependent mind-set influenced the functional outcomes of different types of 
SGT. For example, Past SGT was linked to lower mood levels and poorer task 
performance only following interdependent priming. Although we did not observe 
significant differences in SGT occurrence across priming conditions, our results suggest 
that interdependent priming manipulated SGT properties and perhaps its cognitive 
correlates, therefore leading to changes in functional outcomes. This result provides further 
evidence that the SGT scores generated using PCA can capture changes induced by 
experimental manipulations.   
7.2.5 Summary of findings  
In summary, all empirical chapters provide evidence that different types of SGT 
can be identified using a statistical approach. PCA allowed us to determine how the 
temporal, social and emotional dimensions of SGT interact to make up three distinct types 
of thoughts. We replicated the PCA patterns across five independent datasets. In addition, 
the three SGT types were validated using independent measures and evidence shows that 
they were sensitive to experimental manipulations. Altogether, this demonstrates that 
different types of SGT can be identified based on the content of the thoughts, therefore 
supporting the first prediction the PhD set out to test. Next, we will review the findings in 
favour of the predictions that different types of SGT have heterogeneous functional 
outcomes and heterogeneous neurocognitive correlates.  
7.3 Heterogeneities of SGT  
Chapter 3 to Chapter 6 explored whether the different types of SGT identified using 
PCA possessed heterogeneous functional outcomes and relied on heterogeneous correlates. 
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Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focused on the functional outcomes of SGT, and 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 investigated the cognitive and neural processes of SGT in order to 
test the component process hypothesis.  
7.3.1 Heterogeneities in SGT functional outcomes  
7.3.1.1 Differences across SGT types  
Evidence accumulated in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 provide evidence that 
Future, Past and Emotion SGT have heterogeneous functional outcomes. In particular, we 
found that Emotion SGT (but not other types of SGT) was preferentially linked to emotion-
related outcomes. Positive thinking predicted increased mood levels and higher self-esteem 
(Chapter 4) as well as lower depressive symptoms (Chapter 5). These results are in line 
with previous findings and highlight that the emotional content of SGT is strongly related 
to individuals’ general well-being (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2013; Poerio et al., 2013; Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013).  
More interestingly, we found that Future and Past SGT were associated with 
different functional outcomes. For example, Future but not Past SGT predicted increased 
task performance (Chapter 3, Chapter 4). Next, we replicated the observation that Future 
but not Past SGT is linked to self-referential processes; Chapter 4 revealed that the 
temporal direction of individuals’ self-concept was predicted by their tendencies to 
generate Future SGT but not Past SGT; Chapter 5 confirmed that only Future SGT was 
related to increases in the self-referential effect (i.e. the bias individuals display towards 
remembering self-related compared to other-related words). Finally, we also found that 
Past SGT but not Future SGT was linked to decreased mood levels following 
interdependent priming. Altogether, these findings show that SGT can have heterogeneous 
functional outcomes when the content of the thoughts is taken into account, therefore 
supporting our second prediction and the claim that the content of SGT plays a significant 
role in SGT heterogeneities.   
7.3.1.2 Similarities across SGT types  
In addition to observing differences in functional outcomes across SGT types, the 
studies described in the PhD also show that Future and Past SGT can have similar 
functional outcomes under some circumstances. For example, we found that both Future 
and Past SGT had a similar relation to social problem solving as assessed using the Means 
Ends Problem Solving task (MEPS, Platt & Spivack, 1975; Svaldi, Dorn, & Trentowska, 
2011). Both types of SGT predicted significant increases in relevant means (i.e. the number 
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of steps individuals generated to reach the solution to a given problem) but decreases in 
overall efficiency (i.e. how efficient the story provided by the participant was at solving the 
given problem). In Chapter 4, we also observed that both types were linked to decreased 
task performance following interdependent priming. These results suggest that, although 
Future and Past thinking can have heterogeneous properties, similar functional outcomes 
can also be observed in certain cases.  
7.3.1.3 Interaction between SGT content and context  
Both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provide evidence that the functional outcomes of 
SGT were modulated by the context in which SGT occurred. For example, Future SGT 
predicted increased performance at the CRT but not the WM task. In addition, the link 
between Future SGT and self-concept was also compromised when individuals performed 
the WM task. However, other outcomes do not seem to be influenced by task conditions. 
For example, SGT predicted individual differences in social problem solving skills whether 
the thoughts were measured during the CRT or the WM task (Chapter 3). Similarly, 
interdependent priming led to a negative relation between Past SGT and CRT as well as 
WM task performance (Chapter 4). Although a thorough investigation of the interaction 
between content and context of SGT was beyond the scope of the current PhD, these 
results replicate previous findings and provide additional evidence that the context in 
which SGT occur may modulate the relation between SGT and its functional outcomes 
(Levinson et al., 2012; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014; Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013; 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).   
7.3.1.4 Component process hypothesis  
The previous sections highlight that different types of SGT (in particular Future and 
Past SGT) can have similar or different functional outcomes, and that these functional 
outcomes may be influenced by the context in which SGT occurred. To explain this 
complex pattern of results, we use the component process hypothesis and propose that 
specific processes are recruited according to the demands of each type of SGT (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2014; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).  
The tasks we employed to examine SGT’s functional outcomes assess specific 
cognitive processes. For example, the Twenty Statement Test used in Chapter 4 to measure 
individuals’ self-concept relies on self-referential processes. When two types of SGT have 
a similar relation to a task, this suggests that the cognitive process assessed by that task is 
involved in both types of thoughts. On the contrary, when Future and Past SGT have a 
heterogeneous relation to a task, this suggests that that process is not ubiquitously recruited 
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in these two types of SGT. Finally, when the relation between SGT and a task is only 
observed in one context but not the other (e.g. CRT or WM), this suggests that the process 
is recruited differently according to the demands of the external environment. Altogether, 
we propose that distinct types of SGT may rely on shared or distinct processes to be 
generated and that this may be modulated by the context in which SGT occurred. The 
following section will review evidence in favour of this interpretation.  
7.3.2 Cognitive and neural correlates of SGT types  
The last two studies conducted during the PhD aimed to test the component process 
hypothesis and more particularly, the prediction that different types of SGT rely on 
heterogeneous neurocognitive substrates. To this end, Chapter 5 investigated the 
phenomenological properties of SGT and Chapter 6 explored its neural correlates using 
rsfMRI.   
7.3.2.1 Cognitive correlates of SGT  
In Chapter 5, we investigated the phenomenological properties of different types of 
SGT in order to shed light on their cognitive correlates. Applying PCA to the four 
phenomenological questions revealed three PC: modality of SGT (whether thoughts were 
in the form of words or in images), intrusiveness (whether they were considered intrusive 
by individuals) and vagueness (whether thoughts were rather vague or specific).  Our 
results revealed that positive thoughts were in general more specific and more in the form 
of images than in the form of words. In addition, we observed that both Future and Past 
SGT were considered as more intrusive or more spontaneous. Although speculative, this 
suggests that associative rather than controlled episodic processes may be recruited during 
MTT. This may therefore explain why both Future and Past SGT were linked to the 
creative component of social problem solving (i.e. relevant means). Indeed, creativity 
relies on the spontaneous generation of new ideas and benefits from associative rather than 
controlled processes. Thus, the relation between episodic SGT and problem solving may be 
observed because of shared associative processes. We also explored the relation between 
individual differences in SGT content and in SGT phenomenology. We found that 
individuals who had a tendency to generate episodic SGT also tended to use visual imagery 
rather than inner speech, suggesting that these individuals may rely more on imagery 
processes rather than semantic processes to generate their thoughts.  
Taken together, these findings reveal similarities and differences in terms of 
phenomenological properties between different types of SGT. This therefore provides 
preliminary evidence that the cognitive correlates of SGT may vary according to the 
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content of the thoughts. Nevertheless, the study focused on four phenomenological 
properties (intrusiveness, inner speech, visual imagery and specificity) and we believe that 
subsequent studies should be conducted to assess the role of additional phenomenological 
features in SGT heterogeneities. 
7.3.2.2 Neural correlates of SGT  
In Chapter 6, we assessed the neural correlates of SGT using rsfMRI. In particular, 
we investigated whether the FC of the two mains hubs of the DMN varied according to 
individual differences in SGT content. We observed that Emotion SGT was linked to 
increased FC between the PCC and OFC, a region traditionally involved in emotion 
processing as well as valence and reward appraisal (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; 
Kringelbach, 2005). In addition to replicating Tusche et al. (2014) findings, this highlights 
that emotion processes occurring spontaneously or triggered by external information (e.g. 
during a task) share similar neural correlates. Thus, these results are in favour of the 
component process hypothesis.  
Next, we also found that Past and Future SGT had distinct neural correlates. Past 
SGT was linked to increased FC between the mPFC and frontal regions (e.g. anterior 
cingulate cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral insula), in line with Mason, Bar, 
et al. (2007). Although these results support the prediction that different types of SGT rely 
on specific neural processes, future studies are required to shed light on the role these 
regions play in Past SGT and how they may influence its functional outcomes.  
Finally, similarities between Past and Future SGT were also observed. We found 
that both types of thoughts were associated with increased FC within the DMN. These 
findings are consistent with previous studies showing that MTT relies on the DMN 
(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009) and that prospection and memory 
share neural correlates (Addis et al., 2007; Buckner, 2010; Schacter et al., 2007). We also 
observed that both types of SGT were linked to reduced FC between mPFC and the visual 
cortex. This result supports the perceptual decoupling hypothesis, which suggests that SGT 
requires a reduction in sensory information processing in order to insulate the stream of 
thought (Barron et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015; Smallwood, Brown, et al., 
2011). Taken together, these findings suggest that both types of SGT share neural 
correlates, with the episodic system providing the content of SGT and perceptual 
decoupling allowing insulation from external distraction.  
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7.3.2.3 Summary of findings  
In summary, the findings described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 show that different 
types of SGT can rely on shared or distinct cognitive and neural correlates. In addition, our 
findings suggest that these differences and similarities may underlie SGT heterogeneous 
functional outcomes. Taken together, these findings illustrate the component process 
hypothesis and indicate that the content of SGT plays a role in determining the processes 
involved in SGT. These results provide strong evidence in favour of our hypothesis that 
SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon. We hope that future studies will build on our 
findings and to this end, we will describe potential avenues for future research in the 
following section.  
7.4 Avenues for future research  
7.4.1 Identification of other types of SGT  
The current PhD focused on the identification of distinct types of SGT based on the 
interaction between the temporal, social and emotional dimensions of SGT. We found that 
the three types of SGT identified possessed heterogeneous functional outcomes and 
heterogeneous correlates, therefore supporting our hypothesis that SGT is a heterogeneous 
phenomenon. Although the dimensions we focused on explained significant amount of 
variance in independent variables (e.g. task performance, neural correlates and so on), we 
acknowledge that additional dimensions may also be important to explain SGT 
heterogeneities, and future studies investigating different dimensions of SGT will likely 
find additional types of SGT. Our studies highlight that PCA was able to generate 
meaningful types of SGT based on probe data assessing a variety of features (including the 
content and the phenomenology of SGT), suggesting that this technique can be applied to a 
wide range of variables assessing SGT and is not limited to the ones we examined. To this 
end, we hope that the statistical technique we have employed throughout this PhD will be 
used in the future to identify additional types of SGT and further the understanding of this 
subjective experience.  
7.4.2 Exploration of SGT neural correlates  
As described in Chapter 6, individual differences in SGT related to individual 
differences in neural correlates as assessed using rsfMRI. These data as well as previous 
findings confirm that the subjective reports individuals provide about their thoughts can be 
corroborated by objective neuroimaging measures (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Christoff 
et al., 2009; Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Mason, Norton, et al., 2007). In addition, these 
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findings as well as other studies (Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Schaefer et al., 2014) provide 
preliminary evidence that distinct types of SGT possess specific neural signatures. These 
findings therefore provide a strong basis for further exploration of the similarities and 
differences between thought types.  
In particular, although the spatial resolution provided by rsfMRI and task-based 
fMRI have allowed the identification of key brain regions involved in SGT (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Christoff et al., 2009; Gorgolewski et al., 2014; Mason, Norton, et al., 
2007), their slow time resolution have limited the understanding of the thoughts’ dynamics 
(e.g. onset, development and termination). We believe that employing neuroimaging 
techniques which possess higher temporal resolution (e.g. electroencephalography and 
magnetoencephalography) will provide a fruitful avenue for future research. In particular, 
knowledge about the brain regions involved in different types of SGT can be used to 
understand the dynamics of SGT. For example, recording the dynamical activations and 
deactivations of networks that have been shown to support types of SGT may allow the 
detection of switches between one type and another type of SGT at a ms time scale, or the 
onset of specific types of SGT, which is not easily identifiable using subjective reports. 
Altogether, we believe that gaining a better understanding of the neural mechanisms and 
dynamics of SGT is an exciting avenue for future research.  
7.4.3 Better understanding of clinical disorders  
Finally, we hope that our research findings will have a positive impact on the 
understanding of mental health disorders. These disorders (e.g. depression, anxiety, 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorders and so on) are characterised by deleterious thought and 
behavioural patterns causing individuals to poorly function in daily life (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). We suggest that a better understanding of SGT in healthy 
individuals allows a better comparison with clinical populations and as a consequence, 
may lead to improvements in the treatment and handling of these deleterious conditions. 
7.4.3.1 Comparing SGT between healthy and clinical populations  
A more thorough identification of different types of SGT and their functional 
outcomes in healthy populations provides a baseline on which to compare thought patterns 
in clinical populations and therefore allows an easier identification of deleterious 
tendencies (e.g. exacerbation in one type of SGT). In addition, data from healthy 
populations can also be used to formulate and test clearer predictions regarding 
psychopathological changes (e.g. “depression may be characterized by overall increases in 
negative and Past SGT, but decreases in Future SGT”).  
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7.4.3.2 Investigating differences in SGT between healthy and clinical populations  
We propose two ways in which SGT may change between healthy individuals and 
individuals suffering from mental health disorders: the occurrence of certain types of SGT 
may vary, or the types of SGT experienced may be different. 
Changes in SGT occurrence. Investigations of mental health disorders highlight 
that these illnesses are characterised by deleterious thought patterns. For example, 
depression involves the exacerbation of ruminative thoughts (i.e. negative thoughts focused 
on the past) whereas suicidal tendencies involve a lack of future-directed thoughts. These 
two examples illustrate how the occurrence of certain types of SGT may vary compared to 
baseline levels in healthy populations.  
Changes in SGT types. Additional differences may emerge in terms of the thought 
types identified. In particular, we suggest that the temporal, social and emotional 
dimensions of SGT may interact differently in clinical populations compared to healthy 
individuals. For example, PCA computed on data obtained from individuals suffering from 
depression might reveal one “ruminative” PC loading on past and negative ratings, rather 
than two distinct PC (Past SGT, Emotion SGT) observed in healthy individuals. To 
estimate differences in SGT patterns, other statistical approaches than PCA may be 
employed. In particular, Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA, 
Hirschfeld, Datteln, Brachel, & Bochum, 2014) can be used to compare the patterns 
obtained across different populations. Using structural equation modelling, MGCFA 
estimates regression parameters for each variable and computes latent variables. For 
example, population differences may be identified when the parameters’ loadings or 
intercept are significantly different. Using MGCFA to identify similarities and differences 
in SGT patterns may shed light on SGT changes in deleterious conditions.  
7.4.3.3 Improving the diagnosis and treatments of mental health disorders 
It is possible that applying the experience sampling approach to a clinical context 
may prove beneficial. Clinical assessments usually consist of self-assessment 
questionnaires and interviews, which may lead to overlooking certain symptoms and as a 
consequence, may bias the evaluations of clinicians towards one or another diagnosis. As 
experience sampling allows the repeated measures of different features of SGT, thought 
patterns can be assessed in a broader and unbiased way, therefore potentially improving the 
diagnosis of mental disorders.  
We hope that a better characterisation of the changes in SGT patterns between 
healthy and clinical populations will in turn improve the diagnosis and treatments of 
mental health disorders. In particular, disorders which share similar symptoms are often 
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misdiagnosed as one another and inappropriate treatments are administered to patients. For 
example, bipolar spectrum disorders are frequently misdiagnosed as unipolar depression 
because manic symptoms are overlooked by patients and clinicians. As a consequences, 
patients are prescribed with anti-depressants which lead to increases in manic symptoms 
rather than improvements (Ghaemi, Ko, & Goodwin, 2002; Matza, Rajagopalan, 
Thompson, & de Lissovoy, 2005). We hope that a better description of patients’ thought 
patterns will improve their diagnostic and the administration of treatments.   
7.5 General conclusions  
The current thesis tested the hypothesis that SGT is a heterogeneous phenomenon, 
with the aim to gain a better understanding of SGT’s functional outcomes and 
neurocognitive substrates. Using PCA, we systematically identified distinct types of SGT 
based on the temporal, social and emotional dimensions of thought content. We observed 
that Future, Past and Emotion SGT possess heterogeneous functional outcomes. In addition, 
we provide initial evidence that distinct SGT types rely on specific cognitive and neural 
processes, therefore supporting the component process hypothesis. Altogether, the 
empirical findings described in the current thesis strongly support our hypothesis that SGT 
is a heterogeneous phenomenon. Although subsequent investigations will be required to 
further the characterisation of the neurocognitive substrates supporting spontaneous 
cognition, the current thesis highlights that considering distinct types of thoughts allows a 
better description of SGT and advances the general understanding of this subjective 
experience.  
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